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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The South African Food Sovereignty Campaign (SAFSC) emerged during early 2015 
in response to a range of brutalities affecting a large proportion of South Africa’s poor, 
particularly small-scale farmers and swathes of the population who are at risk of going 
hungry, or who are currently experiencing powerlessness associated with hunger. Of 
particular importance to the campaign is the unjust, unsafe and unsustainable food 
system (Cock, 2014:53), which actors in the campaign argue requires fundamental 
transformation before it can cater to the needs of the hungry in South Africa over the 
needs of profit for corporations.  
 
This research, which makes use of the SAFSC as a case study, aims to explore how 
the food sovereignty framework is being pursued by grassroots activists in South 
Africa to address hunger at its roots, namely at the food system level. To set the scene 
for the research I first describe the South African food system to reveal its brutalities 
in the form of corporate concentration, land dispossession, malnutrition, environmental 
degradation and hunger, to name a few. Thereafter I explore current solutions 
undertaken by the state, business and NGOs which aim to address hunger. After 
presenting these policies and programmes I provide a food sovereignty critique of 
them, showing how despite their reach and at times their valuable contribution to 
nutrition in a highly malnourished country, South Africa still remains largely food 
insecure (and unsovereign). This is because often policy and programmes do not 
address the root causes of hunger, namely the lack of democracy in the food system 
– I elaborate on this root cause in the sections below. Finally, I explore the SAFSC, a 
campaign which came together to unite grassroots’ struggles for a more just and 
sustainable food system. I explore the genesis of the campaign, the actors in the 
campaign and show how they understand food sovereignty and further practise it to 
provide systemic alternatives to the current unjust food system.   
 
Below, I discuss this unjust food system and show how my research fills a gap in the 
literature on food sovereignty, particularly on food sovereignty in South Africa, which 
is currently sparse. Thereafter, I further elaborate the research objectives, and finally 
conclude this chapter by outlining the structure of this research report. Below, I begin 
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my discussion on the unjust South African food system by outlining the story of a bread 
distributor.  
 
The story of a bread distributor 
 
A dedicated bread distributor for Tiger Brands and Premier Foods, Imraahn 
Mukaddam would wake up at 4:30 every morning to receive deliveries of bread and 
milk for clients in risky, crime-ridden areas in Cape Town, areas where Tiger Brands 
and Premier foods decided not to service. One day during December 2006, 
Mukaddam noticed that three bread companies, Tiger Brands, Premier Foods and 
Pioneer Foods had announced exactly the same bread increase at the same time, and 
simultaneously reduced the distributor discounts by the same amount (The Star, 
4/11/15). Four years later, after Mukaddam had approached the Competition 
Commission, who had referred some cases to the Commission and Competition 
Tribunal, the bread companies were found guilty. It emerged that during December 
2006, the three bread companies were part of a bread cartel in contravention of the 
provisions of the Competition act (Mongalo & Nyembezi, 2012:368). The extent of the 
price-fixing was much more serious than what was thought, and the commission 
established that in most cases consumers were paying 25 per cent more for a loaf of 
bread than if the market had been even (The Star, 4/11/15).  
 
Mukaddam made history in the above events as he exposed the largest settlement 
over uncompetitive behaviour in the history of South Africa. But after the bread 
companies paid their fines, what consolation did the consumers and distributors like 
Mukaddam receive? Even when Mukaddam applied for a class-action certification 
against the three bread companies for the ‘compensation of the consumers and 
distributors who were detrimentally affected by the conduct of the companies in 
contravention of the competition act’, the application was dismissed (Mongalo & 
Nyembezi, 2012:368).  
 
Sometimes it is not colluding corporations who are to blame, but it is the very 
‘government’ put in place to oversee and care for its people which causes gross 
violations when it comes to food. The story of the ‘great potato famine’ in Ireland is 
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worth mentioning. Between 1845 and 1849 over one million people died of hunger, 
while another one and a half million had no choice but to emigrate. It was thought that 
a natural disaster in the form of potato blight caused the epidemic which led to famine 
and widespread hunger. However, interestingly, during that time, Ireland was a net 
exporter of food. What is more, a letter to the prime minister in 1946 noted that ‘for 46 
years the people of Ireland [had] been feeding those of England with the choicest 
produce of their agriculture and pasture; and while they thus exported their wheat and 
their beef in profusion, their own food became gradually deteriorated… until the mass 
of the peasantry was exclusively thrown on the potato.’ What becomes evident from 
this letter is that the majority of the poor were vulnerable to potato blight because under 
British rule their impoverishment had reduced their diet to potatoes alone as opposed 
to being dependent on a variety of crops (Lappé et al., 1997:15). Other examples of 
devastating human-made famines include those of the regimes of China and the 
USSR in the 20th century. Although droughts occur on a regular basis in Russia and 
the Soviet Union, the Soviet Famine of 1932-33 occurred during a time when such 
droughts were not severe. The cause of famine and starvation of between five and 
eight million people was instead due to a combination of factors, including a lower than 
average harvest, with an increased demand for food caused by forced collectivisation, 
industrialisation and urbanisation, coupled with the grain exports by the Soviet Union 
at the same time (Tauger, 2001:4). China’s example is similar, where famine was 
initiated by political policies that diverted labour from farming, and where government 
refused to recognise the reality of the problem where 45 million people died in a period 
from 1958-62, and yet China still maintained food exports (Dikötter, 2010:3). 
 
How did we get here?  
 
How did we get here, to a place of vast inequality, exploitation and scandal, where the 
poor remain hungry and hardest hit by shocks, food crises, price hikes and outright 
collusion? How did we arrive at a place where profit matters more than people. Price-
fixing and ‘famine’ are just two of many examples of exploitation of the country’s 
poorest, most vulnerable and as a result, hungry. Deeper roots of such exploitation 
include the commodification of food, displacement of people from their land, and 
intellectual property rights on nature’s gifts, namely seeds. In any event, it is the 
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poorest who suffer most, no matter the reparations of the colluding companies, 
business or government, for example. There are indeed links between these injustices 
and hunger that people fail to see and that are worth mentioning, but first we turn to 
understand this hunger as it plays out in South Africa. 
 
Half the population at risk 
 
Only until humanity has solved the most basic human problem – how to 
ensure that every one of us has food for life – we cannot consider 
ourselves fully human.   (Levine in Lappé and Collins, 1988:6) 
 
South Africans have a long way to go before they can realise their humanity. A recent 
Oxfam report estimates that in South Africa, a country of 53 million, more than half of 
the population lives in such precarious conditions that they are at risk of hunger. The 
number of those currently facing hunger in South Africa is roughly half this amount, 
fourteen million. While South Africa’s hungry only account for 1.7 per cent of the 
world’s total hungry population – which during the period 2012-2014 was at around 
805 million people (FAO, 2014:4), the percentage of hungry in South Africa (26 per 
cent) is far above the world average of 11.3 per cent. Furthermore, while the situation 
of hunger in the world is improving, Sub Saharan Africa remains the region with the 
highest food insecurity prevalence, and this prevalence is worsening (FAO, 2014:11). 
With such rates of hunger, it becomes clear why theorists claim that hunger, 
particularly urban hunger, is one of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century 
(Crush and Frayne, 2010a:6). It is for this reason that the persistence of hunger in 
developing nations such as South Africa requires continual exploration, as do 
approaches to eradicate it.  
 
Back in South Africa, where ‘fourteen million at risk in a land of plenty’ only makes it 
to page fifteen in the Saturday Star (22/03/15), the scale of hunger is being 
exacerbated and is creating divided, dehumanised and conflict-prone societies 
(Satgar, 2015). Surely hunger of such a scale should feature on the front page every 
day; especially in a country where hunger is ‘hidden’ behind definitions of food security 
and in reports that state that South Africa is a food secure nation. South Africa is 
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indeed a food secure nation because within South Africa there are enough calories to 
adequately feed every one of the 53 million citizens. But the problem is that still so 
many lack access to these abundant calories (Oxfam, 2014:10), and still fourteen 
million go hungry on a daily basis. While these numbers, when exposed, serve well to 
shock us, even if only on page fifteen of the newspaper, they can be misleading as 
they restrict one’s vision to view solutions to this hunger in terms of numbers alone. 
For example, if there are five hundred hungry people in a community, the simple 
solution is to provide five hundred packages of food with the correct amount of calories 
to that community. This solution is insufficient because it first, perpetuates 
dependency, and second, food is more than a calorie count, it has social value, 
traditions, meaning and importantly, nutritional value associated with it. Furthermore, 
viewing hunger in terms of numbers tends to numb us to the real people behind these 
figures who experience real emotions linked directly to hunger (Lappé and Collins: 
1988:3). As a result, numbers can also distance us from what is actually very close to 
us, emotions that we have also felt, as I discuss below.  
 
Hunger as powerlessness 
 
Lappé and Collins (1988:2-3) sought to understand why hunger existed in a world of 
plenty. While undertaking research they established that they could get closer to the 
answer if they understood the roots of hunger. For them a clue to the roots of hunger 
lay in the perceptions and emotions of those experiencing hunger. They established 
that hunger translates into anguish, grief, humiliation and fear. Ultimately hunger 
becomes for many a symbol of powerlessness. Once we perceive hunger as a lack of 
power it is then that we begin to see its roots. Lappé and Collins (1988:3) encourage 
a thought experiment. When you or I feel powerless, what is the cause of it? It is often 
when we feel out of control of our lives, lacking the power to protect ourselves or those 
we love. From this simple thought experiment, they further probe, that if powerless lies 
at the heart of hunger, what are its causes? The answer for them is not a scarcity of 
land or food, but rather a scarcity of democracy. This finding gives a new dimension 
to the way that theorists look at hunger.  
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When we look to South Africa, an Oxfam (2014:6) study confirms these findings as 
hunger is described by people who experience it as a sense of hopelessness, despair 
and something that deprives people of dignity and creates ‘genocide of the mind’. In 
light of the above, if the state of hunger in South Africa is thus viewed not as a 
percentage of the population, but rather as a form of hopelessness, powerlessness 
and despair, then solutions would not (only) involve a certain number of relief 
packages (in the short term), but could instead be framed as approaches that increase 
the power of the hungry and marginalised. Food system and food sovereignty theorists 
echo this sentiment and apply it to a food system analysis, revealing that the lack of 
democracy in the food system has an even deeper cause, and this takes root in the 
concentration of power in the corporate food regime.  
 
The corporate food regime – concentration of power at the root of hunger 
 
The corporate food regime is theorised by Friedman and McMichael to be the root 
cause of contemporary hunger. I discuss the food regime theory and various 
frameworks of hunger in the literature review of this report so I will merely describe the 
corporate food regime and a few of its brutalities here.  
 
A defining feature of the corporate food regime is that it places faith in neoliberal 
market policies and corporatisation of agriculture. Under such a regime, the state 
gradually cedes its power and responsibility to international financial institutions and 
transnational corporations. Furthermore, as it is linked to globalisation, the corporate 
food regime strives for and enables the removal of social and political barriers to the 
free flow of capital in food and agriculture, and ensures this by the institutionalisation 
of the World Trade Organisation’s agreement on agriculture. This regime has led to 
neoliberal policies that encourage agribusiness consolidation, dismantling of 
marketing boards and the elimination of small-scale farmer subsidies. This has in turn 
led to the displacement of small-scale farmers, and the undermining of local means of 
subsistence (McMichael, 2009:287). Further, as a result of concentrated power, the 
corporate food regime is able to deal out brutalities to those with no voice or power to 
appeal. These harsh realities include increased hunger, malnutrition and obesity as a 
result of a shift from more indigenous diets to modernised and processed ones – this 
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is referred to as a ‘nutrition transition’. Brutalities also include, the erosion of small-
scale farmers’ control over seed, leading to dependence on Genetically Modified (GM) 
seeds and pesticides and thus resulting in the degradation of nature and health, to 
name a few of these brutalities. Yet while the corporate regime has produced these 
phenomena, it has also evoked something positive, namely another type of power, 
expressed in the food sovereignty alternative, as I discuss below.  
 
The food sovereignty alternative and people’s power 
 
In response to the above injustices and brutalities, various grassroots movements 
have emerged to challenge the system that upholds inequality as they envision 
‘fundamental changes in the basis of modern society’ (Handy, 2007 in Wittman et al., 
2011:4). One such example is food sovereignty, an ideal that originated amongst a 
peasant movement in the global South, named La Via Campesina (translated as ‘the 
peasants’ way’). This movement of peasants promoting food sovereignty is now one 
of the largest international civil society movements globally, and is making great 
strides in advocating for change in the current broken food system. I describe food 
sovereignty in more detail below. 
 
While food sovereignty initially emerged as a rural-based counter movement to 
neoliberal polices, it has shifted to urban areas too as the corporate regime has 
entered a phase of multiple crises, including rampant hunger, environmental and 
social crises (McMichael, 2014a:11). As such, the call for a new food system emanates 
from current inequalities caused by the neoliberal agenda, and more specifically from 
the way in which its policies unfavourably impact food systems and the sovereignty of 
people to determine their own food requirements.  
 
Food sovereignty proponents argue that policies under the household food security 
framework, (the framework currently used to inform many government interventions, 
including in South Africa) do not offer any genuine possibility for changing the current 
system and reducing the power inequities that exist in the social, political and 
economic structures of society (Wittman et al., 2011:3). These policies simply try to 
ensure that there is enough food available and accessible to every household, without 
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questioning the power relations, the environmental impact and the social impact 
involved in producing and distributing that food. Food security sees food aid, financial 
aid and industrial agriculture as vital means to ensure food security.  
 
In contrast, food sovereignty embodies a political struggle for the right to food, centred 
on democracy and justice, calling for democratisation of the food system by 
relocalising markets and governance in favour of the poor and underserved (Holt-
Giménez and Shattuck 2010:76, McMichael 2010:174; McMichael, 2014a:7; Via 
Campesina, 1996). Importantly all of this is to be undertaken with a deep appreciation 
for nature. Food sovereignty thus requires ‘agrarian reform in favour of small 
producers and the landless; the reorganisation of global food trade to prioritise local 
markets and self-sufficiency; much greater controls over corporations in the global 
food chain; and the democratisation of international financial institutions’ (Branford, 
2011:3). Food sovereignty comprises of a vision in which decisions on how food is 
cultivated, processed and traded are handed back to the people as power is reclaimed 
from those currently exercising largely unbridled control, namely the few large 
agribusiness corporations who are promoted and maintained by markets, 
governments and international regulators such as the World Trade Organisation 
(Wittman, 2011:3; Handy & Fehr, 2011:58; McMichael, 2010:171; Branford, 2011:3).  
 
Food sovereignty movements worldwide, including La Via Campesina in the South 
and the National Farmers’ Union in Canada in the North, express a range of the 
abovementioned demands, and undertake various activities to engage with 
consumers, workers, producers and other organisations, who are increasingly 
becoming aware of the importance of domestic food systems (McMichael, 2015:157). 
Where South Africa fits in to this international picture today is still to be determined as 
the literature and research on food sovereignty in South Africa is sparse. Nevertheless, 
the need for food sovereignty alternatives are already being proposed by various 
actors in South Africa as many of the issues that prompted the emergence of the food 
sovereignty alternative internationally are deeply felt in South Africa too. It must be 
emphasised that it is no longer only landless peasants and small-scale farmers who 
are feeling the brutalities of the food system. Increasingly, as the corporate regime 
expands, poor, young, consumers, farm-workers, business-men, students, shop 
attendants, commercial farmers and small-scale farmers alike are implicated. For 
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example, environmental degradation, a nutrition transition, rising food prices, and a 
broader set of crises as a result of the neoliberal agenda, such as climate change; and 
an unjust agrarian structure affects everyone. This further shows the potential that 
food sovereignty has to benefit all of these people in South Africa. And while the same 
brutalities are being felt by a host of people in South Africa, this does not mean that 
food sovereignty will be expressed in the same way as it has been in other countries 
that have been researched. Neither will its expressions remain constant, as I discuss 
below.  
 
While food sovereignty has a clear goal of transforming the food system to eradicate 
the abovementioned crises, it is also quite an elastic discourse and practice because 
the food regime itself is continuously evolving and restructuring. As such, food 
sovereignty embodies movement and it is an uneasy and organic process. It is also 
not a movement concerned with clear-cut solutions, rather, it incorporates a wide 
range of ideals of a multi-faceted counter-movement which is gradually feeling its way 
into the future (McMichael, 2015: 200).  
 
As food sovereignty is gradually taking root in South Africa its expressions cannot be 
studied and extrapolated from other similar developing countries. This is simply 
because food sovereignty movements are determined largely by local dynamics 
(Desmarais & Wittman, 2014:1156). It is for this reason that the emergence of the food 
sovereignty campaign in South Africa, and the local dynamics of the South African 
food system require exploration. Furthermore, it is of particular importance that the 
voice and choice of small-scale farmers be made known, in order for the movement to 
address their challenges effectively. As such I seek to include some of the voices of 
food sovereignty actors and activists in South Africa to inform my research. Further 
aims of the research are discussed below.  
 
Aims of the research 
 
This research explores approaches to address hunger in South Africa. By viewing the 
corporate food regime as the root of the crises, I show how current policies and 
interventions in post-apartheid South Africa are failing in various ways to bring about 
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the desired changes. This is, as I argue in this research, because hunger has been 
produced by, exacerbated by, and cannot be eradicated under the current capitalist, 
neoliberal South African food regime which continues to distort power concentration 
into the hands of an elite few in the food system. Instead, as the food sovereignty 
proponents make clear, a ‘just transition’ is required to usher in a new regime, one that 
is based on eco-socialist principles and, in terms of the food regimes, one that 
embraces a more holistic food sovereignty framework that seeks to disrupt the status 
quo of power distribution. Food sovereignty is unlike the common food security 
framework that sees hunger in numerical terms, and which leads to further 
concentration of power as policy does nothing to challenge the power in the current 
neoliberal regime. 
 
This research also explores a South African case study. Because literature on food 
sovereignty in South Africa is sparse, I document how in the margins of the crisis, 
alternatives to the corporate regime and its brutalities are emerging. These 
alternatives are being coordinated and scaled up by a nascent campaign, namely the 
South African Food Sovereignty Campaign (SAFSC).  This research thus provides a 
detailed report of the emergence of the campaign, the actors in the campaign and their 
perceptions or understandings of food sovereignty.  
 
The South African Food Sovereignty Campaign is a grassroots campaign that 
emerged in early 2015 in response to the crises of hunger. It was the project of the 
Solidarity Economy Movement and the grassroots NGO, the Cooperative and Policy 
Alternative Center (COPAC). The SAFSC is comprised of various organisations that 
are already working on the ground in their various fields to create awareness about 
alternatives in different areas, including in the agrarian space, in mining affected 
communities and with small-scale farmers, to name a few. I have chosen this case 
study as it is an active, nascent campaign that is operating at a national level. While 
other food sovereignty campaigns and movements do exist in South Africa, they are 
in most cases regional or local projects and on their own have not been able to wield 
sufficient power to engage at a national scale.  
 
The research thus has two aims. First, I aim to explore the South African food system 
and reveal its inherent crises embedded in the corporate food system, as a result of 
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both apartheid policy and current neoliberal policy. I explore these crises and solutions 
to them in order to provide a food sovereignty critique of such policies and various 
approaches at eradicating hunger. Second, I aim to explore food sovereignty in South 
Africa as the SAFSC attempts to initiate a campaign to bring about greater awareness, 
create farmer networks, and fight for a fundamentally different food system; one that 
is more just, democratic and anti-capitalist.  
 
Two key factors motivate this research, and these are linked to the nature of the unjust, 
unsafe and unsustainable food system in South Africa. The first motivation is the state 
of hunger in South Africa, and the second is the state of the environment. First, the 
hunger situation in South Africa is not getting any better as her citizens remain hungry, 
malnourished and are becoming increasingly obese. I have discussed this above, but 
it is worth stating again that even though a group of South Africans, comprising of forty 
per cent of the population eat the correct amount of recommended calories, the 
calories that this group eats have so little nutrition, that they actually leave one 
malnourished (SANHANES, 2013:170). Furthermore, South Africa is a ‘fat, hungry 
nation’ as it falls among the top 20 most overweight countries in the world (Stassen, 
2015), and this is as a result of excess calories, but too little nutrition. Thus the situation 
is very unsafe (Cock, 2014:53).  
 
Not only are our unhealthy eating practices harming our bodies, but they are also 
harming the environment, and this is the second motivation; the environment is not 
getting any better. This is because the current corporate regime’s industrial agriculture 
and food-processing practices are anti-ecological and unsustainable. As a result, 
ecological disasters associated with conventional agricultural production are 
proliferating. These include pollution of surface water and ground water with 
pesticides, nitrates, phosphates and sediments, and contamination of food. In addition, 
crop farmlands are experiencing nutrient depletion, while nutrient rich wastes are 
accumulating to dangerous levels in large scale animal production facilities (Magdoff 
and Tokar, 2010:13). Findings from the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation 
further reveal that the world has on average 60 years left of growing crops if current 
production methods continue unaltered (The Guardian, 25/03/15). Not only is our soil 
being depleted of nutrients, and polluted with pesticides for example, but industrial 
agriculture farming practices that heavily rely on excessive fossil fuel use in the 
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transportation and processing of food are all contributing to a more toxic and 
unsustainable future for the environment and all who depend on it (Magdoff and Tokar, 
2010:13; Via Campesina, 2008:52). Again the system is unsafe, and further 
unsustainable.  
 
What both of these rationales further point to is a food system in which food has 
become a by-product of an agricultural system that destroys nature and dehumanises 
people in its relentless drive for profit. Not only is power that is concentrated in the 
hands of the few corporations and agribusiness along the food chain playing and 
winning a zero-sum game with the poor as it profiteers out of food and exploits farm 
workers, benefitting only itself and the wielders of the power, this zero-sum game is 
also being played with nature, for in the drive for increased profits, industrial agriculture 
is eroding nature’s power which is best displayed in biodiversity of ecosystems. Slowly 
but surely nature and the poor are suffering most from this corporate food regime. This 
is unjust.  
 
But the poor, in their coordinated numbers might be able to stand together to take back 
their power, and with their eco-logical practices, give back the power to nature. Herein 
lies the potential of food sovereignty. Below I discuss the structure of this research 
project, in which I aim to, among other things, tell the story of how the SAFSC seeks 
to take back and redistribute power along the food system in a more equitable way. 
 
The structure of the research report 
 
Chapter two provides a review of the literature on hunger and various frameworks that 
have existed to combat it. These range from the right to food to the household food 
security, to the food sovereignty framework. Food regimes and food frameworks are 
described in order to explain historical food crises and solutions to them, as well as to 
contextualise and establish the roots of the current the food crisis in the contemporary 
corporate food regime. Reviewing food sovereignty literature also gives rise to 
interesting and important principles of food sovereignty that food sovereignty 
movements internationally promote. These principles (which can also serve as 
preconditions to achieving food sovereignty) are useful to inform and compare the 
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current situation in the South African food system against. The literature also 
addresses the role of the state in achieving these conditions. This is particularly 
important in South Africa where the state is gradually ceding its power to corporations 
and at the same time lacking political will to assist its most powerless citizens through 
policies of agrarian reform and comprehensive support for small-scale farmers. The 
literature also highlights different pathways by which food sovereignty has evolved, 
from the first generation of rural peasants, to a second generation that includes urban 
middle class consumers. In South Africa the SAFSC is made up of both these 
generations, as I show in chapter five. Finally, I also draw attention to the debates that 
food sovereignty has sparked in the literature (See Bernstein, 2014 and Agarwal, 
2014) to highlight recent critiques of the viability of the alternatives that the food 
sovereignty movement proposes, particularly in the ability of small-scale farmers to 
feed the world. Answers to this question conclude the literature review and present the 
gap that this research intends to fill, namely to understand the food sovereignty 
alternative in South Africa.  
 
Chapter three describes the methodology used to undertake this research. Since 
numbers tend to numb, this research provides a qualitative assessment of the food 
system and food sovereignty actors and activists’ perceptions of it, as well as a 
qualitative description of the SAFSC. To do this, research methods include desk 
review, in-depth interviews and participant observation. In this section I also describe 
how my initial plan changed with the opportunity that I was presented with, namely to 
volunteer at COPAC, the secretariat to the SAFSC. This opportunity allowed me to 
take part in various campaign activities such as organising for the national festival, 
attending activist schools and national coordination committee meetings, and taking 
part in a seed saving workshop. These opportunities further enabled me to experience 
first-hand what actors in the campaign are exposed to and gave me insight into what 
goes on in the background by the facilitators of many of the national events who also 
work at COAPC. Finally, and importantly it introduced me to various partners in the 
campaign. My tasks while volunteering included assisting with coordination, working 
on the webpage, communicating with partners telephonically and establishing and 
facilitating a food sovereignty and climate justice forum at Wits University. Insight 
gained during my six months of volunteering provided me with invaluable information 
I would have not been able to elicit from participant observation and interviews alone. 
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All of these experiences gave me great insight to tell the story of the SAFSC, 
understand its operations and contribute to a qualitative study to understand a 
grassroots campaign set up to challenge the current South African food system. I 
explain these experiences as well as additional methodology and limitations of the 
research in the methodology section.  
 
Thereafter, Chapter four turns to discuss the uniqueness of the South African food 
system as a result of apartheid’s exclusionary policies on the majority of the 
population. The impact of this on the state of hunger today is also addressed, followed 
by descriptions and food sovereignty critiques of significant relevant post-apartheid 
government’s policy achievements and failures to address apartheid legacies, 
contemporary hunger and environmental crises.  
 
In chapter five I address the preconditions to food sovereignty as described in the 
literature and apply them to the South African context. The purpose of this chapter is 
to comment on policies, statistics and examples in the South African food system to 
explore the way in which food sovereignty initiatives would have to overcome issues 
of powerlessness and hunger. By doing so I also contextualise the SAFSC’s terrain 
for struggle in each area and highlight where specific action is required to make a very 
food unsovereign South Africa more just.  
 
Chapter six, entitled ‘The food sovereignty alternative in South Africa,’ introduces and 
explains the genesis of the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign. In this section 
I detail how it emerged, what brought about the emergence of the campaign and who 
the integral players have been thus far. Thereafter, I introduce the various actors in 
the campaign, discuss their understandings of food sovereignty and further establish 
what activities they undertake locally to advance food sovereignty and the campaign. 
Throughout this chapter I allude to the preconditions of food sovereignty as discussed 
in the previous chapter and the literature review to determine what gap the campaign 
is filling, and to what extent it is achieving its objectives of promoting a more food 
sovereign South Africa.  
 
Finally, chapter seven concludes this report. In the conclusion I bring together the most 
interesting findings of the research and show how I have answered the research 
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questions. I explain how, in South Africa, an alternative food regime is possible and is 
gradually emerging under the coordination of the SAFSC. I also highlight the gaps that 
the campaign has filled thus far and assess its importance by reflecting on what the 
situation would be like in South Africa if there was no campaign. I argue that the 
prospects of achieving a food sovereign South Africa are seemingly dire in the short 
term, because of the entrenched neoliberal state, but this does not mean that there is 
no hope. Hope lies in the corporate food regime and the powerless majority. While 
‘prospects’ are not entirely measurable or predictable due to a range of factors 
inherent in the corporate food regime, for example those external to any one group of 
people’s control such as financial crises, exacerbated environmental crises, an 
illegitimate government, or a government that is inadequate to deal with prolonged 
drought, these factors may give rise to greater resistance sooner than the SAFSC can 
handle. While the past year has given some indication that resistance is brewing in a 
very troubled and insecure South Africa, for example through the student protests, this 
does not suggest either that the SAFSC might become redundant. Instead it shows 
that the SAFSC is currently playing, and may continue to play a vital and central role 
in the upcoming years as it attempts to coordinate and consolidate various alternative 
approaches in the transition to a safer, more just and sustainable food system.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
 
Theorists have long debated the issue of hunger and proposed different solutions to 
address it. For example, the orthodox approach to hunger founded by Thomas Malthus 
regards overpopulation as the chief cause of hunger. In 1798 Malthus claimed that 
population growth would naturally outstrip the growth in food production until the world 
would no longer be able to feed itself. For Malthus this would result in eventual 
starvation, which would drastically reduce human population to a level that can finally 
be sustained by the available food supply. Solutions to hunger for Malthus ought to 
then reduce population growth by reducing fertility for example (Thomas and Evan, 
2011:471-472). Not only have solutions such as these presented ethical dilemmas in 
development, but they have not proven very successful either. For example, Post 
Malthusian theorists have since promoted strict family planning policies that limit Third 
World populations in one way or another.  
 
Other solutions to hunger have arisen out of criticisms of the orthodox approach. 
Critics argue that orthodox theorists’ analyses ignore important factors of food 
distribution. They note that despite the increases in food production per capita, little 
impact has been made on the devastating numbers of hungry people globally, in fact 
the number of hungry continues to grow, especially in the Third World where most of 
the food is produced (Thomas and Evan, 2011:444). Amartya Sen has since put 
forward a convincing alternative to the orthodox explanation of hunger in his 
pioneering book, Poverty, and Famines: An essay on entitlement and deprivation 
(1981). Here he argues that famines have often occurred during years of peak food 
availability and rather than not having enough food to eat, people go hungry because 
their claim to food has been disrupted, and as a result they lack entitlement to that 
food. In this theory, labelled the entitlement approach to hunger, theorists argue that 
hunger is caused by lack of access to food, not only lack of availability thereof. As 
such, conditions for hunger prevail, even in a land of plenty.  
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It is here where Lappé and Collins (1988) pick up on the same question as they seek 
to establish why there is hunger in a land of plenty. For them hunger is as a result of 
powerlessness, whereby power to protect oneself and those one loves has been 
stripped from the poor. From this insight, they find that the root cause of hunger is not 
natural disasters or scarcity of food or land, but rather a scarcity of democracy. They 
claim that it is in antidemocratic systems where power is tightly concentrated that the 
majority of people are left with no say at all (Lappé and Collins, 1988:3).  
 
The food regime analysis presented by Friedmann and McMichael (1989) adds to the 
above views by exploring the broader relations of food production, consumption and 
distributions to show that different forms of capital accumulation in agriculture 
constitute global power arrangements (Magnan, 2012:375; McMichael, 2009:144), 
thus showing that it is not only lack of democracy held by an individual in a state, but 
further that between states there are power relations affecting the way that food is 
produced and distributed, which ultimately affects the availability of food and thus 
hunger. Madeleine Fairbairn (2011) further develops the food regime analysis as she 
shows that within each food regime, a framework to address hunger has emerged. 
These frameworks include the right to food frameworks, freedom from hunger, food 
security and finally food sovereignty.  
 
In this literature review I discuss the food regimes and Fairbairn’s framing of hunger 
to show how, as she argues, food sovereignty has arisen out of crises in the current 
corporate food regime and is a framework with solutions that take a deeper and 
broader look to the roots of the food crisis. The food sovereignty framework differs 
fundamentally from the previous frameworks because it was developed by the 
underdogs of the world food system and is the first framework that seeks to overturn 
the regime within which it was created (Fairbairn, 2011:30).   
 
This literature review thus serves to introduce historical frameworks for analysing and 
addressing hunger, and to ultimately arrive at a framework that addresses issues of 
hunger at a food system level, namely food sovereignty. By drawing on Friedman and 
McMichael’s historicisation of food regimes, I explore the origins of the current food 
crises, namely the corporate food regime, which is characterised by bread cartels, 
price-fixing, and corporate control of the food system from production to consumption. 
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Most importantly it is driven by profit and greed. It is also an environmentally 
unsustainable and socially unjust system, where staple foods are regarded as 
commodities for raking in large profits. In such a regime people seldom matter. It is at 
these roots where solutions to targeting perpetuating hunger need to be directed.   
  
Thereafter the literature review turns to explore solutions to various crises of hunger. 
As I summarise Fairbairn’s analysis of different frameworks of hunger, I introduce the 
alternative of food sovereignty, argued here as the only framework to address hunger 
at its roots, the roots which exist at the system level, namely at the level of the 
corporate food regime. For Fairbairn, each framework arises out of conditions within 
the food regimes in place at the time, and aims to describe and address hunger. What 
we can learn from Fairbairn’s analysis is that solutions to hunger that focus on only 
one or two aspects of hunger, for example entitlement, provision or access, such as 
the current household food security framework, are failing to eradicate hunger, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa where hunger levels are increasing. For example, 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s global share of undernourished people has increased from 17.3 
per cent in 1990-1992 to 26.6 per cent in 2012-2014 (FAO, 2014:11). A more 
progressive framework for addressing hunger, according Fairbairn is one that food 
sovereignty proponent’s advocate, one that deals with the power in the system and 
envisions and promotes an alternative food system. 
 
Because this research focusses on actors, actions and campaigns promoting food 
sovereignty in South Africa, I then turn to the literature to explore what food sovereignty 
entails and how it can be achieved. Little literature exists on food sovereignty, 
particularly in South Africa. As such, a chapter is dedicated to exploring hunger, the 
food system and food sovereignty in the South African context, while the 
corresponding section in this literature review points to various international 
experiences, theories and critiques of food sovereignty and how to achieve it. Raj Patel 
recognises the ‘big tent’ nature of food sovereignty, as a broad concept under which 
many definitions, principles and ideas are birthed and advocated for. I present a few 
of the principles and characteristics that have been established, put into practice and 
theorised about in order to understand what food sovereignty is, how it is practiced 
and how it is evolving from the first generation of rural peasants, to a second 
generation that includes urban middle class consumers (De Schutter, 2015:2). 
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However, for some food sovereignty theorists like Akram-Lodhi, food sovereignty 
principles such as distributive agrarian reform and food system localisation for 
example, can only offer limited guidance on what kind of specific changes would need 
to happen in order to achieve the specific outcome, such as agrarian reform or 
localised food systems, and ultimately food sovereignty. As such I present arguments, 
examples and concrete preconditions from the literature to suggest what needs to exist 
in a country before food sovereignty can actually be present. The literature review 
concludes with criticisms of food sovereignty as presented in the literature, of which 
there are many due to the radical, transformative and seemingly ‘backward’ appeals 
of its proponents.  
 
The roots of the ongoing food crisis  
 
Analysts of early modern food systems, Friedmann and McMichael (1989) sought to 
determine the conditions under which the world staple food circuits emerged to form 
a world food system which catered to the needs of capitalism in its drive to raise profits 
by reducing inputs (McMichael, 2015:195). The answer to this question culminates in 
a food regime theory, detailing a Marxist analysis of food’s role in the accumulation of 
capital in the international food system. Through their analysis, Friedmann and 
McMichael identify two food regimes. The first food regime is characterised by an era 
of exports to Europe from the colonial states during 1870-1914. During this regime, 
family farmers were the primary suppliers of grain and meat which would serve the 
emergent European urban workforces (Friedmann & McMichael, 1989:100). The first 
regime thus exemplified the culmination of the organisation of pre-capitalist regions by 
colonial powers and also saw the rise of the nation state system (Friedmann & 
McMichael, 1989:95). 
 
The second food regime extended the relationship agriculture had with metropolitan 
nation-states to the post-colonial world. It was termed the mercantile and industrial 
regime which encompassed the period from 1950s-1970s, and was initiated by the US 
after World War II. The US was in a strategic position, it had grain surplus which it 
provided to Third World countries in order to fulfil its political and economic national 
interests. Political interests were met as the US was able to win states over (with aid 
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in the form of new staple foods) in the context of the Cold War struggle with Russia. 
Economic interests were met as the US could ‘dump’ surplus grain in the Third World, 
thus removing food surpluses from economic markets (Clapp, 2012:31) and providing 
developing countries with food ‘aid’ – often with strings attached, and further 
encouraging trade. The effects that such trade had on the receiving countries left them 
dependent on foreign aid, while trade relations also reached to the countryside 
(Friedmann & McMichael, 1989:95). The second food regime grew around the grain-
livestock and durable foods complexes, these were central to the restructuring of 
agriculture both transnationally and culturally (McMichael, 2009:149). While the first 
food regime saw the rise of the nation state, the second brought the state system to 
completion through decolonisation, but also weakened it through the transnational 
restructuring of agricultural sectors by agro-foods networks (Friedmann & McMichael, 
1989:95).  
 
These two regimes illuminate the international relations of food since the 1870s and 
show how transitions between different food regimes are birthed out of tensions in the 
previous order. McMichael (2009:287) further identifies a possible third food regime 
with its tensions, namely the corporate food regime. It is this current food regime which 
places faith in neoliberal market policies and the corporatisation of agriculture. For 
example, this regime is linked to globalisation and strives for the removal of social and 
political barriers to the free flow of capital in food and agriculture, and ensures this by 
the institutionalisation of the World Trade Organisation’s agreement on agriculture. 
The effects of this regime are already being experienced as neoliberal policies 
encourage dismantling of national marketing boards, agribusiness consolidation and 
elimination of small-scale farmer subsidies. This has further led to the displacement of 
small-scale farmers, the undermining of local means of subsistence (McMichael, 
2009:287) and a host of other brutalities, including inequality, increased hunger, 
ecological degradation, the introduction of genetically modified crops, a nutrition 
transition, environmental degradation, food price fluctuations, and the erosion of small 
farmers’ control over their seeds, to name a few (Branford, 2011; McMichael, 
2009:292) 
 
The corporate food regime may however never fully consolidate as it is being 
challenged by food systems change activists as a result of the recent and current food 
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and climate crises. As the assumptions that underlay the corporate food system are 
unravelling, so the problems inherent in it are becoming evident, and the brutalities 
are increasingly being felt (McMichael, 2009:292). It is this regime with its brutalities 
which rural peasants of La Via Campesina came to reject (McMichael, 2015; 
Desmarais & Wittman, 2014:1155; Wittman et al. 2010, 2). Patel (2011:190) presents 
the problem succinctly:  
 
‘The structure of the modern food system has been designed by a handful 
of privileged people… this is illegitimate because the design of our social 
system isn’t the privilege of the few, but the right of all.’ 
 
By recognising that we live in a corporate food regime that is controlled by capital 
designed by a few, and that perpetuates hunger, Fairbairn shows how food 
sovereignty offers a systemic solution to hunger. I summarise Fairbairn’s analysis 
below, drawing on other theorists’ texts to supplement the analysis. 
 
Framing of hunger and solutions to it 
 
In her paper, ‘Framing Resistance: International food regimes and the roots of Food 
Sovereignty,’ Fairbairn (2011) further develops Friedmann and McMichael’s (1989) 
food regime analysis as she traces the development of the discourse of the question 
of hunger and access to food. Unlike other approaches or theories of hunger, such as 
Malthus’ orthodox approach or Sen’s entitlement approach, that are shown to arise 
out of a focus on improving or altering the conditions of the hungry, Fairbairn 
establishes that various frameworks, for example, from the right to food, to household 
food security, and finally food sovereignty, arise out of contradictions in each food 
regime (Fairbairn, 2011:16) and therefore the socio-political, and economic systems 
present internationally during that period. As a result, food regimes shape food 
frameworks and vice versa. Food sovereignty is thus argued by Fairbairn to be the 
most recent in an evolution of historically embedded frameworks created to address 
global food issues (Fairbairn, 2011) because it deals with the problem of hunger at its 
roots (Wittman et al., 2011; McMichael, 2015; Patel, 2011; Brem-Wilson, 2015) as it 
‘strives to create a radically different food system’ (Fairbairn, 2011:16). At the same 
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time her analysis brings attention to the inherent difference between food sovereignty 
and the well-known, frequently used framework/concept of ‘household food security.’ 
Fairbairn’s analysis is presented below. 
 
During the first food regime, no universal food frameworks were present. While 
historians have documented public claims for food such as bread riots which can be 
said to have taken place during the first food regime, it was only during the second 
regime that the first universally recognised framework for food emerged (Fairbairn, 
2011:19). The first framework, termed the ‘right to food’ was followed shortly by the 
‘freedom from hunger’ framework. Both of these frameworks served as a means of 
conceptualising hunger and further promoting solutions to hunger and food crises 
during the post-war regime. Both frameworks reflected and were influenced by the 
dominant political and economic ideologies of the post-war regime, and were 
conceptualised by relatively powerful diplomats. The post-war regime saw the 
emergence of the nation state, and it was also during this time that the nation state 
(particularly in Europe) began to take on unheard of responsibilities in the regulation 
of food supply, such as rationing, subsidising bread and providing nutritional 
education. It was believed that through such state-led interventions, hunger could be 
eradicated, as states attempted to ensure that acute food shortages would not be 
experienced. During 1948, the right to food was even given a place in article 25 of the 
Universal declaration of human rights. Although these documents were drafted by 
international bodies, the obligation to ensure the right to food was dependent on 
national level policy and enforcement (Fairbairn, 2011:20).  
 
The right to food and freedom from hunger frameworks thus place the responsibility of 
feeding the hungry on the state. This is because in the post-war regime the state had 
established political and economic prominence, and now apparently a social role. 
Central to the role of the state was its intervention in the markets and the development 
of agriculture as a national sector and an industrialised sector (Fairbairn, 2011:29). 
The development project was birthed out of this regime, and this too influenced the 
framing of the question of hunger. Since it was held that US style development ought 
to be a universally attainable goal, it was to be achieved specifically by advances in 
agricultural technology. Thus, states sought to ensure this end particularly in Third 
World countries where traditional small-scale agriculture was viewed as an 
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impediment to progress. The development project, coupled with Cold War politics also 
influenced the way hunger in the Third World was approached. It is for this reason that 
food aid and capital investment for agricultural advancement was provided to the Third 
World, especially by the US (Fairbairn, 2011: 20, 28). 
 
When crisis struck the post war regime during 1972-73, the problem of hunger had to 
be reframed. Delegates to the 1974 World Food Conference reframed it in terms of 
food security. Because this new food security framework was created as a response 
to a failed post-war regime, much of its sentiments reflected aspects of the regime, 
particularly the development project (Fairbairn, 2011:28). However, like its two 
predecessors, food security was conceptualised by global powers, and even though it 
attempted to remedy the faults in the post-war regime, it did so without questioning the 
dominant economic and political ideologies (Fairbairn, 2011:22). The food security 
discourse has since been shaped and reshaped, but the essence of this framework is 
that food security is addressed in terms of national food supply. Integral to this 
approach were strong states who can create favourable environments to ensure the 
adequate availability of food for their citizens, coupled with a global approach that 
ensures that adequate global food supplies are promoted, all of which were to be 
undertaken by increased production, market intervention and external food aid 
(Fairbairn, 2011:22-23). 
 
During the 1990’s a new structure emerged, and the food security framework 
underwent a major reformulation. Changes in the development discourse occurred, 
particularly under the influence of Amartya Sen’s (1989:7) claim that availability of food 
in a state does not translate into access to food for all its citizens. This belief introduced 
changes to the way food security was viewed. This new framework was termed 
household food security, for it was argued that if a household cannot afford to buy 
food, all members would go hungry irrespective of the amount of food available in the 
country (Webb et al., 2006:1405; Fairbairn, 2011:29). This shift to household food 
security occurred under the emergence of the corporate food regime. The framers 
were again in the seat of power, and the household food security framework that 
resulted therefore mirrors a number of structures inherent in the new regime and the 
emerging globalisation project. These include the erosion of state responsibilities due 
to the assignment of increasing power to international financial institutions and 
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transnational corporations. In addition, the transnationalisation of agriculture was 
undertaken and market liberalisation was prioritised over social goals. Yet such 
neoliberal approaches adopt mostly technical means to achieve food security and as 
a result do not pay attention to inequalities in the political economy. In addition, these 
approaches do not concentrate on policies that might expand economic democracy 
and transform unequal social relations (Rai and Selvaraj, 2015:149). What this 
framework has further encouraged is the commodification of food because of the 
prolonged influence of the corporate regime. This new dimension of food security in 
its household guise is the dominant framework used today by international institutions, 
national governments and most NGO’s (Fairbairn, 2011:29-30), yet it is merely 
contributing to greater strains on the poor (Rai and Selvaraj, 2015:151). It is this regime 
and this framework that is in crisis.  
 
Thankfully this is not the end of the story of the discourse on hunger alleviation and 
access to food, for it would be a dismal ending, as corporations would continue to take 
advantage of poor farmers and citizens, and the number of hungry would continue to 
increase. Another framework offering some hope has since emerged. This final 
framework differs significantly from the other four, because it was not defined by those 
in any seat of power, and furthermore, unlike the other regimes, it does not seek to 
make small changes to the current regime, instead it attempts to completely overhaul 
it (Fairbairn, 2011:27). This framework, referred to as food sovereignty, is discussed 
in detail below. 
 
Food sovereignty: An alternative, progressive framework for addressing 
hunger 
 
In this section I provide a brief history of food sovereignty, and further elaborate its 
principles, ideals and solutions to ending huger. Fairbairn clearly shows how food 
sovereignty emerged as a response to the corporate food regime, to be exact it 
emerged in 1993 from both the mobilisation of campesinos in Costa Rica and the 
protests of small-scale farmers in Kamataka, India (De Schutter, 2015:1). Since its 
emergence, as a concept and framework, and thereafter its elaboration at the 1996 
World Food Summit in Rome ‘food sovereignty’ has increasingly occupied a significant 
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place in the discourse of food activists globally (Akram-Lodhi, 2013:2), such that today 
development agencies like the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the UN 
regularly use the term in discussions and documents. For example, the UN and World 
Bank led International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
Technology for Development makes mention of food sovereignty in their report, 
recognising that corporate concentration of agriculture and increased international 
trade have had negative impacts on the environment and social equity (IASSTD, 
2009:8). In addition, in some countries like Bolivia, Mali, Venezuela, Senegal and 
Nepal food sovereignty has been embedded in their constitutions. This proliferation of 
food sovereignty and its infiltration into the basic discourse of social justice advocates 
could suggest that the food sovereignty alternative is gaining prominence as a result 
of the increasing problems facing the food system, thus reflecting a series of basic 
failures and crises in the corporate food regime, which present a desperate need for 
alternatives (Akram-Lodhi, 2013:2; De Schutter, 2015:2). The proliferation of these 
problems also explains why food sovereignty movements in different countries, which 
initially emerged as rural-based counter movements to neoliberal polices, have since 
shifted to urban areas too - as the food regime has entered crisis phase (McMichael, 
2014a:11; De Schutter, 2015:2). De Schutter (2015:2) suggests these crises and shifts 
have given rise to a second generation of food sovereignty which takes on a number 
of new key characteristics. I discuss these characteristics in the following section, after 
outlining some key tenets of food sovereignty.  
 
What is food sovereignty? 
 
Food sovereignty proposes a radical alternative to the orthodox frameworks because 
it embodies a political struggle, the right to food, and agrarian reform. It is centred on 
democracy and justice, calling for democratisation of the food system by prioritising 
local markets and self-sufficiency. It calls for greater controls over corporations in the 
global food chain, and the democratisation of international financial institutions. It also 
presents a vision of the world in which decision making and governance around how 
food is cultivated, processed and traded is reclaimed from capital and handed back to 
the people, particularly the poor and underserved (Holt-Giménez and Shattuck 
2010:76, McMichael 2010:174; McMichael, 2014a:7; La Via Campesina, 1996; 
26 
 
Branford, 2011:3). Ultimately, in the face of the organised power of science, business 
and mainstream politics, food sovereignty is about strengthening local organisations 
of food producers and of citizens to reclaim the power over their lives (Pimbert, 
2009:12). In its second generation, food sovereignty has taken on these and additional 
characteristics, such as a focus on agroecology, social innovations and resilience as 
means by which this power can also be built.  
 
In order to gain a greater understanding of the potential and traction that the food 
sovereignty alternative has to go beyond the contradictions in the present food regime, 
namely the social, ecological and economic crises (Rosset, 2009:192; Akram-Lodhi, 
2013:2), I elaborate on its key principles below. To do this I draw from two sets of food 
sovereignty principles put forward by Nyeleni (2007) and Via Campesina (1996), as 
well as De Schutter’s (2015) characterisations of the second generation of food 
sovereignty. In addition to these principles and characteristics I provide examples from 
the literature of how food sovereignty is being practiced/achieved internationally. 
Furthermore, while many food sovereignty theorists are not able to ‘identify the 
possible pathways by which societies can move from the corporate food regime to 
food sovereignty, transforming the disaster that is the corporate food regime into a 
more equitable and just future’ (Akram-Lodhi, 2013:2), I also show how some literature 
does provide concrete suggestions of how changes to global and local food systems 
are required to bring about food sovereignty, in the ‘messy reality of the present’ 
(Akram-Lodhi, 2013:2). As such, after each principle/characteristic provided below, I 
provide further ideas and examples from the literature to draw attention to what 
achieving these principles in practice looks like or might entail. 
 
Principles and characteristics of food sovereignty 
 
In this section I elaborate on nine principles to achieving food sovereignty drawn from 
various sources in the literature and food sovereignty declarations to highlight how 
achieving food sovereignty is being thought about in the literature and practiced in 
various locations. The first of these sources include the pillars of food sovereignty 
formulated at the Nyeleni forum for food sovereignty that took place in Mali in 2007 
with more than 500 representatives from over 80 countries (Via Campesina, 2007a). 
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At this conference food sovereignty was further articulated and collective 
understandings of food sovereignty were deepened (Nyleni, 2007a:1). These 
understandings form the six pillars of food sovereignty. I also draw from previous 
principles put forward by Via Campesina at the World Food Summit in 1996. These 
principles serve as a set of mutually supportive principles which present an alternative 
to the world trade policies, as they seek to realise the human right to food (Pimbert, 
2009:7). De Schutter’s distinction of the first and second food sovereignty generations 
also serves as useful for highlighting and analysing new ways by which food 
sovereignty is being understood and practiced today. The first generation is comprised 
of the rural peasants like those farmers in Via Campesina who initially emerged in 
1993 to challenge the way in which food was going to become the ‘next frontier in the 
mill of commodification’ (De Schutter, 2015:2). While peasants are still emerging today 
and fighting for food sovereignty, a second generation has since emerged in rural and 
urban areas alike as problems facing farmers and consumers have grown bigger. 
Taking together these principles, characteristics and preconditions to food 
sovereignty, much can be learned about what food sovereignty entails and how it is 
being promoted. I discuss these principles and examples from additional literature 
below.  
 
The first principle of food sovereignty is the right to food for all people. Food 
sovereignty stresses the right to sufficient, nutritious and culturally appropriate food 
for all. It is a call for each nation to declare that access to food ought to be a 
constitutional right, and thus ensure that the fundamental right to food is then realised 
(Nyeleni, 2007; Via Campesina, 1996). While using similar rights language, this 
principle differs from the right to food framework as it is much more encompassing, 
stressing that it is not just any food, but the right to nutritious and culturally appropriate 
food (Desmarais and Wittman 2014:1156), and further adds that food sovereignty 
includes a right to produce food sustainably and ecologically. However, as Bentham 
(in Patel, 2011:190) stresses that ‘wants are not means, hunger is not bread’, for rights 
to mean anything at all they require a guarantor who is responsible for implementing 
a parallel scheme of duties and obligations (Patel, 2011: 191). The guarantor of this 
right, as stressed in the Via Campesina principle, is the state, and this is another way 
in which the food sovereignty right to food principle differs from that of the right to food 
framework. While the right to food framework focusses on the state’s obligations to 
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guarantee the right to food and to use legal remedies to get their rights achieved, it 
does not rest on a particular set of policies (Windfuhr and Johnsen, 2005:23). While 
the food sovereignty principles clearly call on each nation to declare that access to 
food ought to be a national constitutional right (Via Campesina, 1996), what they 
further do, which is a strength of the food sovereignty framework, is to address the 
problem of decreasing state regulatory power. Food sovereignty thus comprises a 
more precise policy proposal while its proponents challenge political inactivity and the 
failure of the state to pursue appropriate policies that would promote a more equal 
food system (Windfuhr and Johnsen, 2005:29).  
 
This leads us briefly to the role of the state in ensuring the right to food and food 
sovereignty. Clarke (2013:7) stresses that the state is currently an obstacle to the 
achievement of food sovereignty because in most nations, state power is used to 
impose neoliberal policies that have led to the unjust corporate food regime. Despite 
these obstacles, food sovereignty proponents view state power as a necessary 
practical means by which neoliberal trade policies can be reversed (Clarke, 2013:8). 
To do this, food sovereignty movements in Ecuador, for example, have dedicated most 
of their efforts to influencing policy change, and pushing the state to rethink and 
reshape the politics that govern food (Pena, 2013:1).  
 
The right to food therefore entails the promotion of a rights-based approach, not only 
to food but also to food and agricultural policies. However, in order to achieve this 
right, further preconditions are stressed. These include a more active role of the state 
in promoting policies that tackle inequalities of power in the food system by ensuring 
adequate access to physical and economic resources, to nutritious and culturally 
appropriate food, as well as to culturally appropriate food producing resources, 
including access to water, seed and importantly land (Beauregard, 2009:9; Windfuhr 
and Jonhsen, 2005:14). This leads us to the next precondition, agrarian reform.   
 
Agrarian reform is the second principle of food sovereignty. Via Campesina (1996) 
stresses that genuine land reform is necessary to provide landless and farming people 
with the ownership and control of land they work. It is also necessary to return the land 
to indigenous people. Food sovereignty proponents of Via Campesina believe that the 
land belongs to those who work it, as such, the right to land that is free of discrimination 
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on the basis of gender, religion, race, social or class ideology is an important 
precondition to achieving food sovereignty. Via Campesina also stresses the role of 
the government in ensuring that social and ecological infrastructure is sufficiently 
invested in, in addition to agrarian reform.  
 
Pro-poor, gender responsive redistributive agrarian reform is one of the key starting 
points in constructing a pathway toward food sovereignty. This is because it has the 
potential to directly address historical injustices by which farmers lost access to land 
over the course of the last two centuries (Akram-Lodhi, 2013:8). As it addresses these 
injustices, agrarian reform fundamentally tempers with the inequality generated by 
market imperatives under capitalism, thus creating preconditions for the marginalised 
to improve their wellbeing, livelihoods and human rights. This is why Via Campesina 
and other food sovereignty proponents stress the importance of agrarian reform.  
 
Some food sovereignty proponents, namely Borras and Franco (2012), opt to rather 
speak of land sovereignty as they argue that in the changing global context of the 
‘global land grab’. As the industrial agro-fuel context, together with the energy 
complexes, have made land and water key resources in the global capitalist system, 
they argue that land sovereignty can best capture the essence of the demand for land 
(Borras and Franco, 2012:1,6). Land sovereignty is the right of working people to have 
access to, use of and control over land. This principle is similar to Via Campesina’s, 
however the way in which it is sought goes further to encompass first, a call to action 
against a renewed corporate and (trans)national global push to enclose the commons 
and second, an assertion of the need for a people’s enclosure of the land (Borras and 
Franco, 2012). In terms of the first, elite and corporate enclosure in the form of land 
grabbing has been experienced globally, for example in Cambodia, where previously 
occupied and farmed lands were suddenly seized by the state and reallocated to 
domestic and transnational investors. In many cases policies such as those in 
Cambodia have led to dispossession of the poor and as a result are met with 
resistance in various organised or unorganised, legal or extra-legal ways, taking place 
at both local and transnational levels. Resistance like this, referred to as ‘the working 
people’s counter enclosure campaign’ is a critical component of the land sovereignty 
principle, but represents only half of the picture of the agrarian struggle that is taking 
place today (Borras and Franco, 2012:8-9). The second is a more pro-active campaign 
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for people’s enclosure where working people proactively assert their political control 
over their remaining lands against actual and potential threats. Land sovereignty 
campaigns for people’s enclosure can take place through three broad strategies, 
including state led policies, community or highly organised social movement-led 
strategy, or a state/community driven strategy (Borras and Franco, 2012:8-9). I 
summarise each briefly below to show how the agrarian reform principle is being 
pursued. 
 
State-led redistributive land reforms have been carried out by a range of states in 
varying contexts and have been key in ensuring land reform takes place. The state’s 
role in land redistribution is in many contexts vital because the state often has the 
power, or if necessary, the coercive apparatus to make authoritative decisions in 
society on some significant policies and programmes. In terms of social movement led 
campaigns, the best known one at a national scale is that of the Movimento dos 
Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST) and other militant agrarian movements in Brazil. Both 
inside and outside Via Campesina, these movements have used strategies such as 
land occupation to implement state land reform law. However, models such as these, 
although most popular perhaps because of their dramatic methods, are difficult to 
replicate and are also rare. The final strategy for promoting people’s access to land 
involves state/community-led or state/social movement led techniques. Here land 
reform occurs when actions from below (from communities) are met by actions from 
above (the state). These are the least popular, but can result in desirable outcomes 
for the poor as has been the case in the Philippines during 1992-2000 and in Kerala 
in the 1960s to 1970s. This model is important for land reform especially when the 
state is unable to overcome institutional or structural policies on its own, or where 
powerful national movements do not exist. Combining limited forces of societal actors 
and the state thus becomes central to land redistribution in the presence of no 
alternatives (Borras and Franco, 2012:10-11). 
 
While land sovereignty involves a struggle against corporate and transnational 
enclosure and an assertion for people’s enclosure of the land, for this to lead to the 
end goal envisioned by food sovereignty proponents, more than just agrarian reform 
is required. Akram-Lodhi stresses that what is missing from this demand is a host of 
additional measures that would assist male and female producers to increase 
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production, productivity and incomes, and thus improve their livelihoods. These 
include access to inputs, electricity, machinery at prices that they can afford, access 
to credit at important times and at the right price, and access to markets (Akram-Lodhi, 
2013:8). Pro-poor gender-responsive redistribution agrarian reform with extra 
supportive measures that enable male and female farmers to succeed is thus the initial 
pathway by which societies can move from the corporate food regime toward land 
sovereignty and ultimately guide it on a path toward food sovereignty. Additional 
supportive measures are addressed in sections below.      
 
A third principle of food sovereignty is that it values food providers. Food sovereignty 
supports the contributions of all types of food producers including women, men, 
migrants, pastoralists, small-scale farmers, forest dwellers, and indigenous people. 
Food sovereignty rejects all policies that undermine livelihoods and undervalue food 
producers (Nyeleni, 2007). Via Campesina stresses that government too has a role to 
play here in ensuring that food providers are valued. This can be done by ensuring 
that peasant families have access to productive land, credit, technology, markets and 
extension services. Government also has a role in supporting decentralised rural credit 
systems that prioritise the production of food for domestic consumption to ensure food 
sovereignty where production capacity above land is used to determine provision of 
credit. For Via Campesina (1996), government should encourage young people to 
remain in rural communities as productive citizens, this would then entail assigning 
new values to the work of producing food, both socially and economically. De Schutter 
(2015:3) recognises that these values are changing as food sovereignty actors unite 
to challenge the status quo, make demands on establishments and join forces to fight 
against government policy, for example. By doing so, they move away from the roles 
pre-assigned to them by the division of labour within society; they also redefine their 
social identities, acting as citizens to reshape their environment.  
 
The food sovereignty principles of agrarian reform and additional support measures 
that value providers by providing access to credit, technology and markets, fails to 
address the problem of continued accumulation, however. Akram-Lodhi argues that if 
farmers were to continue producing using the current market model, what would 
eventually happen is what currently happens under capitalism. Those who are most 
productive and meet the market imperative will accumulate, while those who fail to, 
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will ultimately have to distress sales to meet short-term cash needs, and later might 
have to sell their assets and ultimately their labour for the same reasons. What remains 
is two types of producers, those who accumulate, innovate and then expand, and 
those who eventually rely upon selling their labour power for a wage in order to survive 
in the capitalist economy. One way in which this could be prevented is by implementing 
a restriction on the market imperative, fundamentally by restricting land markets. Such 
a restriction would demand that when the more successful farmers produce more and 
are ready to expand, they should be restricted to do so, and instead be encouraged to 
continue accumulating by diversifying, which could involve processing the agricultural 
output. The role of the state would be important here to use fiscal incentives to push 
successful farmers to diversify into non-farm activities. In this way, as successful 
farmers diversify, the need for their land diminishes, thus releasing more land for 
others to farm, or for providing additional land for those who are not as successful, to 
fully utilise available labour in an effort to improve their livelihoods (Akram-Lodhi, 
2013:9-10). While this proposal may in some way promote a more equal distribution 
of land and capital, it does not however deal with the profit incentive, and loopholes in 
the state’s policies may remain. What some food sovereignty proponents rather 
promote is the development of alternatives outside of the state that support small-
scale farmers. An example of this is in Ecuador where the promotion of agroecology 
or the solidarity economy, whereby alternative forms of finance, production and 
consumption to the capitalist economy are promoted (Williams, 2014:51). Such 
methods are additionally implemented to achieve food sovereignty (Clarke, 2013:8).  
 
This is not to say that state policy is not necessary. Food sovereignty actors, 
particularly in Ecuador, engage with state and policy for a range of demands – 
increased support to small-scale farmers is one of these. Major state supportive 
policies that are implemented, particularly at the international level are viewed as key 
for food sovereignty proponents who see free trade as the greatest threat to small-
scale farmers (Bello, 2007). These policies might include specifically targeted 
protectionist measures to counteract the distortions in the world food market arising 
from subsidies to farmers in developed countries (Kay, 2006: 474). State policies in 
some cases might also serve better to stop the forced exportation of food desperately 
needed by their own populations (Rosset, 2011:473). Dealing with international trade 
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policies also aids in localising food systems – this is an additional principle I discuss 
below.  
 
The fourth principle of food sovereignty is to localise food systems and reorganise 
trade. As alluded to above, this means a return to the protection of national food 
production against the dumping of both, artificially cheap food that undercuts local 
farmers and against the artificially expensive food imports that are also present today. 
It also means rebuilding national grain reserves and parastatal marketing boards that 
actively include farmer organisations. This is one of the key ways by which the food 
system can be taken back from the transnational corporations that serve to hoard food 
stocks to drive food prices up (Rosset, 2008).  
 
In terms of localising food systems, while the first food sovereignty generations’ 
frontline was the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the second generation seeks to 
invent new ways to build bridges between urban consumers and local farmers. Now 
the move is towards more local connections, encouraging schools, universities and 
farmers’ markets to source locally. Alliances are thus being built at local levels 
between citizens, farmers and municipalities (De Schutter, 2015:2). As these actors 
come together to fight a common cause, providers and consumers are put at the center 
of decision-making over food issues; consumers are protected from poor quality and 
unhealthy food and GMOs; and they are able to resist governance structures and 
agreements that depend on and promote unsustainable and inequitable production 
and trade that gives power to often remote and unaccountable transnational 
corporations (Nyeleni; 2007). While the first generation of food sovereignty was 
accused of putting the needs of farmers above those of the urban consumers, today’s 
generation’s most dynamic members are often from the urban middle-class united with 
low-income communities, fighting for more food justice in the form of localised food 
systems (De Schutter, 2015:3).  
 
There are several advantages to having more localised food systems, these include 
healthier communities which are more resilient in the face of shocks as they can 
ensure that food is distributed to those in need of it. Local food systems also have less 
impact on climate as they travel less food miles than the current long-distance, 
corporate food regimes international food system (Akram-Lodhi, 2013:13).  
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As food sovereignty seeks to re-establish local markets, it is imperative that those who 
consume food also go through a transformation, importantly a transformation of tastes 
(Patel, 2012 in Akram-Lodhi, 2013:13). Food preferences today show how corporate 
interests have shaped the food system. For example, the need for manufacturer’s long 
shelf-life and the capacity for food to travel long distances without perishing is reflected 
in the production of processed foods, full of sodium, high fructose corn syrup and soya, 
and this in turn is reflected in the taste preferences of the majority of people today. 
What this suggests is that the taste preferences today by no means reflect the needs 
of food providers, nor consumers, but is purely an invention to suit the needs of capital 
(Akram-Lodhi, 2013:13). Only by eating locally, seasonally and by paying prices that 
reflect actual costs of production (including ecological costs) are the needs of the food 
providers met. At the same time, a system is created that does not massively 
contribute to climate change. The needs of the consumers are also met as they eat 
locally, for the current food system’s taste formation has done nothing to look out for 
the consumer’s need, and has produced an onslaught of obesity, nutrition-related 
diseases and a vast proportion of the population who are undernourished and 
underfed. In addition to working towards localised food systems, it is also important 
that these systems are gender responsive and producer and consumer responsive, so 
that they can resurrect the damaging social transformation that the corporate regime 
has successfully created (Akram-Lodhi, 2013:13,14).  
 
A fifth principle and important precondition to achieving food sovereignty is to ensure 
democratic control and local decision-making. There are two levels at which 
democratic control of the food system can be attained. The first is at the producer level, 
and the second at the consumer level. The latter is where the new generation is 
making great strides. For the first, Via Campesina (1996) stresses that smallholder 
farmers must have direct input into formulating agricultural policies at all levels. What 
this entails is that the UN and other similar organisations will have to undergo serious 
democratisation. Democratic control also entails access to territory, land, grazing, 
seeds, livestock, and fish populations for local farmers. Importantly, Via Campesina 
stresses that resources should be shared in ways that are environmentally sustainable 
and socially just. Food sovereignty also rejects privatisation of natural resources 
through laws, commercial contracts and intellectual property rights (Nyeleni; 2007), 
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while Via Campesina (1996:2) further stresses that ‘rural women must be granted 
direct and active decision-making on food and rural issues.’  
 
Innovations that form the second generation of food sovereignty today are already 
democratising, particularly when viewing consumers. People who were once passive 
consumers, now seek to reclaim control over their food systems and to exercise their 
rights to choose, as such they are increasingly becoming active citizens, such that the 
act of consuming has become political. More than that, their actions are increasingly 
political as they work together to co-design their food systems, with the end goal of 
ultimately recapturing them to the local sphere (De Schutter, 2015:2).  
 
An additional precondition of food sovereignty is that it builds knowledge and 
resilience. Food sovereignty seeks to utilise and build on age-old knowledge that 
conserves, develops and manages localised food production and harvesting systems. 
In addition, food sovereignty aims to develop appropriate systems of research that 
support indigenous knowledge and the passing on of this wisdom to future 
generations. Food sovereignty rejects technologies that undermine, threaten or 
contaminate these traditions, and life (Nyeleni, 2007), for example seed patenting and 
genetic engineering that prevents saving of seeds. By drawing on indigenous 
knowledge, in many respects food sovereignty favours resilience over efficiency. This 
is because, while the current dominant food system produces food in an incredibly 
cost efficient manner, it is also energy and capital intensive, economically consolidated 
and globally integrated (Feenstra, 2002:100). As a result, the world is becoming more 
and more uncertain in an era of peak oil, an unbalanced nitrogen cycle, nutrient 
depletion of soil as a result of monocropping and erosion, and the repeated shocks 
from climate change, and economic disaster. This impacts small-scale farmers, 
community processers and other local businesses who are tied to food production 
(Feenstra, 2002:100; De Schutter, 2015:4). What these threats mean for the new 
generation is that there may be more instability and volatility, thus a need to invent 
solutions. These solutions, food sovereignty proponents stress, need to be invented 
locally, using predominantly local resources (which indigenous knowledge already 
depends on). These solutions would also benefit from being diverse, for the more 
diverse they are, the better the system will be equipped to deal with unpredictable 
shocks (De Schutter, 2015:4). Akram-Lodhi takes this principle further, as he shows 
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that knowledge-sharing can lead to agricultural surpluses, which ultimately lead to 
improved well-being. He also shows how this can be done in concrete terms. I discuss 
this below.  
 
Sustaining knowledge and creating resilience, serves as an important precondition to 
food sovereignty. Akram-Lodhi (2013:11) stresses that a key objective of the food 
sovereignty movement ought to be the creation of a ‘rural development framework that 
facilitates sustained increases in agricultural surpluses.’ This is a precondition to food 
sovereignty based on the argument that farming has the capacity to produce more 
than what the producing family needs to live and keep working the farm, as such 
agricultural surpluses are the foundation of improvements in well-being in town and 
country (Ghatak & Ingersent in Akram-Lodhi:2013:11). If the food sovereignty 
movement develops a framework to increase agricultural surplus, which favours 
sustainability of nature and the poor (unlike the technocratic green and gene 
revolutions), then what is required is that indigenous knowledge of men and women 
be shared. How this can practically be done is through farmer to farmer networks, as 
has been done in Central America. Such networks and socially-embedded learning 
spaces have been found to provoke changes in behaviour and further empirical 
evidence has shown that social learning has also led to greater innovation (Pretty and 
Hine, 2001:18). The food sovereignty movement is increasingly faced with the 
challenge of developing more autonomous and participatory ways of knowing to 
produce knowledge that is relevant to the context, socially just and also ecologically 
literate. What this means is that they have made a radical shift from the existing 
hierarchical and increasingly corporate-controlled research system to an approach 
that transfers more decision-making power to farmers, indigenous peoples, 
consumers and citizens for the production of social and ecological knowledge 
(Pimbert, 2006). One way in which this precondition can be sure to be met is not only 
encouraging farmer to farmer learning exchanges, but also by establishing publically 
funded agricultural research that is not directed solely at the urban and rurally 
prosperous, but is rather directed toward meeting the livelihood challenges of rurally-
marginalised farmers (Akram-Lodhi, 2013:11).  
 
The seventh principle of food sovereignty is social peace. Via Campesina realised that 
increasing levels of poverty and marginalisation in rural areas, along with growing 
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oppression of ethnic minorities would aggravate situations of injustice and 
hopelessness. These cannot be tolerated, as such they expressed that everyone has 
the right to be free from violence, and that food must not be used as a weapon (Via 
Campesina, 1996).  The new generation proposes solutions to how this social peace 
can be achieved – namely, by strengthening social links. Polanyi noted that the market 
economy has in many respects eroded human relationships as useful goods have 
been objectified into commodities, human needs have been transformed into demand 
and the personal relationship of humans cooperating with one another has been 
corroded into the ‘impersonal exchange-value of the goods produced by them’ 
(Polanyi in De Schutter, 2015:3). The result of the penetration of market relationships 
into all spheres of life is that the human social and spiritual fabric that is part of society 
and food systems has been eroded. Furthermore, as ‘people are individualised and 
less and less socialised, they are assigned roles as producers and consumers, as 
buyers and sellers, and they communicate through prices (De Schutter, 2015:3), 
critical connections between humankind and nature are lost (De Schutter, 2015:4; 
Feenstra, 2002:100).  However, under food sovereignty and the principles and 
practices it promotes, these relations can be altered. For when people work together 
to change the system, they forge stronger community links and richer social 
relationships.  
Another principle of food sovereignty is that it works with and protects nature. Simply 
put, ‘those who work the land must have the right to practice sustainable management 
of natural resources and to preserve biological diversity’ (Via Campesina, 1996:1). 
Furthermore, farming communities should have the right to use and protect their 
diverse genetic resources, especially their seeds, which they have been saving and 
developing throughout history. The new generation of food sovereignty has carried on 
this principle and is closely aligned with agroecology; a contribution to the science of 
agronomics which tries to work with nature in the process of producing food, thus 
maximising synergies between different elements of nature (Mendez et al., 2013:4). 
By doing so, agroecology can also reduce fossil-based inputs and commits to recycle 
waste. Agroecology is more than a farming practice though, it is a certain way of 
thinking about our relationship toward nature (De Schutter, 2015:4). De Schutter 
provides some examples of how this principle is concretely being achieved, particularly 
in the production of food using agroecology methods. In the new generation this is 
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happening as farmers exchange information with one another, as the relationship with 
the farmers and ‘experts’ change, not to replace one hierarchy with another, but in 
order to work towards the co-construction of knowledge. A critical means by which the 
livelihood challenges of first and second generation of food sovereignty actors 
including marginalised farmers can be met is by facilitating the transmission of 
agroecological farming practices, and basing these practices and inputs on local 
ecologies and ecosystems instead of on the needs of distant external markets (Akram-
Lodhi, 2013).  
 
There are multiple benefits to using agroecological methods and these have been 
frequently documented. First is that they meet a key challenge of the 21st century of 
creating jobs, since agroecological farming is much more labour and employment 
intensive than conventional agriculture. Agroecological practices also sustain the 
micronutrients in soil, thereby increasing its productive potential. This is of vital 
importance, for built into a rural agroecological development strategy must be the 
ongoing effort to increase crop yields. This must be done so that the myth of the 
corporate food regime can be debunked, the myth which suggests that industrial 
agriculture is the only way to feed growing populations of people. Much research 
instead suggests that agroecology has the capacity to be as productive and as 
profitable as industrial agriculture (Rosset, 1999). In addition, when considering 
environmental impact assessments in the cost and benefits calculation, agroecology 
would prove to be even more productive economically and ecologically sustainable 
and more resistant to drought and other manifestations of climate change (Rosset, 
2008:192).  
 
There are additional principles and preconditions which ought to exist for food 
sovereignty to be achieved. These do not fall specifically under one or another 
principle, and neither is the list I have provided above comprehensive. Nevertheless, 
a new common sense is a principle that is important for the new generation of food 
sovereignty actors, as such I discuss it below. 
 
The present-day politics of food sovereignty depends on the current relation of forces 
between food sovereignty and other complimentary movements against the dominant 
power of capital. Capital and corporate interests, with support from the capitalist state 
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are currently winning the battle, and this is because its agents have successfully 
manufactured a ‘common sense’ to suit its needs. This common sense has infiltrated 
attitudes, beliefs and aspirations of common people. This new common sense has 
provided legitimacy to those in power, while simultaneously robbing the powerless of 
the power they might have once had. Sustained reiterations of this common sense by 
those in power have resulted in a range of accepted truths. These truths include those 
that Lappé and Collins sought to debunk in their initial book on world hunger in 1986, 
such as the idea that industrial agriculture is the only way by which the world can be 
fed, and without it there would simply not be enough food, or that the free market can 
end hunger and free trade is a powerful solution (Lappé and Collins, 1986). More 
recently these myths have been built upon to further persuade us that small-scale 
producers are relics of pre-modernity, and that the presence of capital in the food 
system has increased choice, availability and consumer freedom, to name a few 
(Akram-Lodhi, 2013:18).  
 
However, as these myths have gradually proven to be false, the corporate food regime 
has given rise to its nemesis, namely food sovereignty. And further, as the corporate 
food regime has evolved, from dumping of cheap food on increasingly unprotected 
farmers to appropriating land for agro-exports, the initial food sovereignty intervention 
has matured in vision and circumstance (McMichael, 2014b:951). It is this growing 
alternative movement that seeks to create a new common sense in order to forge new 
alliances to fight against the power bloc of capital, corporations and the neoliberal 
state. The movement contests ‘the contemporary 'common sense' across a range of 
arenas in social life in an effort to construct a new 'common sense' that configures 
different subjects, identities, projects and aspirations, building unity out of difference’ 
(Akram-Lodhi, 2013:18). Through all its differences in ideology and agendas however, 
finding a common ground in order to build a new moral and intellectual power bloc 
around food is central to the building of this movement (Holt-Gimenez, 2011:xvii). And 
because everyone is a consumer of food, food sovereignty offers significant potential 
to strike more chords than other subjects of great concern.  
  
While the first and second generations of food sovereignty have done well to create 
awareness around issues of food miles, climate change, injustice and a broken food 
system, for example, there are further aspects which the food sovereignty movement 
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can elaborate in order to promote a deeper, broader and more inclusive appeal to 
change the food system. Theorists note the gaps that sometimes exist in the food 
sovereignty approach, and emphasise what more could be done to create a more 
inclusive appeal of food sovereignty. This could include highlighting that the corporate 
regime’s industrial grain-livestock agro-food complex is centrally associated with 
climate change and ecological degradation. Furthermore, that food is centrally 
implicated in the livelihood inequalities that define the current critical state of affairs – 
for example, the fact that more people than we think are connected to the corporate 
food regime. These workers, including those in services, agriculture and retail, in both 
the developed and developing world, are not unionised and work in low-wage jobs. 
What this means for the food sovereignty movement is that the food sovereignty 
alternative may be in the interest of many more people than small-scale farmers and 
conscious consumers. But rather, by stressing these links persistently, they may in 
turn bring out the linkages required to give a stronger conviction about the ideals of 
food sovereignty, than is currently the case (Akram-Lodhi, 2013:19). The movement 
can use this key dimension to construct a new common sense ‘around a broad 
democratic alliance of citizens united for change.’ One concrete way by which this can 
be done is to intervene in the ongoing activities of organised labour, to establish 
collective bargaining units and negotiate over terms and conditions of employment 
and health safety. In this way, food can be inserted into other efforts to achieve 
economic justice, and by doing so can bring about the livelihood linkages that are 
needed to give more power to the food sovereignty alternative (Akram-Lodhi, 
2013:20).  
 
From principles to preconditions to practice 
 
From the presentation of food sovereignty principles, characteristics and preconditions 
above, among others, we can learn two things. First we can obtain a greater 
understanding of what food sovereignty entails. It is clear that many of the principles 
which emerged from Via Campesina in 1996 are echoed at the Nyeleni conference in 
2007. Furthermore, the second generation of food sovereignty has drawn from these 
principles and in the presence of the convergence of multiple crises, has elaborated, 
innovated and expanded the food sovereignty reach and practice. But it is clear that 
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more needs to be done. The second lesson to be taken from the above principles and 
preconditions is to approach food sovereignty with both criticism and admiration. 
Criticism because food sovereignty should be regarded as more than a set of 
principles, but it demands concrete steps that ensure concrete preconditions before 
food sovereignty can be achieved. And admiration because it has the potential to bring 
about the much needed change to the current unjust and unsustainable corporate food 
system which is implicated in systemic crises where multiple dimensions converge 
(Rosset, 2011:21). Food sovereignty can thus have positive implications for the 
environment and the majority of people currently oppressed by the food system - not 
only farmers, but also consumers and those who work in other low-wage jobs in the 
corporate food regime.  
 
At the same time, we should question whether preconditions can be universalised. 
Akram-Lodhi does well to draw attention to the fact that we need concrete examples, 
and that we need to consider implications of achieving one principle in the long run. 
For example, achieving agrarian reform on its own as a first step in a capitalist society 
would not promote improved livelihoods for the majority of the people, as another form 
of accumulation would ensue. Thus additional support measures are required to 
ensure that recipients of redistributed land can benefit from that land, for example. 
However, what should also be noted is that while most of the preconditions are 
directed at the global food sovereignty movement, and some are directed at state and 
local levels, in some areas it is difficult to locate a local movement’s roles in achieving 
these preconditions. Furthermore, the ‘messy reality of the present’ is different for 
movements in different countries, cultures, economies and geographies. This raises 
an important concern which Agarwal alludes to. I conclude this argument and the 
literature review by addressing critiques of food sovereignty below.  
 
Critiques of food sovereignty 
 
Food sovereignty and its ideals are not without flaws, and Bernstein (2014) is quick to 
notice them. His key concern is on the ability of small-scale farmers to feed the rest of 
the non-farming world (should all corporate farms be dismantled) (Bernstein, 
2014:1057). Another concern from Bernstein is about the way in which food will be 
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distributed without a market model, should the peasant farmers win the battle. He 
terms this the downstream question (Bernstein, 2014:1051-1052). McMichael 
responds to the first question however with a reminder that small producers still 
account for up to 70 per cent of the world’s food (McMichael, 2015:196). Akram-Lodhi 
would respond that Bernstein’s version of ‘common sense’ is a fruit of the corporate 
regime’s plans to lure in consumers and reproduce the industrial farming model (as is 
being done in Africa) to ultimately increase profits. Yet linked to this, further critique is 
provided by Agarwal (2014:1265) when he assesses the global nature of the food 
sovereignty movement and the way in which its vision is to be adapted to local 
contexts, like that of Akram-Lodhi’s too. For Agarwal (2014:1265) ‘it is equally 
important to recognise that the valuable rights of voice and choice of disadvantaged 
in local contexts cannot always fall in line with preconceived trajectories defined by 
global movements on behalf of the disadvantaged.’ This is an important point, which 
Aerni (2011:30) echoes as he questions the assumption that all farmers would willingly 
choose to return to the peasant way. Perhaps some farmers in the North would, but 
these farmers might not suffer the same challenges that those in the South do. Herein 
lies a paradox within food sovereignty. McMichael provides a strong rebuttal to 
Bernstein’s criticisms, which can be applied to Agarwal’s paradox too. This is 
discussed as I conclude the literature review below.  
 
Overcoming Agarwal’s paradox: Understanding alternatives and context  
 
It is clear that food sovereignty includes a range of struggles, and that critiques on the 
viability of such a movement are necessary. While food sovereignty has a clear goal 
of transforming the food system, it is also evidently quite an elastic discourse and 
practice because the food regime itself is continuously evolving and restructuring. As 
such, McMichael (2015:200) stresses that food sovereignty embodies movement and 
it is an uneasy and organic process. It is further not a movement concerned with clear-
cut solutions, rather, it incorporates a wide range of ideals of a multi-faceted counter-
movement which is gradually feeling its way into the future (McMichael, 2015: 200). 
This is a strength of the movement:  
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The strength of this global movement is precisely that it differs from place 
to place… The world is a complex place, and it would be a mistake to 
look for a single answer to complex and different phenomena. We have 
to provide answers at different levels – not just the international level, but 
local and national levels too (Bové and Dufour, 2001:168). 
 
Food sovereignty has felt its way into South Africa, and is as much a local endeavour 
here as it is a global movement. How it is expressed in South Africa however, and how 
its actors and activists seek to bring about change to the system is determined largely 
by local dynamics (Desmarais & Wittman, 2014:1156). It is for this reason that the 
emergence of the food sovereignty campaign in South Africa, and the local dynamics 
of South Africa require exploration. Furthermore, it is of particular importance that the 
voice and choice of small-scale farmers be made known, in order for the movement to 
address their challenges effectively. Methods detailing how I seek to explore the food 
sovereignty alternative in South Africa are discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The research question has originated out of a pressing need, namely to address a 
condition in South Africa where thirteen million people currently go hungry, in a world 
where hunger is exacerbating as solutions fail in various ways. The literature review 
has shown that a key way in which mainstream solutions such as food security 
initiatives fail is that they do not address the roots of hunger, namely the causes of 
powerlessness in the corporate food regime. At the same time, the industrial food 
system is exacerbating hunger in the long run as it destroys soils, ecosystems and 
biodiversity. The purpose of this research is to explore alternative solutions to hunger 
that exist in South Africa, particularly those that promote food sovereignty and, which 
have as their objectives to localise food systems, demonstrate alternatives such as 
agroecology and which seek to shift the balance of power in the food system away 
from corporates and back into the hands of producers and consumers. In this chapter 
I discuss the methodology used to undertake the research, as I explored the 
underexplored landscape of food sovereignty in South Africa, with a specific focus on 
the nascent South African Food Sovereignty Campaign as a case study. Here I detail 
the research design, data collection methods, the research site, sampling and 
limitations of the methodology.  
 
Methodology to explore food sovereignty in South Africa 
 
Numbers, when exposed serve well to shock us, but at the same time they can 
distance us from real people and real solutions behind those numbers. Since we have 
been distanced from something that is actually very close to us, namely 
powerlessness (a feeling associated too with hunger), I do not seek to tell a story of 
numbers, but rather to provide a qualitative study of the state of South Africa’s food 
system (admittedly, I do use numbers at times – to shock) and the progressive 
responses like food sovereignty that exist to try and give back the power to the people. 
Food sovereignty as an ideal and as a movement encompasses a broad range of 
issues from concerns about seeds to local markets to the agrarian question. As such 
the methodology required to explore food sovereignty involves a qualitative research 
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design. A qualitative approach to research consists of a set of practices that seek to 
make sense of the world, and in the process represent it through a series of interviews 
of conversations with people, thus making their perceptions visible (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2003 in Davies, 2007:10). In addition, this research is exploratory, as I seek 
to use secondary data to understand the food system in South Africa. While research 
on the food system in South Africa has already been conducted (see Pereira, 2013), I 
refer to it in my research, but go further to explore and critique the food system and 
solutions to hunger in South Africa using the food sovereignty framework. In addition, 
this research explores a progressive alternative. There are thus two parts to the 
research which I discuss below. Thereafter I discuss the methods used to obtain data 
to answer each question.  
 
Two research questions 
 
The first question this research seeks an answer to is, very broadly, what is the current 
state of the food system in South Africa? This question is broken down into sub 
questions and is presented in the two chapters following this one. The first chapter 
entitled The South African food system aims to explore the roots of hunger in South 
Africa using a food regime analysis. It seeks to highlight some of the brutalities in the 
food system, citing both numbers and conditions. It further takes a look at solutions 
that exist in South Africa to eradicate hunger. Government’s response to hunger has 
been well documented by McLaren et al (2015) in their report on the right to food in 
South Africa. This is a useful and comprehensive report which I use to draw on a few 
examples of policy responses in various sectors, but then go further and assess civil 
society and business’ response too. The chapter following, entitled How food 
unsovereign is South Africa? assesses the food system in terms of the food 
sovereignty principles and preconditions to determine how far along the path towards 
food sovereignty South Africa is, and where additional intervention might be required. 
Answering these questions lays the foundation for the following question.  
 
The second research question is what does food sovereignty in South Africa look like 
and how is it being achieved? Answers to this question are found in the third empirical 
chapter, Food Sovereignty in South Africa. In this chapter I turn to the case study of 
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the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign and explore its genesis, organisation, 
actors, and importantly how it seeks to achieve food sovereignty. In this chapter I also 
explore what food sovereignty is to those in the campaign, particularly the farmers and 
local activists in order to understand the voice and choice of those fighting for food 
sovereignty in South Africa. Below I explain how I gathered the data required to answer 
these questions.  
 
Research methods 
 
To answer the research questions, I use three key methods, namely a desk review, 
participant observation and in-depth interviews. I discuss each below as it pertains to 
the research questions.  
 
First, in order to locate data that answered questions about the South African food 
system, I used secondary data, news reports and additional literature from searches 
on the internet, in journals, news articles and on google scholar. These documents 
were useful because they provided answers about the conditions of hunger in South 
Africa and brutalities that can be attributed to the corporate food regime. Thereafter, I 
made use of internet searches to locate data on the government’s various policies to 
address hunger. These searches proved challenging, and at times frustrating for two 
reasons. First, because there are a range of policies in South Africa that exist to 
address hunger. Some of these policies are specific to departments, while others 
depend on coordination between a range of departments. While an internet search on 
the policies brought up various applicable policies from the government gazette, and 
government departments, the results were overwhelming as I could not bring any order 
to the numerous, sometimes disconnected policies. Some of these policies also lacked 
implementation plans, and there was no way to establish how the plan was going to 
be carried out. From this range of seemingly disconnected policies it was difficult to 
establish which were the most relevant to my research, which had been implemented 
and which were successful.   
 
The second reason why finding data on policy in South Africa was difficult and 
frustrating was because there is a lack of adequate reporting on these policies at any 
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level of government. Websites are not kept up to date and there is no central location 
to find which policies are still in practice. As such, I returned to the literature. Few 
literature searches returned positive results about what I was looking for, until 
eventually I found the working paper on the right to food in South Africa by McLaren 
et al (2015). This document was helpful because it provided a well-ordered outline of 
policy documents that exist to ensure the right to food in South Africa. Researchers 
had undertaken in-depth studies on the topic and provided both chronological 
accounts of policies and a list of various policies implemented by departments. I used 
the paper to guide my choice of policies, to determine which had been implemented, 
which were currently being implemented and which were outright failures. Accessing 
policies on the internet by searching for them by name thereafter proved a lot easier, 
however progress reports on these policies was also still sometimes scarce. The 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group website (www.pmg.org.za) filled this gap somewhat 
as it provided useful information about policy processes and progress. This non-
governmental website delivers verbatim records of proceedings of parliamentary 
committees. Here some information about the progress in terms of policy could be 
gathered since reporting on different strategies of government departments was found 
to be inadequate. Therefore, to answer the question of the South African food system, 
I made use of purely secondary data, in the form of literature, reports, meeting minutes, 
internet sources and news reports. To assess the state of food sovereignty in South 
Africa, I drew from this data and additional secondary sources to provide a summary 
of the current state of the South African food system. 
 
In order to answer the second question, and gather data about the food sovereignty 
alternative in South Africa, I used three methods. First, document analysis was used 
to answer questions about the genesis of the South African Food Sovereignty 
Campaign, the partners and strategies. I could locate answers to these questions 
easily because progress and minutes from meetings have all been well documented 
in publically available reports, press statements and newsletters. These documents 
are available on the SAFSC website, and are also freely distributed at various SAFSC 
events. To complement these documents, I made use of an additional data collection 
method, namely participant observation, as I discuss below.  
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This method is one that presented itself to me at a later stage in the research, shortly 
after I started fieldwork. While my initial intention was to undertake participant 
observation with five SAFSC activists, to observe, assist and participate in the daily 
duties of their organisations as they promote food sovereignty, this plan changed 
before I had made arrangements for these observations.  
 
Since the beginning of 2015 I volunteered at various events at the SAFSC through a 
connection at The University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg (Wits University). 
While volunteering at a SAFSC event in June 2015 I was met with the possibility of 
getting more involved in the campaign. Soon thereafter I became a part-time volunteer 
at the NGO, the Cooperative and Policy Alternative Center (COPAC) for six months. 
This was an exciting prospect, as not only would I get more access to the participants 
in the campaign, but I would be right at the centre of coordination of the campaign as 
COPAC is currently serving as the secretariat to the SAFSC. In addition, my concerns 
about being a researcher for purely degree purposes were quelled as I would be 
trained to be a food sovereignty activist and assist in the ongoing establishment and 
promotion of the campaign. Being an activist researcher, as I have heard, is an 
important form of ethical research. 
 
As such, the key method used to gain greater understanding of my case study, was 
still by participant observation, but whilst at one organisation for an extended period 
of time whereby I was able to immerse myself in the campaign operations and 
activities. During this time, I was also able to meet activists of the campaign to 
undertake in-depth interviews, the third research method used, as I discuss below.  
 
A final method used to elicit information, this time from those actors and activists who 
make up the campaign, was through in-depth interviews. Data from these interviews 
provided insight into what food sovereignty is in South Africa, according to actors and 
activists. Interviews also provided further insight into the establishment of the 
campaign, and gave me interesting insights into the activists’ visions of what a food 
sovereign South Africa would look like, and what is being done to achieve these 
visions. 
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Together, these three methods gave me adequate data to inform this research. Below 
I describe the research site and sampling methods for the latter two methods in more 
detail.  
 
Research site, sampling and data collection tools 
 
The research site was in Johannesburg since COPAC is based in Johannesburg and 
many of the SAFSC events take place in Johannesburg as it is a central location for 
bringing people together. At these events, SAFSC activists from all over South Africa 
frequently met at a local conferencing venue for various assemblies, festivals or 
training. Being a volunteer gave me an opportunity to attend all these events in 
Johannesburg. These included two activist schools and a seed-saving workshop, 
where I was both a participant and a volunteer. I also attended national coordinating 
meetings, one which was a teleconference and one which was held over two days in 
Johannesburg. Here I was tasked with taking minutes. I also assisted in planning and 
organising the annual food sovereignty festival that took place on World Food Day, 17 
October 2015 at the Greenhouse project in the Johannesburg CBD. This event 
brought together over 200 people from both the public and the campaign. It was a 
space to celebrate food sovereignty, and at the same time I was able to observe and 
take part in different activities and even assist in a session on creative campaigning 
where I demonstrated mural painting.  
 
As a Wits student, I was also tasked with establishing a food sovereignty and climate 
justice forum at Wits. I facilitated many of the meetings of the forum, took minutes, 
communicated with the members and participated in activities hosted by the forum, 
such as documentary screenings and an agroecology training session in the Wits food 
garden. On one occasion I went with the rest of the COPAC team to the West Rand. 
The purpose of the trip was to scope out idle land for the campaign, for activist schools 
and demonstration sites. On this trip we also visited an activist’s farm. This was a large 
farm that had been redistributed to the farmer. The visit gave me insight into what 
happens on the ground, and I learned about some of the challenges of farmers in the 
SAFSC.  
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Finally, most of my volunteering happened at the COPAC office and over email and 
telephone where I was required to follow up with various partner organisations and 
their commitments to the SAFSC. I also assisted with the website and the SAFSC 
newsletter. As such, even though the research site was limited to Johannesburg, I was 
fortunate that activists from all over the country gathered in Johannesburg, where I 
could arrange interviews with them, without having to travel far to meet them.  
 
Interviews were undertaken during the two activist schools, one in June and one in 
July, 2015. These were optimal sites to locate activists in the campaign, who had been 
brought in from all over the country. Here I approached the facilitators and asked 
whether I could attend the schools and observe for research purposes. I was 
introduced to the activists and none had objections to me being there. They were also 
notified that I might approach them for interviews, which I did in between sessions and 
during mealtimes.  
 
Sampling was thus convenience sampling. I had initially decided that I would require 
a certain number of farmers, activists and people from the NGO sector in order to 
obtain a representative sample of the activists. However, after completing the first few 
interviews I realised that many of the actors wore many hats and it was difficult to 
categorise them under one label. I ended up interviewing twelve people in total, each 
had to sign written consent which I explained to them before the interviews 
commenced. To maintain their anonymity, I have used pseudonyms in the report. The 
interviewees’ positions and occupations include urban and rural farmers, community 
development practitioners, members of social movements, coordinators of 
cooperatives, forum coordinators, activists and environmental activists. Although 
many wore various hats, I was still able to make some distinction and analysis in terms 
of their understanding of food sovereignty, which I discuss in chapter six.  
  
Data collection tools included an interview schedule and field diary. The interview 
schedule was a semi-structured schedule that made use of open-ended questions to 
understand the activists’ positions, challenges and understandings of food 
sovereignty. The questions allowed for respondents to give as much information as 
possible, but when information was not sufficient or clear, I would probe the 
respondents. To record data from participant observation at events, I would take notes 
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on my laptop. In some of these events I was required to take minutes, which then also 
served as my field notes. After each event I recorded reflections and observations in 
a field diary. Initially I structured the entries to include the name of the event, a 
description of who was present, my observations, my role, supporting documents from 
the event that were available (for example minutes and press statements) and 
reflections on the entire event. However, as time went on and as activities became 
more frequent, I would just write general comments of observations and reflections 
after each event.  
 
Limitations and ethics 
 
Some of the data collected was not representative of all partners in the campaign, nor 
of all the different types of actors. For example, answers to the question of what is 
food sovereignty? and what does food sovereignty mean for your organisation? only 
reflected understandings of food sovereignty from twelve actors in the campaign. 
While these findings were not intended to be comprehensive, they are however 
supported by a document from the right to food dialogues (meetings held to discuss 
challenges facing people in the food system, which was one of the events that gave 
rise to the SAFSC). These dialogues were hosted by COPAC during 2014 and here 
definitions of food sovereignty from activists present were discussed and recorded in 
the report. This report and its findings provide a much more representative view of 
food sovereignty understandings, while my interviews merely confirm these findings 
and provide further insights into what food sovereignty entails and what it would look 
like if it was achieved in South Africa. Therefore, I overcame this limitation by 
triangulation.  
 
In terms of ethics, it should be noted that I followed all required university procedures 
to apply for ethical clearance to undertake this research. I was thereafter granted 
ethical clearance. During the research phase, in line with my ethical protocols as set 
out in my ethics application, I began each interview by explaining the research to the 
activists, by clarifying my role and theirs in this research. Thereafter I requested that 
they sign a consent form, which all participants willingly did. Anonymity of these 
participants has been maintained as I make use of pseudonyms in this research report. 
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However, because the identity of various organisations in this campaign are publically 
available on the SAFSC website, and on other websites or documents, I could not 
maintain anonymity of them and this was explained to respondents. Furthermore, 
COPAC’s role as the secretariat is also not something that can be kept anonymous, 
as such I made sure to obtain necessary permission from COPAC to undertake 
research of their and the SAFSC’s operations and events while volunteering for them. 
Throughout the research I experienced no ethical dilemmas and all activists and 
respondents were particularly willing to share their understandings, experiences and 
knowledge with me in an effort to bring greater awareness to their challenges and the 
need for the food sovereignty alternative in their communities and in South Africa. This 
attitude is in line with what I would expect from such activists who are also trying to 
promote an alternative system that rests largely on promoting knowledge commons. 
In the following chapters I present findings from the research, beginning first with a 
look at the South African food system. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOOD SYSTEM 
 
Twenty years of democracy in South Africa have seen some great advances in 
addressing the debilitating legacies of apartheid. Economic growth occurred for most 
of these years, and the provision of basic services like houses, water, medical services 
and electricity, as well as infrastructure to ordinary citizens has improved dramatically. 
Despite these improvements there is compelling evidence that structural poverty, a 
major legacy of apartheid is deepening (Ntsebeza and Hall, 2007:2; Leibbrandt et al., 
2012:19). Along with this poverty we are also witnessing an increasingly undemocratic 
and unjust food system, where millions still go hungry (Oxfam, 2014:6).  
 
Why?  
 
In this chapter we turn to the food sovereignty framework to answer this question. 
 
Crises and brutalities in the food system 
 
Many of the issues that prompted the emergence of the food sovereignty alternative 
internationally are deeply felt in South Africa too, and are evident in the inequalities, 
injustices and brutalities present in the food system. In addition to widespread hunger, 
these brutalities include an unjust land structure, corporate control, a nutrition 
transition and lack of support to small-scale farmers, to name a few. These brutalities 
are exacerbated by crises present in South Africa, such as climate crisis, economic 
crisis, water crisis and an energy crisis. These brutalities, crises and the resultant 
hunger can be attributed to, among other things, the South African government’s 
embrace of neoliberal policies of the corporate food regime. In some cases, the roots 
of hunger emanate not only from the corporate food regime’s presence in a country, 
but also evolve from other structures inherent in a country’s history and context. This 
is especially true for South Africa, whose history of apartheid presents a unique and 
important case for understanding the food system and food related policies (Koch, 
2011:2). There is a history for this case which begins long before apartheid was 
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institutionalised. These injustices take the form of racial inequality and are still evident 
today, as I discuss in this chapter.  
 
In order to better contextualise this research on the South African food system and 
food sovereignty, this chapter aims to do two things. First, it describes the current 
brutalities in the South African food system. While highlighting the brutalities, I then 
suggest possible causes of them. These causes are informed by the food sovereignty 
literature and the literature on the South African food system. Causes of hunger in 
South Africa have been well documented and range from the access of food, the 
availability of food, to the lack of resources (such as land, seed, water) for people to 
produce their own food. These causes are similar in other countries too; however, I 
seek to further show the uniqueness of the South African case which has its historical 
roots in apartheid’s exclusionary policies on the majority of the black population. I also 
show how contemporary neoliberal corporate food regime characteristics, such as 
trade agreements, globalisation and the commodification of food is playing out in the 
South African food system to underpin and exacerbate hunger. I thus argue that the 
roots of present day hunger in South Africa can be found in both apartheid policies 
and in the neoliberal regime’s hold on South Africa’s government, which is reflected in 
state policies created to eradicate hunger. 
 
Second, I present, discuss and critique post-apartheid and current strategies to 
address hunger in South Africa. These strategies include those broad national policies 
and strategies drafted by national government institutions, to more sector specific 
policies that deal with nutrition, food production and agriculture, food relief and 
emergency planning. At the same time, I refer to civil society’s and business’ 
involvement in hunger reduction strategies. This is done to paint a picture of what is 
being done in South Africa to address hunger. In doing so, I also critique various 
programmes to reveal several gaps.  
 
This chapter does not only serve to contextualise the landscape in the South African 
food system, but will further inform the following chapter which aims to analyse and 
assess the current situation in South Africa in terms of the principles and preconditions 
to food sovereignty as addressed in the literature, thus providing a food sovereignty 
critique of the South African food system and the current approaches to address 
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hunger. This will be done to locate the space in which the case study, the South African 
Food Sovereignty Campaign is operating, in order to show the parameters and the 
gaps in the food system that might require attention by the campaign, but also to show 
that even though there is despair in the fields, and in the stomachs of so many hungry, 
there is an alternative. This alternative is present in pockets of South Africa and is 
being coordinated by the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign. This campaign 
is a constant reminder that ‘choices are there to be made, and to be imagined. Not just 
choices to turn back the clock, but to imagine something new. This can only happen 
after a cold look at where we are now and what has failed.’ (Patel, 2007:18). So in this 
chapter I take a look at where South Africa is now and I highlight what has failed. 
Insight gained from this and the following chapter informs the chapter thereafter as I 
assess the role, successes and challenges of the South African Food Sovereignty 
Campaign as they fight for a more food sovereign South Africa.  
 
The main argument I develop in this chapter is that South Africa requires a 
fundamental change in its food system. This is because current strategies are not 
working as they do not address the root of hunger in South Africa. I also argue that 
the role of the state needs to be more pronounced. While its policies are certainly 
progressive in some respects (i.e. the promotion of small-scale farmers and a policy 
intent on land reform), they are dogged by mismanagement of funds, poor coordination 
of policy implementation strategies, and are all in some way or another linked to a 
strong focus on economic growth at the expense of people and the environment. In 
addition, coordination between progressive civil society movements and NGOs is 
required to build a strong base to fill government gaps, but more importantly to 
challenge government policy, implementation and put the constitution to work. I also 
show how and why it is necessary to deal with power in the food value chain. Policies 
and a responsive government is key, but it is only by dealing with power at the roots 
of the crisis, that we will be able to see real progress in the lives of the poor and in the 
condition of the environment.  
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Crises, hunger and its causes in South Africa 
 
Below I discuss some of the causes of today’s inequalities particularly relating to the 
unjust agrarian structure – a key driver of hunger in the past – and some of the colonial 
state’s responses to hunger, all in an effort to uphold free-market principles. Thereafter 
I discuss some of these brutalities and their roots in the apartheid regime and the post-
apartheid corporate influenced South African food system. I do this to describe hunger, 
its brutalities and its causes, and to highlight where possible points of intervention are 
situated in order to deal with the roots of hunger. First I briefly discuss the colonial 
government’s approach to national hunger. 
 
Colonial government and apartheid 
 
During the nineteenth century, African small-scale farming comprised of peasant 
farmers, including thousands of black tenant farmers, who would grow fresh produce 
for markets in the cities (Du Preez, 2013:165). After the establishment of the Union of 
South Africa, and during the period between 1913 and 1948, a number of policies were 
established to disrupt this vibrant African small-scale farming sector (which was 
outperforming white farmers at the time) (Bundy, 1988:119), in favour of white 
commercial agriculture. These policies set the basis for the present dualistic 
agricultural structure we see in South Africa today (FAO, 1995:87-88). The Natives’ 
Land Act of 1913 in particular, disadvantaged African small-scale farmers as it 
segregated Africans and Europeans on a territorial basis, restricting Africans to native 
reserves (Bundy, 1988:126). These reserves were allocated only about 7.8 per cent 
of the total land area (Du Preez, 2010:165; FAO, 1995:88). During 1926 the colonial 
government then established a Native Affairs Department. This department was 
tasked with overseeing African reserves. Some argue that the development of the 
Native Affairs Department was the colonial state’s attempt to integrate free market 
principles with the aims of providing relief to and uplifting black people. The Native 
Affairs Department’s desire to uphold free-market principles also influenced its 
decision to provide relief in other situations (Koch, 2011:1). Several additional acts 
served to ensure that African farmers would not join marketing cooperatives, would 
have limited access to markets, farm services and credit. While at the same time 
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measures were put in place to ensure that white commercial farmers would benefit 
from all of these things (FAO, 1995:88). 
 
The National Party however had a different approach. After coming to power in 1948 
it undertook successive acts and policies that significantly undermined the basic 
provision of food, particularly in segregated townships. One of these measures was to 
introduce drastic cuts in funding for feeding school children. This was the first in a 
series of racist government measures aimed at putting an end to food relief, which 
resulted in widespread hunger among Africans and later presented the need for the 
government to re-introduce relief measures to avoid projecting images of crises 
internationally. Other cuts in food relief occurred against the backdrop of deliberate 
dispossession of assets from members of the black majority, such as brutal seizures 
of land and livestock, forceful resettlement schemes into crowded townships and later 
into so-called homelands, while denying black people opportunities to develop, access 
markets, infrastructure and human capital (Koch, 2011:2,4). At the same time, white 
agriculture was still being promoted, especially expansive agricultural production. Up 
until the 1960s, white farmers were incentivised to scale up, purchase more land and 
labour, which were both available at low costs at the time. Thereafter, from the 1960s 
and even more during the 1970s, a shift toward mechanisation was promoted, and 
large farms using capital-intensive technology were created (FAO, 1995:89). The 
above policies systematically set the foundation for today’s vast land and agricultural 
inequalities. In addition, during this time Apartheid further entrenched these 
inequalities as Africans were denied political rights and were excluded from 
participating in the mainstream economy. 
 
End of apartheid but not of hunger 
 
As part of a policy revolution after the end of apartheid in 1994, and influenced by the 
country’s poverty and food insecurity, emphasis was placed on developing a 
comprehensive food security strategy to reverse the apartheid legacies and injustices 
by being more inclusive of all people (de Schutter, 2012:3; Koch, 2011:3,4).  Until then 
the government had not acted on the constitutional provision of the right to food, and 
so the ANC government took up a range of regional obligations to evaluate and report 
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on the state of food security and ultimately address it (Koch, 2011:4). Yet despite 
advances and policies to address this inequality and hunger, harsh brutalities in the 
food system still exist. I discuss these brutalities and their roots below, which have 
been produced by both apartheid policy and the current neoliberal regime.  
 
Brutalities in the food system and their causes 
 
The first brutality, and perhaps the most symbolic and sensitive issue in South Africa 
is that of an unjust agrarian structure. A very unequal distribution of land is one of the 
most prominent legacies of apartheid (de Schutter, 2012:8). Furthermore, the current 
agricultural sector has been built on the back of dispossession of the African 
population (Greenberg, 2010a:1). A key driver of this dispossession is the Native Land 
Act and supporting legislation which, following 1913, led to some seven million people 
being dispossessed from their land, where more than half of these people were 
dispossessed after 1948 (Du Preez, 2013:165). What this also meant is that peasant 
farmers and thousands of black tenant peasants were stripped of their land and 
livestock, thus stripped of their means of subsistence and livelihoods. This is a clear 
contributor to hunger as people no longer had means to produce food for themselves. 
The Land Act was only repealed in 1991. What this unjust land structure has also 
contributed to is a very racially skewed picture of land ownership today, as 87 per cent 
of land is still owned by white farmers, and as a result, a more concentrated agricultural 
sector in the hands of a few. This paved the way for corporate control in the South 
African food system. 
 
A key feature of the corporate food regime is corporate control, when national, 
multinational or transnational corporates dominate certain sectors of the food system.  
This corporate control is playing out in plain sight in the South African food system as 
the food industry is dominated by a handful of large corporate firms that control the 
availability, price, quality, safety and nutritional value of food consumed by all South 
Africans (Oxfam, 2014:24). For example, when looking at production of food, there are 
approximately 40 000 large scale capital intensive commercial producers, and around 
1.3 million small-scale labour-intensive farmers in South Africa. These commercial 
farmers account for 91 per cent of agricultural production and are supported by a 
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powerful lobby group that actively influences government policy. There is similar 
concentration along different nodes of the food system, especially in the retail sector 
where four supermarket chains (Pick n Pay, Shoprite/Checkers, Spar Group Ltd and 
Woolworths) dominate the retail space with a 70 per cent market share between them 
(ACB, nd:6).  
 
What is the cause of this? Liberalisation and deregulation had direct implications for 
downstream activities in the food system. For example, the concentration of power in 
the hands of a few in the food value chain in South Africa can be attributed to the 
ceding of the development path to the private sector that occurred in almost all 
downstream activities in the food system. This allowed for market forces to determine 
the development of the value adding sections of the agricultural economy with limited 
government intervention (Greenberg, 2010a:24; Pereira, 2009:19). During this time 
the wheat producers and millers who were cooperatively organised into Sasko and 
Bokomo merged under the umbrella of a private company, Pioneer Foods, following 
the amendments to the cooperative act in 1993. By the late 1990s Pioneer foods 
already held one-third of the wheat market (Greenberg, 2010a:24). Concentration 
occurred among other cooperatives such that today the chief millers include four 
companies, namely Pioneer Foods, Tiger Brands, Premier Foods and Foodcorp, 
jointly accounting for 98 per cent of milled wheat sales (ACB, nd:5). Furthermore, 
bakers of bread in South Africa are also highly concentrated, for example in 2010, only 
four bakeries held a 50-60 per cent share of the domestic bread market in South Africa 
(ACB, nd:5). Retailers in the food industry are also highly concentrated since 
becoming under the sway of free markets, as mentioned above.  
 
On the other end of this power spectrum are those millers, bakers, food producers and 
suppliers who have been squeezed out of the value chain and who now have no 
bargaining power due to consolidation in the food system. Furthermore, new entrants 
to the sector are being crowded out, denied entry, or are facing an intensification of 
competition (Greenberg, 2010a:25). This also limits consumer choice in terms on non-
GM alternative staple foods, as almost all of the main producers use GM ingredients 
(ACB, 2014:6). Furthermore, corporate control and concentration has also led to 
increased collusion, as I discuss below. 
 
60 
 
In a free market, although government can have full control over the market, it chooses 
not to intervene and by doing so, creates favourable conditions for markets to function 
freely, while still having in place some mechanisms to stop abuse of dominant market 
positions. Yet even with these mechanisms, abuse of these positions has become 
increasingly common as concentration in the value chain intensifies. In addition to 
bread price cartels, collusion has been found in fertilisers, storage, manufacturing and 
retail. Interestingly, however, the National Agricultural Marketing Council found that 
bread price increases for 2008 were not as a result of monopoly pricing in South Africa, 
but was rather due to economic fundamentals governing international markets. 
Greenberg (2010:24) suggests that this is a far bigger problem when the price rise is 
a structural feature of contemporary capitalism. Remedies for such problems lie out of 
reach of national governments as they are purely driven by international market forces 
 
Thus with corporate control comes market distortions as well as increased prices of 
food, which both contribute to hunger. Satgar (2010:1) claims that food insecurity has 
been exacerbated in South Africa as a result of the globalised agro-foods complex, 
and this is because the price of staple foods is dramatically rising (De Wet et al., 2008; 
Satgar, 2010:1). Hunger is further exacerbated due to the fact that most people 
depend on purchases for food, even in rural areas, where it is believed that rural 
poverty is replicating urban poverty due to dependence on a cash economy (Oxfam, 
2014:12). Another cause of hunger, and it was a key finding of the Oxfam report on 
hunger is that ‘jobs and livelihoods do not provide enough to buy adequate food.’ Here 
we see the failure of the food security paradigm, for while there is adequate food 
available in South Africa, livelihoods are not providing enough cash to purchase food 
at the household level. This brings in another dimension of the structural inequalities 
inherent in the food system, which are linked to the structure of the South African 
economy, namely vast inequality and unemployment. If South Africa has an economic 
system that still excludes 25,5 per cent of the population (StatsSA, 2015:iv), how will 
hunger ever be eradicated in a sustainable way? The grant system, which I discuss in 
the policy section of this chapter, cushions many people from hunger and has been 
praised for its reach, for without it there would be many more people suffering on a 
daily basis. However, the grant system is merely a band-aid approach that does not 
deal with the root cause of the problem. As such it continues to create dependency in 
a system where social grant increases are not keeping up with the food price increase 
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(SPII, 2015:4). A more sustainable solution to lack of purchasing power could be to 
improve working conditions of people so that they can actually afford food, particularly 
farm workers’ conditions who currently earn far below the minimum wage, and who, 
over the first ten years of democracy have seen over 2.35 million farm evictions, only 
one per cent of these involved a legal process (Greenberg, 2010a:17). Furthermore, 
if the ability to purchase food is a key determinant of hunger, then creating jobs could 
prove sustainable. This could include the promotion of state-subsidised labour-
intensive agriculture, or more sustainable climate jobs in the face of climate change. 
The National Development Plan of South Africa states that one million new jobs can 
be made through labour intensive forms of small-scale farming in communal areas 
and on redistributed land, especially in niche crops such as berries, nuts and olives. 
However, in order to achieve this, expanded access to land and water is necessary. 
But even these are not sufficient, and a wider structural change is still required 
(Cousins, 2013:116). Furthermore, the type of farming is also questionable for these 
proposals for more jobs, for if they make use of pesticides and fertilisers, there is 
potential for great ecological degradation, another stark brutality of the industrialised 
agriculture and food processing model, which is a key feature of the corporate food 
regime as I discuss below.  
 
Large scale agriculture can further contribute to ecological degradation and climate 
change, another important brutality of the corporate food regime which requires 
attention. While corporations have been obsessed with producing as much food as 
possible, no matter the environmental cost, it would seem that the food system has 
been remarkably successful. However, from a sustainable development perspective, 
the food system is contributing to environmental stress and climate change which 
could exacerbate hunger in the long run. According to the world’s leading authority on 
food policy, Tim Lang, sooner or later the food system will have to be radically 
rethought, and designed around what the earth can deliver and what human bodies 
need (Branford, 2011:24). This sentiment is echoed by the UN in their trade and 
environment review (2013), as it is stressed that “the world needs a paradigm shift in 
agricultural development from a green revolution to an ‘ecological intensification’ 
approach.’ Currently however, the food system in South Africa is designed around 
what capital wants.  
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In its pursuit of economic growth, as a water-scarce country with little arable land and 
increasing dependence on coal-fired power and oil imports, South Africa’s economy 
is testing the limits of its resource constraints (von Bornman and Gulati, 2014: 6). In 
particular, its agriculture sector is depleting resources and contributing to increased 
pollution, leading to problems such as loss of genetic resources, increased pest 
hazards, pesticide and fertiliser pollution, phosphorous, fossil fuel, water and soil 
depletion due to farming intensification of single crops on vast expanses of land to 
promote efficiency and uniformity (monocropping) and increased use of pesticides, 
continuous tillage and poor irrigation management (Swanepoel et al., 2014:91) which 
together destroys the soil’s vital organisms and ecosystems (Branford, 2011:22). The 
agriculture sector is also increasing the spread of water-borne diseases and 
salinization (Aihoon and Kirsten, 1994:127). The rate of this degradation is increasing 
rapidly as general household survey results show that in 2002, 15.5 per cent of 
households reported land degradation in their communities or on their own or 
neighbouring farms. This figure increased to 33.9 per cent in 2013 (McLaren and 
Moyo, 2014:10). In addition, while catering for capitalism’s needs, agriculture has 
increased food miles, is heavily dependent on fossil fuels and pesticides, thus 
contributes to further ecological degradation and climate change. Interestingly, further 
along the food value chain, processed foods are contributing to greenhouse gas 
emissions as they have the highest freight carbon footprint (over 20 per cent) across 
the road corridors in South Africa (Branford, 2011:11).   
 
These brutalities against nature in turn affect and exacerbate the challenges for the 
production of food in South Africa as climate change contributes to shifts in rainfall and 
temperature patterns, and as extreme rainfall events have increased in frequency, and 
mean annual temperatures have increased at least 1.5 times the observed global 
average of 0.65˚ (Ziervogel et al, 2014:605). Climate change has also led to increases 
in carbon dioxide levels, shrinks in arable land and shifting of available water supply. 
This affects food systems in several ways, but importantly it directly affects production 
as weeds, plant diseases and pests proliferate and drought or floods hamper yields 
(von Bormann and Gulati, 2014:10; Branford, 2011:10). In the event of increased 
climate change, the production of cereal crops is viewed to be of particular concern as 
irrigation demand will increase in the order of four to six per cent (Ziervogel, 2014:609). 
This puts increased stress on South Africa’s water supply as currently 98 per cent of 
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South Africa’s water supply is already allocated (von Bormann and Gulati, 2014:5). 
Mounting environmental degradation, stress and resource pressure further leads to 
increased food prices, and ultimately hunger. As such, in South Africa, environmental 
stress is increasingly becoming a key driver of hunger (Misselhorn, 2006:124).   
 
All of the above brutalities, including dependence on purchases for food, and 
monocropping of the most economical genetically modified grains (yet still 
unaffordable for many), have contributed to a further brutality in the food system, a 
nutrition transition, as I discuss below.  
 
A nutrition transition is described as a shift from a diet rich in whole grains, fruit and 
vegetables to one that is high in saturated fat, added salt and sugar (Zingoni, 2009:4). 
A nutrition transition is often accompanied by an increase in various nutrition-related 
non-communicable diseases. This transition is evident in South Africa and implications 
of the gradual nutrition transition are dire (De Schutter, 2012:17). These include a 
decline in the quality of food, nutritional deficiency, obesity (70 per cent of women in 
South Africa are currently overweight – a sign of malnutrition and bad health), stunting 
(26.5 per cent of children are stunted) and underweight children (Pereira, 2014:18; 
Chopra et al, 2009:6-9). The proliferation of supermarkets also contributes to this 
nutrition transition as it embodies a shift to an industrialised food system which 
jeopardises dietary quality and encourages a move from a more indigenous diet such 
as legumes and sorghum, to a nutritionally deficient diet highly reliant on processed 
meat and maize (Greenberg, 2010a:9; Pereira, 2014:18). Together, the above 
phenomena lead to growing health concerns for an increasing number of South African 
citizens, particularly women and children (Satgar, 2010:6; De Schutter, 2012:4).  
 
Why are people turning to supermarkets and ‘big food’ (large commercial entities that 
dominate the food and beverage industries) in the first place? The answer is that they 
often provide cheaper, more convenient foods than those available from smallholders, 
and also because the various strategies to promote ‘big food’ and more ‘modern diets’, 
are winning customers over. These strategies include increased availability and 
affordability of these foods, coupled with marketing strategies to make products more 
acceptable and desirable. Success of the big food industry is evident in the increase 
of sales of almost all packaged food in South Africa (Igumbor et al., 2012:1-2), but also 
64 
 
in the prevalence of non-communicable diseases. Big food has also won on the staple 
food front, and has contributed to the nutrition transition from not only traditional grains 
to more processed grains, but South Africa is the first and only country in the world to 
cultivate a genetically modified staple food. Genetically Modified white maize, and now 
wheat which has also been contaminated with Genetically Modified soya, leaves South 
African consumers with little choice but to consume diets with Genetically Modified 
foods. The safety of these foods for human consumption has not yet been proven, 
while the pesticides used on GM crops, such as Glyphosate, have been confirmed a 
probable human carcinogen by the World Health Organisation (ACB, 2015b:13).  
 
‘Small food’ on the other hand, a healthier and safer alternative to ‘big food’, cannot 
compete with these expensive industrial agriculture techniques and marketing ploys 
and is thus being pushed aside, as are the farmers that produce local varieties of 
vegetables and fruit. A further reason why big food has been allowed to squeeze out 
the small farmers and producers is because of the lack of state support or favourable 
regulation for these small players.  
 
The demise of smallholder farmers and lack of smallholder farmer support from 
government is another brutality of the corporate food system as a result of international 
trade policies (Windfuhr and Johnsen, 2005:6). During the 1980s, before the signing 
of the Marrakech agreement in 1994 (an agreement that would ensure worldwide 
agricultural deregulation), South Africa had already committed to deregulation in its 
agricultural sector. When this agreement was finally ratified and more states were on 
board, it had a significant impact on agricultural supply chains across the world, as it 
obligated states to reduce tariffs on agriculture. South Africa reduced its tariffs at a 
much quicker rate than required and proceeded to become a member of the Cairns 
group which supports the unilateral liberalisation of agricultural trade (Pereira, 
2013:14). Since then the South African agriculture sector has been increasingly 
exposed to international market impulses and has more recently become a net 
importer of various agricultural products and food (Fukuda-Parr, 2012:8; Igumbor et 
al, 2012:4; Pereira, 2013:14). Furthermore, South African agribusiness is continually 
having to maintain competitiveness in order to survive in the new international 
competitive market. What this has resulted in is significant trends towards cooperation 
and coordination in the agribusiness supply chain of South Africa (Pereira, 2013:19), 
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which means that small-scale farmers, rural smallholder farmers’ communities, 
pastoralists and fisher-folk are unable to compete and are continually squeezed out of 
the market. Furthermore, the opening up of agricultural markets for food imports has 
put many small and medium producers in developing countries in competition with 
competitors on the world market (Windfuhr and Johnsen, 2005:6,7). What this means 
is that in South Africa global commodity prices now dictate what local producers 
receive for their produce, regardless of the cost of production. As such, most farmers 
have no control over what prices they want to receive for their produce, they have 
instead become price takers (Greenberg, 2010a:27). What this has also contributed 
to is the necessity for the South African government to promote agriculture that can 
compete at a grand scale, thus we have seen government support for farmers skewed 
toward large scale farmers who are already successful, at the expense of support for 
small-scale farmers. 
 
Above I have highlighted a few of the brutalities facing the South African food system 
which directly or indirectly impact the South African people, particularly the poor, 
marginalised and the small-scale farmers. From the above it is now clear that causes 
of hunger run deeper than access to food, but have their roots in colonial, apartheid 
and current neoliberal policies, and also in the international food regime where food 
has become a commodity to make a profit, where markets determine prices and 
producers and consumers of food are mere cogs in the food regime profit machine. 
This system has produced a range of brutalities, to which solutions cannot be one-
dimensional, nor can they solely be local. To get to the roots of hunger, a more 
integrated response would be required to address the brutalities at every node along 
the food chain, but more than that, structural responses are required to challenge the 
power at play in the food system. In the recent past, the post-apartheid government of 
South Africa has sought to undertake integrated policy approaches to address hunger. 
Below I discuss these policies as well as other more sector specific plans and 
programmes of government departments, civil society and business alike. 
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Strategies to address hunger 
 
A range of strategies in South Africa exist to fulfil the right to food and address the 
abovementioned brutalities that emanate from the neoliberal regime and apartheid. 
These strategies range from state interventions and policies, for example land reform 
policy to address apartheid inequalities of land dispossession, or social protection 
interventions intended to address poverty and hunger of the poorest. In addition, a 
range of civil society actors, such as NGO’s, religious organisations and even business 
pursue strategies or interventions such as feeding schemes, to cushion hunger. I 
discuss key interventions below, beginning with the state’s policy strategies and 
obligations to fulfil the right to food in South Africa.  
 
The South African government’s mandate 
 
The adoption of the 1996 constitution was the first marked enactment of one of the 
world’s most progressive constitutions that would guarantee everyone in South Africa 
the right to have access to sufficient food, social security, and appropriate social 
assistance. Section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution of South Africa (1996) states that 
‘everyone has the right to have access to sufficient food and water.’ This obligation is 
extended in section 27(2), according to which ‘the state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation to each of these rights.’  What this further means is that as the 
government seeks to ensure the right to food for its people, it ought not to take any 
actions that could result in increasing levels of hunger or malnutrition. It further 
suggests that a government ought to protect its people from actions of powerful actors 
who might violate the right to food. Finally, the government has the obligation to invest 
in the eradication of hunger (Koch, 2011:4). And while the constitution obligates the 
state to use its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation to the right 
to food, it has made some progress, but is falling short as still so many people, thirteen 
million, are currently faced with hunger (Oxfam, 2014:6). Nevertheless, I discuss the 
various policies and strategies of the state below.  
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Government policies and strategies to address hunger 
 
Misselhorn (2006) outlines a typology of four food security interventions in South 
Africa. These include health and nutrition intervention programmes; early warning 
systems and disaster management; agricultural production interventions and; social 
protection interventions (Misselhorn, 2006: 75-71). This typology is useful to 
categorise various state interventions as there are many in South Africa which are 
carried out by a range of national, provincial and local departments. However, because 
these interventions are classified as food security interventions (as opposed to food 
sovereignty, which focusses on power in the food system too), the typology does not 
account for important and necessary policies that might address the governance 
structure in the food system, the trade policies affecting the food system, as well as 
the state of the environment when producing food, distributing it and attempting to 
alleviate hunger. What the typology also does not account for, and this is partly 
because of the integrated nature of some policies in South Africa, are the policies that 
make use of a range of interventions, thus spanning across more than one typology, 
for example the Integrated Food Security Strategy of 2002, and the National Food 
Security and Nutrition Policy. Nevertheless, these typologies are useful for 
categorising and presenting approaches to South African policy for hunger eradication 
(within each integrated policy, or more focussed individual policies), and for 
highlighting that a broad range of policies are in place in South Africa to deal with 
hunger. Because the more integrated policies cannot be categorised under one 
typology, below I first briefly discuss and comment on the four integrated strategies of 
South African national policy. Thereafter I turn to the typologies to categorise and 
describe various policies and strategies under each one.  
 
There are four key strategies that have been established to coordinate national policy 
that addresses hunger. These include the Integrated Food Security Strategy, the Food 
security policy/Zero hunger programme followed by the Fetsa Tlala programme, 
various objectives within the National Development Plan and finally the National Policy 
on Food Security and Nutrition, implemented under the Food Security and Nutrition 
Programme. I discuss each one below.  
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The Integrated Food Security Strategy (IFFS) of 2002 is one of the first comprehensive 
policies created to address hunger. This policy provides a multidimensional, multi-
sectoral strategy which is broadly developmental and is aimed predominantly at 
household food security in rural areas (Koch, 2011:4). The policy has five broad pillars, 
including production and trading; income opportunities; nutrition and food safety; 
safety nets and food emergency; and information and communication (Koch, 2011:5). 
The policy is coordinated by the DAFF and includes initiatives such as the 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme, support to vulnerable groups, 
school feeding schemes, social grants and a public works system. It aimed at 
eradicating hunger by 2015, which it clearly has not achieved. Its failures are largely 
due to lack of coordination, maladministration and poor targeting of initiatives at a local 
level. The policy also presented a range of gaps such as accessibility, comprehensive 
support to small-scale producers and environmental sustainability to name a few 
(Oxfam, 2014:30). In addition, by placing the responsibility of food security under the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, has implied and led to a common 
held belief that there is a bias towards food production to achieve food security, rather 
than physical and economic access (McLaren et al., 2015:40). This is important 
because currently not everyone can produce their own food. 
 
During 2009 another policy with various programmes to address hunger was drafted, 
namely the Food Security Policy/Zero hunger programme. This programme, based on 
a successful progressive Brazilian model, was anticipated to be a move in the right 
direction if implemented correctly. One of its important features was that it would 
develop market channels through bulk government procurement of food linked to the 
emerging agriculture sector (DAFF, 2012:19; Oxfam, 2014:30). The programme was 
to be undertaken by a range of actors including the Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries, to improve food production capacity of households and poor resource 
farmers, and also to develop market channels for emerging farmers to supply 
government channels. The Department of Social Development was tasked with 
ensuring access to food through cash transfers, food transfers, skills development and 
school feeding programmes with the assistance of the Department of Basic Education, 
while the Department of Health was to improve nutrition security by creating public 
awareness and nutrition awareness (DAFF, 2012:21). The programme would be 
overseen by cabinet and provincial legislatures, and at the same time the need for 
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national and provincial food security forums was stressed as an important means to 
provide ‘platforms for different stakeholders engaged in food security and nutrition 
issues in South Africa to participate in shaping the Government plan of ending hunger 
in South Africa’ (DAFF, 2012:17). The strategy was bold, but very fragmented. 
Departments were isolated in the implementation of the plan and the drivers of the 
plan, namely the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries did not have a 
good track record of delivering the minimum requirements of their grand plans. One 
member at the meeting where the DAFF presented their proposal exclaimed that ‘the 
department seemed always to have grand policies and plans, but these did not 
translate into real implementation’ (PMGa, 2012). Since the above meeting the 
suspicions came true.  
 
The policy did indeed fail, but was also dogged by political controversy as stories of 
partnership or adoption of the president Zuma’s own NGO, Masimbambisane Rural 
Development Initiative. There were later allegations of the funnelling of 800 million 
rand of funds to Masimbambisane. Later the whole programme was scrapped and it 
was stressed that the project was only supposed to be a campaign. Documents and 
plans don’t suggest anything about a campaign however. This policy shows the blatant 
failure of a policy intended to assist millions of hungry people, based on a successful 
Brazilian model. While the policy writers were doing something right by learning 
lessons from other developing countries, the lack of reporting on progress, the lack of 
transparency and the inconclusive arguments coming out of the ministers (based on 
media reports – since policy progress on government websites is absent) suggest that 
even if South Africa did manage to create a progressive policy, implementation is still 
a challenge. While the budget gets misallocated, the hungry still suffer.  
 
The National Development Plan that was developed during 2011 and implemented 
during 2013 is another example of optimistic government plans and policies to 
eradicate hunger. The document outlining the National Development Plan begins with 
a ten-page vision statement of the ideal South Africa in 2030. The statement is a story 
from the future that includes phrases like ‘we feel healthy’, ‘we are resilient’, ‘we are 
self-sufficient in community’, ‘we have food on the table’, ‘we live and work in it [our 
land], on it with care, preserving it for future generations. We discover it all the time. 
As it gives life to us, we honour the life in it’ and finally, ‘since 1994 we’ve changed our 
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laws to obey our constitution’ (NPC, 2011:11-22). This is a picture of an ideal South 
Africa, but present reality and present government failure thus far makes it clear that 
this is just an ideal. An ideal that cannot be met especially if government lacks the 
political will, and more importantly, if inequality is still rampant, which it will be even if 
the targeted objective of reducing inequality from a Gini coefficient of 0.69 to one of 
0.6 is met. A key problem with this plan is that it is trying the same strategy that has 
been tried in the past 20 years, with a less competent government (particularly the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). Its objectives are also purely 
measured in economic terms, and it is argued that economic growth will radically 
reduce poverty, but does not take into consideration the implications of this on nature, 
a very big limiting factor.  
 
Perhaps the strategy differs a little from previous ones, as it intends to ‘realise a food 
trade surplus, with one third produced by small-scale farmers’ (NPC, 2011), thus 
attempts are made at including small-scale farmers in the share of the pie. However, 
in promoting small-scale farmers, the report mentions nothing about the dominance of 
agribusiness and how to reduce their power – a key precondition stressed by food 
sovereignty proponents, to ensure that small-scale producers succeed. Furthermore, 
further along the report it becomes clear that economic growth is key for improving 
income and reducing inequality, at the expense of the environment. The report 
suggests that future prospects of increasing industrial agriculture would benefit the 
economy, but it does not mention how industrial agriculture might negatively impact 
the environment. It seems that whatever would increase growth takes priority over 
poverty and the environment, while policy makers can only hope that growth will trickle 
down to the poor and hungry and small-scale farmers, and environmental damage can 
be repaired with money. Another example is its plan to support small-scale farmers 
that follows the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) model (NPC, 
2011:89). This plan, is one that will lock African countries in to accepting patented 
seeds, pesticides and fertilisers, which does not align with the vision ‘we live and work 
in it [our land], on it with care, preserving it for future generations’ furthermore, putting 
pesticides into the soil is certainly does not align with the vision that we ‘honour the 
life in it.’ The implications that the AGRA model will have on the food system, on 
farmers, indigenous knowledge and seed sovereignty is dire.  
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Perhaps the picture painted by the Southern Africa Food Lab (SAFL) (2015) is a more 
realistic one. Their report on the future of food in 2030 presents various scenarios of 
what might be likely if we continue on the path that we are on. They state that by 2022 
there will be limited declines in overall soil fertility across the country, with Africa’s 
Green Revolution being one of the compounding factors, and in 2030 average 
temperatures will be one degree Celsius higher than in 2005, which results in more 
extreme weather events (SAFL, 2015:8). As a result of compounding factors, by 2030 
the inequality gap will widen between those who have resources to make a plan in 
such hot and dry weather conditions, and those who have no viable options. 
Furthermore, in 2030 ‘the income streams of small-scale farmers, subsistence farmers 
and farm workers are drying up’ (SAFL, 2015:9). This picture is in great contrast to the 
cheery vision expressed in the National Development Plan, however I would argue 
that at the current rate of progress in government to act on its policy, and because of 
the current system’s relentless drive for profit, at the expense of all else, the Food 
Lab’s picture is a more realistic one.  
 
A final policy, which was created to replace the Integrated Food Security Strategy, is 
the National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security. This policy is intended to serve as 
a common reference for all players in tackling the food and nutrition insecurity problem. 
It further emphasises the need for synergy in order to reduce duplication of effort and 
resources (DAFF, 2014:3-4). The strategy to implement this policy was approved in 
2013 to continue responding to the hunger challenges in South Africa. The 
implementation strategy recognises that measures such as social grants, feeding 
schemes, fortification of staples, moderation of food prices and subsistence farming 
support to address household level food and nutrition are important, but further 
stresses that they are inadequate and should be expanded. This policy starts out well, 
is very detailed and picks up challenges of previous policies and strategies, and 
therefore stresses the need for better coordination and monitoring of responses to 
hunger. It also focusses attention on support for smallholder producers with capital, 
and seeks to link them under the government food purchase programme. Its objectives 
are very similar to the Zero Hunger Programme, however it differs in key ways. First it 
has a very detailed implementation plan, and second it recognises climate change and 
the associated risks for the hungry. As such it introduces a food and nutrition security 
risk management element, which includes increased investment in research and 
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technology to respond to the production challenges currently facing the country, and 
also to ensure that prime agricultural land is protected from being alienated by other 
activities such as mining, property development and game farming (McLaren et al, 
2015:42). This is a good proposal, but why it doesn’t specify that other farmers’ 
(especially small-scale farmers) land can be protected from these activities too is an 
important question to ask. It differs in a third way from the Zero hunger programme 
and also from the Integrated Food Security Strategy in that it recognises the need for 
inclusive engagement of all the relevant actors and stakeholders in the various 
sectors, however this engagement is only nominal (RSA, 2014:7). In a joint civil society 
statement on the policy, organisations stress that the public has not been consulted in 
the drafting of the policy or its implementation, and where consultations had been 
planned, no public awareness was raised about these consultations (Section 27, 
2015). As a result of lack of public consultation, not only is the policy revealing 
immediate failure to implement what it has promised (to consult all necessary 
stakeholders), but in doing so it is failing to engage with those actors who have been 
working on the ground and with the hungry. Neither has it engaged the hungry, 
themselves. Is also deficient in its identification of problems with the food system in 
South Africa (Section 27, 2015). Progress on the implementation of this policy cannot 
be commented on as it has not yet been implemented at the time of writing.  
 
Before turning to additional strategies that aim to address hunger in South Africa, it is 
important to note that although some of the above policies and implementation 
strategies have sought to address hunger in ambitious and progressive ways, for 
example by integrating small-scale farmers into the food system, and initiating 
agroecology gardens in Durban to increase community self-resilience, recurring trends 
in the above four policies prevent them from dealing sufficiently with the brutalities in 
the food system. These trends include the lack of public consultation, lack of political 
will, poor implementation (or no implementation at all as in the case of the Zero hunger 
programme), and lack of coordination between national and provincial departments. 
These recurring trends in turn limit access to food to millions of people and contribute 
to the failure of the state in many respects to eradicate the brutalities from the food 
system. At the same time the brutalities are being exacerbated and have given rise to 
increasing responses from civil society and business as they recognise a need to fill 
in the gaps and supplement governments initiatives. In the following section I present 
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a range of additional policies and strategies to address hunger by government and 
these additional actors. These will be discussed as I draw on the four typologies of 
hunger as discussed by Misselhorn.  
 
Additional strategies and policies to address hunger in South Africa  
 
Further strengths and weaknesses of the above policies are addressed in relevant 
sections below as I turn to address Misselhorn’s four typologies to address hunger as 
applied to South Africa. I also highlight additional policies and strategies under each 
typology, including the various civil society and business approaches intended to 
address hunger in South Africa to show the weaknesses, strengths and possibilities 
to combat hunger that exist in these sectors. 
 
The first typology, health and nutrition intervention programmes, are designed to 
improve nutritional status. This can be done by providing nutritional supplements in 
the short to medium term to relieve nutritional symptoms of hunger, and can include 
health and nutrition education, micronutrient supplementation or fortification 
programmes, growth monitoring and supplementary feeding programmes.  
 
A key strategy under this typology in South Africa is the Department of Health’s 
Integrated Nutrition Programme. This strategy was implemented in 1995 and has 
guided the policy for nutrition in the health sector ever since (McLaren et al., 2015:49). 
The department’s recent publication, entitled the Roadmap for Nutrition in South Africa 
2013-2017, details priorities for the five-year period from 2013-2017. It is a child-
focussed approach, with a key goal of decreasing maternal and child mortality through 
improving infant nutrition during the first 1000 days of life (since it has been established 
that maternal and child under-nutrition are responsible for more than one third of all 
deaths of children under five) (DoH, 2013b:8, 10). To achieve these aims, various 
programmes, including food fortification programmes, vitamin A supplementation, 
breastfeeding promotion and nutrition education have been established.  
 
The vitamin A supplementation programme is one of the flagship initiatives of the 
programme. It involves providing children age 6-59 months with Vitamin A capsules 
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periodically. This programme has proved to be somewhat successful as the uptake 
rate for children age 0-6 months has been 100 per cent nationwide, an increase from 
62.8 per cent in 2003 (McLaren and Moyo, 2014:11). The intervention has not been 
as successful for infants aged 12-59 months, as the percentage receiving supplements 
was only 42.8 per cent in 2012 (DoH 2013a:49). This can be due to the fact that 
children are no longer required to visit clinics after 12 months once they have had their 
last required vaccination at 18 months of age and also as a result of lack of education 
around the importance of vitamin A supplementation. Furthermore, in terms of the 
impact of the intervention, the prevalence of stunting has increased from 28.4 per cent 
in 1999 to 36 per cent in 2012 while, the prevalence of vitamin A deficiency is high 
(still 70 per cent) despite the vitamin A supplementation programme (McLaren et al., 
2015:50). A further critique of the nutrition programme is that in reality it is a 
programme intended to support micronutrient availability in pregnant women and 
children (McLaren et al., 2015:50), thus neglecting nutrition in school children, women 
who are not pregnant, and men. The staple food fortification however, is intended to 
address micronutrient deficiencies in the larger population, as I discuss below.  
 
Another intervention to address malnutrition is the fortification of staple foods. This is 
a mandatory market-based initiative which requires that a combination of eight 
vitamins and minerals are added to all commercial maize meal porridge and wheat 
flour (Pereira, 2014:12; UNICEF, 2014:5).  The success of this programme is difficult 
to determine since monitoring of the actual fortification of staples and of the impact of 
fortification on malnutrition is challenging. First, monitoring of the fortification process 
has been assigned to health and safety workers who do not see it as a priority nor a 
threat if foods are not fortified. As such, millers are not held accountable to fortifying 
staples. In terms of assessing whether fortification of the staples is having an impact 
on malnutrition levels, this has proven difficult too as a baseline study was undertaken, 
but only two years after staple fortification had been initiated. A such, follow up studies 
can only compare with data that existed after fortification was well underway. Further, 
the lax monitoring may mean that millers are not fortifying as much as they were in the 
initial years of the programme. Another problem with the initiative is that even if a child 
eats three 850g servings of maize meal per day, they will only receive 45.5 per cent 
of the Recommended Dietary Allowance for protein, 85 per cent for iron and only 31.2 
per cent of vitamin A (Pereira, 2014:12). So even if meals are fortified, they are still 
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not sufficient to ensure adequate nutrition. Furthermore, fortification programmes have 
no impact on those who cannot afford food in the first place. Such people are however 
sometimes covered by social relief programmes that provide fortified food packages. 
For example, Stop Hunger Now, an NGO which provides meal packs consisting of 
rice, lentils and a nutrient pack, are other means by which nutrient deficiency is 
approached by the civil society sector in South Africa. However, the reach of these 
programmes is not far enough to cover all thirteen million hungry people.  
 
While all of these programmes are beneficial and indeed necessary in the short term 
to alleviate inadequate nutrition and the range of conditions associated with it, such 
as malnutrition, stunting, blindness, and kwashiorkor, what they all fail to do is ask the 
question of why people are not consuming sufficient micronutrients in the first place. 
By not asking this question these programmes fail to address the problem of 
malnourishment at its roots. In the process those who are causing hunger, such as the 
bread price colluders continue to hold onto power in the food system, by adding 
‘fortified’ to their bread as a marketing ploy, while the small millers, farmers and food 
producers they pushed out are barely managing to purchase their nutrient-stripped 
and then fortified staple foods. A more sustainable solution might be the promotion of 
more nutrient rich staples, such as indigenous crops like sorghum. These crops would 
not only ensure increased nutrition, but can also assist in times of natural disaster such 
as droughts as they are more resilient. I discuss the second typology, early warning 
and disaster management below.  
 
Early warning and food security monitoring systems, and disaster management 
 
Early warning and disaster management includes those interventions implemented to 
monitor food supply and demand, identify regions of severe food shortages and to 
quantify emergency food requirements. These are also interventions that provide 
timely and effective information, for example, in the period of approaching famines, to 
allow individuals, areas, farmers and communities to take action to avoid or reduce 
the risk and prepare for effective response (van Zyl, 2005:26). Disasters in South 
Africa include storm surges, wildfires, floods and droughts, while the latter three place 
agriculture at a high risk of vulnerability (DEA, 2015:22) and have significant 
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consequences for food supply and food security in different provinces (DEA, 2015:22; 
Gbetibouo et al., 2010:181).  
 
In the past it has been the government’s responsibility to respond to disasters, 
however these interventions often proved insufficient due to lack of coordination, 
communication and corruption. The Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries 
sought to rectify past failures by instituting a disaster management Act (57 of 2002) 
and a National Disaster Risk Framework, 2005. This act (2002:22) notes that the 
failure of past response measures and interventions, particularly on post disaster relief 
instituted by government, international organisations, agencies and donors, were due 
to the lack of priority given to disaster relief in national policies, and this is what resulted 
in the defensive and reactive measures to the crises. Responses like these sometimes 
even further increase vulnerabilities by fostering and increasing dependency on 
internal or external assistance. To combat these past problems, the Act and the 
Framework seek to ensure that emphasis is placed on addressing agricultural risk 
management, particularly by strengthening early warning systems and by building 
resilient farming communities in order to ‘reduce or prevent the potential losses from 
hazards, assure prompt and appropriate assistance to victims and achieve rapid and 
effective recovery’ (DAFF, 2012:12).  Furthermore, in the face of climate change, the 
act seeks to ensure that such interventions are supplemented by climate change-
related policies and programmes (GCIS, 2014: 32).  
 
A range of institutions, policy obligations and mechanisms are currently in place to 
forecast and respond to disasters. These include national, provincial and local 
government disaster management frameworks and plans. At a national level the 
National Disaster Management Committee is responsible for developing frameworks 
for government’s disaster risk policy and legislation and facilitating and monitoring their 
implementation. At this level a National Disaster Management Information System was 
initiated to establish an early warning system, disseminate warnings and information 
and profile vulnerability. At a provincial level, each province is required to develop a 
Disaster Management Center and a Framework consistent with the national act and 
framework. At the local level, municipalities are also required to establish disaster 
centers, but there are no clear guidelines for establishing these centers (DEA, 2015: 
25-28).  
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These institutional arrangements, the act, and the framework are comprehensive and 
encourage working with stakeholders to create partnerships. Importantly community 
participation and coordination between spheres of government and various 
departments is also encouraged. However various gaps exist in these policies, 
including lack of coordination between departments and inadequate capacity at 
provincial and local levels, while some district municipalities have not established 
disaster management centers, as such have no disaster plans in place. At the local 
level, disaster and risk management is not adequately funded or incentivised (DAFF, 
2014: 43), showing that past gaps have not been dealt with as risk management is still 
not prioritised. While the act and the framework do well to mention the importance of 
climate change adaptation, the implementation of such policies requires assessment.  
 
By looking at the response to the recent devastating drought caused by El Nino events 
during 2015/2016 in South Africa, where five provinces gazetted drought status, one 
can broadly assess the success of the implementation of the disaster management 
framework and find that the response by government was still defensively reactive, 
lacking resources and a coordinated plan. Furthermore, those plans in place to adapt 
to changing climates are questionable. For example, in a media briefing on the drought 
by the inter-ministerial national government committee set up to devise plans around 
the drought, it was stressed that government had not only woken up after the drought 
was in full effect, and that they had in fact been doing a lot in response to the drought. 
However, the range of programmes cited at the press conference were mostly delayed 
and reactive (as opposed to proactive). These include drought relief packages, the 
dissemination of water tanker and drilling of boreholes. Other plans cited included a 
range of plans from the framework which are still only a policy intent, these include a 
strategy to strengthen planning and implementation in order to anticipate and reduce 
risks to climate vulnerability and change, an intent to look at means by which water 
can be harvested, plans to rehabilitate springs and use alternative water sources 
(ENCA, 13/11/2015) and finally an intent to import 5 000 million tons of maize to cover 
the shortfall in South African maize production after hot weather and poor rainfall 
ruined a third of the crop. Maize reserves in South Africa are said to last until 
September 2016, as such, imported maize will only be needed thereafter and it is 
claimed that there is enough time to ensure this (ENCA, 15/01/2016). While the bases 
are covered in terms of maize supply (and the country will be food secure), it is still the 
78 
 
poorest who will be hit as food prices are expected to rise by 25 per cent (ENCA, 
15/01/2016; Fin24, 18/01/2016). This shows that food security interventions are 
inadequate even (and especially) in times of crisis. 
 
While drought is difficult to recognise, especially in its early stages, crisis management 
is often the response (van Zyl, 2006: 27). Government’s response of crisis 
management is understandable, however it should be stressed that had all of the 
policy intent been translated into action prior to the drought, the impact of the drought 
may have been less devastating, for example if small-scale farmers had functioning 
boreholes, they could have planted their crops. However, because of poor 
infrastructure in areas like Limpopo, small-scale farmers have been hardest hit.  
 
A further question to ask is why a drought resilient plan has not yet been implemented 
since the development of the framework ten years ago. One solution, boasted by 
government is the piloting of water efficient genetically modified maize in South Africa, 
in partnership with business like Monsanto. The goal of this project is to produce 
drought tolerant maize varieties for small-scale farmers, using genetically engineering 
and conventional hybrid breeding. Such a plan, would however only benefit a select 
layer of small-scale farmers, and further trap them into adopting hybrid maize varieties 
and their accompanying synthetic fertilisers and pesticides. Furthermore, evidence 
from the United States suggests that the seed will make minimal impact in drought 
prone areas (ACB, 2015a:5). Nevertheless, the South African government praises its 
own efforts, believing it has been assigned for a noble intervention. These efforts do 
not however present a sustainable solution to climate change in which all farmers can 
participate. Furthermore, the effect of the GM seed MON87460 on human health has 
not been proven to be 100 per cent safe for human consumption (ACB, 2015a:11).  As 
such, the GM seed is not a sustainable risk management solution to climate change 
induced drought. More holistic, inclusionary schemes are required that will not only 
benefit those who can afford it, but all of the small-scale farmers, and ultimately the 
consumers. Despite lack of evidence of the safety of GM seeds, the South African 
government is still encouraging their use (along with pesticides) and in doing so 
depleting nature’s resilience to withstand drought in the future. This plan is thus in 
contradiction to the need to avert risk during climate crisis. Similar contradictory 
policies are included in agricultural production interventions, which I discuss below.  
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Agricultural production interventions 
 
Because the prevailing lexicon sees food insecurity as a crisis of agriculture, 
agricultural interventions are viewed as a key way of mitigating hunger (Misselhorn, 
2006:62). These interventions often focus on ways in which farmers can increase 
production, become more competitive and ultimately supply export markets. In South 
Africa an additional focus for agricultural interventions is on rural areas and importantly 
land reform. This is particularly because agriculture in South Africa has been built on 
the back of dispossession of the African population. Furthermore, because agriculture 
is also built on extractive measures that deplete soil, water and natural vegetation 
(Greenberg, 2010a:1), policy tries to grasp these realities. As such, agricultural 
interventions include introducing high yielding varieties of maize and strategies to 
increase production or soil fertility enhancement for example, as well as rural 
development strategies such as land reform and support to small-scale farmers.  
 
Policies in the agricultural space are mostly coordinated by the Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, while the Department of Rural Development plays 
some role, particularly in the area of land reform. There are a range of policies under 
this typology. In this section I discuss two government interventions, namely land 
reform and the Comprehensive Agriculture Support Programme.  
 
Land reform in South Africa consists of three parts, namely the land restitution 
programme which allows those families who were dispossessed from their land after 
the 1913 land act to apply for the restitution of their land. The first round of applications 
for restitution closed on March 1996, by which 68 878 claims (individual or group) had 
been logged. The second leg is the land redistribution programme, established to 
assist previously disadvantaged people in purchasing land. This is done by allocating 
subsidies so that beneficiaries can purchase land at the market price (Anseeuw & 
Mathebula, 2008:2). Finally, the land tenure reform programme seeks to ensure that 
land rights of farm workers, labour tenants and residents in ‘communal areas’ under 
‘traditional systems’ are secured (O’Laughlin, 2013:9). These various projects have 
run into a host of problems in the past. These include failure to meet its objectives, 
such as the initial target to redistribute 30 per cent of white owned agricultural land 
within the first five years (O’Laughin, 2008:8). It has been argued that insufficient 
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resources have been one of the reasons for this failure (Greenberg, 2010a:5), 
however, according to respected academics and Agri SA’s figures, public expenditure 
on land reform since 1994 could have purchased 37 per cent of all farm land at market 
value. As such, millions may have been lost through bad management, bureaucratic 
incompetence and corruption (Du Preez, 2013:170). Another problem with land reform 
programme is the failure of government to provide post settlement support, including 
access to credit, skills, markets and infrastructure to the beneficiaries of land reform. 
As a result, the vast majority of the beneficiaries have been unable to use their land 
productively (De Schutter, 2012:9). In response to these failures, the Comprehensive 
Agricultural Support Programme arose. This programme sought to enhance the 
provision of support services to promote and facilitate agricultural development. The 
programme is targeted at the beneficiaries of land and agrarian reform and include the 
hungry and vulnerable, household food producers and those who are engaged in 
value-adding enterprises domestically or involved in export (NDA, 2004:1). There are 
six areas of support which the CASP seeks to offer, these include information and 
knowledge management, advisory and regulatory services, training and capacity 
building, finance, on-farm and off-farm infrastructure. This programme however has 
been dogged by delays in support to small-scale farmers, poor planning, lack of skills 
and inability to retain technical staff (PMG, 2012b). The programme has also 
benefitted only a few small-scale farmers with large capital injections (consisting in 
part of GM seeds) instead of a broader base, and has further not been comprehensive 
enough for those that have been targeted (Hall and Aliber, 2010:11). Furthermore, 
proper needs assessments have not been done for those receiving assistance, as 
Manana (Personal interview, 23 June 2015) recalls a group of farmers receiving 
tractors and farm implements, but still lack access to land. 
 
Failure of government to implement successful land reform and small-scale farmer 
support has seen some resistance from civil society, but the response has not been 
as strong as it could be. This is because the National Land Committee, a land based 
network of NGO’s established during apartheid, in response to forced removals of 
millions from white designated areas, was dissolved after the end of apartheid under 
the allusion that the ANC would take forward their struggle and would be truly 
committed to redressing historical injustice. As a result, many from the National Land 
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Committee joined the Department of Land affairs as government officials while others 
took it upon themselves to support the department (Ntsebeza, 2007:128).  
 
Only once it became clear that land reform was not taking the route it was supposed 
to, did the Landless People’s Movement, supported by some members of the National 
Land Committee, emerge. This movement, which brings together rural and urban 
landless people from all provinces marked the beginning of a new phase in the struggle 
for land. In 2002, the movement undertook a march on the World Summit On 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. This was the first substantial 
manifestation of a rural protest movement in South Africa in over forty years (Lahiff, 
2003:39). However, the Landless People’s Movement was rather short lived as by the 
end of 2003 it was in disarray and by 2004 it was formally disbanded as a network. 
While some affiliates continue to exist in an informal network (Ntsebeza, 2007:128), in 
rural areas there is still a low level of civil society organisation that is based on justice, 
active organisation and resistance to imposed power for reasons as stated above, 
namely the belief that the state will bring about the necessary transformation. Of those 
CSOs with land and agriculture as a priority, many are either products of their donor 
non-governmental organisations or of the government itself, while few exist that have 
a radical orientation and who are intent on building up change from the ground and 
making alliances with other grassroots movements (Greenberg, 2010b:15). I discuss 
some of these examples in Chapter six.  
 
In terms of business support in the agriculture sector, various food retailers have 
initiated agriculture projects. For example, Woolworth’s Farming For the Future 
initiative, requires that all of Woolworth’s local suppliers use approaches that grow 
food sustainably and in harmony with nature, using fewer chemicals and integrated 
pest management. While this is a beneficial initiative for preserving ecosystem integrity 
for the future, for promoting climate resilience in the face of climate change, and 
ensures that consumers are eating healthier food (King and Thobela, 2014:165), the 
vast majority of South Africans are left out of this plan, as they can neither afford to 
shop at Woolworths, nor can they ever enter the supplier pool for Woolworths. Looking 
ahead however, Woolworths claims that it will be more accommodating and inclusive 
of secondary produce farmers and will also promote the development and inclusion of 
emerging small-scale farmers through the program (King and Thobela, 2014:166). 
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Spar’s environmental programmes also provide examples of support to small-scale 
farmers. Their 2015 integrated report states that all its farmers in the emerging farmer 
sector will be trained in sustainable farming practices. As of 2014, 58 per cent were 
using sustainable practices. Furthermore, fifteen emerging farmers had already been 
trained in sustainable agriculture practices through one of their projects. Spar also 
allows for individual stores to source goods from local traders, while they are 
encouraged to buy through Spar (Spar, 2015). While these interventions too are a step 
in the right direction, there are a range of farmers who are not included in this plan. 
Furthermore, while Spar is squeezing out smaller retailers with its expansion plans 
(ACB, nd:17), those small-scale farmers who are left out of the plan will have fewer 
places to sell their goods. As such one cannot rely on retail sector to make a drastic 
impact on a great deal more farmers than it is already working with. I now turn to 
explore social protection interventions, of which business like Woolworths is a keen 
player too.  
 
Social protection interventions 
 
At a very basic level, the cause of hunger in South Africa is a problem of production, 
distribution and access. Because social and economic conditions shape vulnerability 
and the environment, social protection interventions do not only cover social-security 
transfers from the state to the vulnerable, but also include the creation of an enabling 
development environment so that people are able to meet their needs through a 
variety of means (Misselhorn, 2006:66).  
 
The government has emphasised social protection in the form of grants to overcome 
problems of access and availability of food in South Africa. This social security system 
has been lauded and is said to be exemplary for other nations in the way that it benefits 
poor households (Koch, 2011:9, De Schutter, 2012:14). Social protection measures 
include social transfers, which comprise of social assistance in the form of child 
support grants, foster child grant, older persons grant, and disability grants. In addition, 
the state provides on a far smaller scale food parcels and school feeding schemes. 
These are the government’s main initiatives to eradicate poverty and inequality-related 
issues such as hunger (Fukuda-Parr, 2012:8; de Schutter, 2012:13). While these 
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interventions show proven impacts on lowering poverty levels, especially in rural areas 
(Everatt & Smith, 2008:16) and also play a critical role in alleviating hunger for the 
beneficiaries (SPII, 2015:35), they do however keep the current system in place and 
do not challenge powers that created hunger in the first place. They further encourage 
dependence on the current systems to provide food that is created by industrial 
agriculture. In response to unsustainability and dependency of the above programmes, 
government programmes supporting the production of food gardens is expanding. For 
example, in 2008/2009, 80 000 food garden starter packs, comprising of seed, 
seedlings, fertiliser and pesticides, were distributed through the national household 
food production programme. During 2011-2012 the plan was to increase the provision 
of food garden starter packs to 140 000 households per year and ensure that 60 per 
cent of households meet their food needs through own production by 2014 
(Greenberg, 2010a:29). This has not yet been achieved. Furthermore, although they 
are trying to reduce dependency on food aid, departments are now ensuring that 
households are becoming dependent on inputs for gardens, including the pesticides 
and seeds (which are usually hybrid or GM seeds for which saving seed becomes a 
problem). In response to this, the Durban/eThekwini Municipality initiated a peri-urban 
agroecology strategy to promote sustainable approaches to the way in which 
agriculture is planned and implemented. As of 2015, six agricultural support hubs had 
been established or were under development. Agri-support hubs include 
demonstration sites of agroecology techniques, training sites, a research and 
development centre on agroecology, a packing and marketing hub and a future seed 
bank (eThekwini Municipality, 2015:104). 
 
Interestingly, other findings from meeting minutes within the Department of Social 
Development show that they did not abandon their mandate for the Zero hunger 
programme and during 2012 and 2013, and were able to link 735 households to 
income generating opportunities, while 183 179 households benefited from the 
Department of Social Development’s feeding programmes and 14 955 food parcels 
had been distributed, however only 355 food gardens had been established by the 
department at a national level (PMG, 2012a). What this shows again is clear 
disconnect between national departments (while DAFF abandoned the Zero hunger 
programme, the Department of Social Development continued with it), and also that 
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provincial governments are perhaps more effective at implementing household 
gardens.  
 
In terms of business’ interventions in social support strategies, there are many which 
often form part of their corporate social investment. For example, Woolworths has 
sponsored the EduPlant programme which together with Absa and Engen assist South 
African schools develop permaculture food gardens. This programme was coordinated 
by the Non-Profit Organisation Food and Trees for Africa (WHL, 2010a). Many similar 
interventions exist in South Africa, including direct relief of hunger. A large number of 
companies have also started supporting the development of food banks. The aim of 
these food banks is to redirect food that would otherwise be wasted or recycled in 
order to give poor people better access to adequate nutrition (Pereira, 2014:29). 
Woolworths, for example gives away millions of rands’ worth of surplus food that is 
past its sell by date to local charities (WHL, 2010b). Shoprite checkers and other 
retailers and business supports the South African Food Bank, which provides 
12 717 279 meals per year at a cost of R1,19 each (FoodBank SA, 2015). Other NGOs 
like Stop Hunger Now have massive programmes to pack and distribute fortified food 
packages to early childhood development centers, schools, universities and 
households, and rely on donor support for sponsoring and packing the meals. The 
project claims that it is not just giving a hand out, but also assisting early childhood 
development centers with a hand up, by helping them develop their facility sufficiently 
to qualify for registration with the Department of Social Development (Stop Hunger 
Now, 2016). While all of these above initiatives are indeed necessary in a country 
where thirteen million go hungry and an additional fourteen million are at risk of hunger, 
for business, many of these are ‘mandatory’ as part of their corporate social and 
environmental responsibility or a choice of business strategy to satisfy consumers. 
What none of these approaches do, however, is challenge the roots of the problem. 
For Woolworths, Spar and Shoprite, it is a means of mopping up the mess that they 
are in part responsible for due to their market concentration and profiteering out of 
food. While in the civil society sector, more sustainable approaches such as assisting 
with planting food gardens that NGOs like Trees for Africa are doing, may prove more 
successful than merely providing food handouts. However they seldom go as far as 
challenging the corporate food regime. Yet in the face of increasing hunger and failed 
state policy to address it, all of the above schemes are welcomed and necessary in 
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the current food system as they provide immediate relief to hungry people. But they 
are not sufficient.   
 
Government is also not in a position to challenge the corporate food regime regime as 
eighty-nine per cent of its Public Investment Corporation’s investment capital is held 
on behalf of the Government Employees pension fund. It holds a 14,69 per cent share 
in Tiger foods, 13.96 per cent share in Woolworths holdings and 13.6 per cent share 
in Spar to name a few. Nevertheless, although ceding a lot of ground to capital, the 
government has imposed regulations that rely on self-regulation of private actors. 
Such regulations are not covered in these typologies by Misselhorn, but are indeed 
important as concentration of power in the food system is a key determinant of hunger 
as we have seen, as such I briefly discuss it below.  
 
Greenberg (2010b:17) highlights four areas of meta-governance which shape the 
boundaries within which private actors can self-regulate, these include consumer 
protection, labour regulations, competition policy and Agricultural Black Economic 
Empowerment (ABEE). These regulations are however hampered by state weakness 
to realise its policies, and in the inability to monitor and enforce compliance 
(Greenberg, 2010b:17). These weaknesses have been evident in the bread price fixing 
which Mukaddam exposed, and further in the introduction of GM staples in South 
Africa. By allowing GM staples into the country presents a blatant undermining of 
consumer protection act whereby Section 61.1 of the Consumer protection act (No.68 
of 2008) states that liability is placed on the producers, importers, distributors and 
retailers for inadequate warnings provided to consumers pertaining to hazards arising 
from or associated with the use of any goods. In the case of GM bread and GM mealie 
meal, no warnings are given to consumers, even though GM foods have not been 
proven 100 per cent safe (ACB, 2010:3).  
 
Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have explored some of the brutalities of the food system, these include 
the unjust land structure, corporate control, a nutrition transition and lack of support to 
small-scale farmers. I have revealed the roots of these brutalities, which are deeply 
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embedded in the corporate food regime and in South Africa’s apartheid and post-
apartheid neoliberal policies. I have further shown how approaches from government 
are failing in countless ways to respond to the needs of the hungry and to address the 
brutalities for reasons such as lack of coordination, poor communication, 
mismanagement and poor implementation of policy. Not only have these policies failed 
to be implemented, but they have failed the people at large, while at the same time, 
government has ceded more control to the corporates in the food regime.  
 
In the more targeted approaches, such as dealing with specific brutalities like nutrient 
deficiency in the food system, government, civil society and business has done well to 
curb micronutrient deficiencies with their various interventions. The same can be said 
for hunger relief, although the reach of these interventions is not nearly sufficient. 
However, while vital assistance is being provided to the beneficiaries, there are still 
gaps in these policies as they fail to address the causes of malnutrition for example. 
One of the causes of malnutrition could be that people have been forced onto refined 
staples like maize meal and wheat bread. As such, a solution encouraging eating more 
maize meal and wheat bread that might have more nutrients due to fortification is not 
a long term solution to malnutrition and is further encouraging a nutrition transition 
further away from traditional and more nutritious food.  
 
Failure of government to implement its plans, or to make changes in the lives of 
millions of South Africans has given rise to a host of strategies by business and civil 
society alike. While some of these interventions might be more realistic than 
government’s and also more successful in implementing them, these interventions too 
fall short in various ways. Most importantly, these interventions do not do anything to 
change the deeply embedded power relations in the food system.  
 
Some civil society organisations have tried and failed, for example the Landless 
People’s Movement and at present there is a void in the agrarian and civil society 
space of a mass based rural movement like that which prompted food sovereignty 
alternative in Via Campesina. One reason for this weakness in civil society is the belief 
that the ANC government would take forward their struggles. This chapter has shown 
that they have not succeeded in doing this, and further, due to the complexity and 
embeddedness of capital in most of the food system’s sectors, and the weakness of 
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the people on the ground, current strategies will prove insufficient. As such, eradicating 
the corporate food regimes brutalities in an attempt to end hunger is not a simple task.  
Alternative solutions are thus required.  
 
Besides the failure of government to implement adequate policy in South Africa, 
coupled with a weak civil society and seemingly benign yet reformist business 
initiatives, there are other fundamental obstacles that stand in the way of ensuring that 
people have access to nutritious, culturally appropriate food. I address these in more 
detail in the next chapter as I turn to assess how food unsovereign South Africa is in 
terms of the principles and important principles to achieving food sovereignty.  
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CHAPTER 5 
HOW FOOD UNSOVEREIGN IS SOUTH AFRICA? 
 
Food sovereignty principles in South Africa 
 
In this chapter I discuss the principles of food sovereignty as applied to the South 
African context. The idea is to highlight policies, statistics and examples in the South 
African food system to explore the way in which food sovereignty initiatives would have 
to overcome issues of powerlessness and hunger in the South African food system. 
By doing so I aim to contextualise the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign’s 
terrain of struggle in order to better understand the challenges, shortcomings, and 
possibilities of realising food sovereignty.   
 
Food for people 
 
In terms of the first principle, a focus on food for people, the adoption of the 1996 
constitution was the first marked enactment of one of the world’s most progressive 
constitutions that would guarantee everyone in South Africa the right to have access 
to sufficient food, social security, and appropriate social assistance. In addition, 
section 20 of the Constitution guarantees children the right to basic nutrition, and as 
such, in order to fulfil this right, the state ought to pay special attention to children as 
a vulnerable group. However even with such a progressive constitution, state 
obligations have not translated into concrete realities for thirteen million people who 
are currently faced with hunger.  
 
In a comprehensive survey on nutritional health, coupled with health examinations it 
was established that in 2013, only 45.6 per cent of the South African population was 
food secure. Of these, 26.5 per cent of all children were stunted, and 70 per cent of 
women were overweight. In terms of demographics, black Africans had the highest 
prevalence of food insecurity of 30.3 per cent, while an additional 28.5 per cent were 
at risk of hunger. Of the white population, the majority, 89 per cent was food secure 
(SANHANES-1, 2013). These statistics of fluctuating hunger paint the picture of a 
distorted national food system that is unable to feed its people even though it is highly 
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modernised in many respects. These statistics further point to the crisis of a hunger 
pandemic in the country which requires complex solutions, more so than what has or 
is currently being undertaken. In short, the fact that the right to food is enshrined in the 
constitution is a great achievement, and South Africa is among one of 20 countries in 
the world who have this provision (Fukuda-Parr, 2012:7). However, an urgent 
realisation of this right is necessary. This will involve promoting access to nutritious 
food, while realising that social assistance programmes are insufficient in the long run. 
Ensuring the right to food also involves protecting citizens from actions of powerful 
actors who might violate the right to food. A food sovereignty approach seeks to take 
into account these inadequacies of current practices, promote those that will ensure 
change and expose the real reasons why the right to food is not being met. Below I 
touch on agribusiness actors who potentially play a large role in violating this right, 
and show that the state is currently inadequately playing its role to protect consumers 
and small-scale producers in this regard. As such I argue that the state has a key role 
to play to ensuring the other preconditions for food sovereignty are met. 
 
While the state is currently not playing this role adequately, even in the presence of a 
progressive constitution, a gap exists that the food sovereignty campaign seeks to fill, 
namely by putting the constitution to work, and holding the state accountable to its 
obligations in the constitution, especially to create and implement policies that would 
ensure the preconditions to food sovereignty are met. Arguably some of the 
government’s policies do attempt to address the preconditions mentioned in the 
literature, for example land reform policies have been implemented to address the 
unjust agrarian structure. But once again the failure lies in the lack of state capacity 
and political will, and also in the distorted focus of policy on the poor instead of on the 
structure that causes the poverty and hunger. For example, on the domineering power 
of agribusiness which hinders those with a little land, without land and small quantities 
of fresh produce, i.e. small-scale farmers from ever entering the market, as I discuss 
below. As such, not only does the food sovereignty approach seek to demand better 
policies, it also has to continue to push for the sound implementation of those policies. 
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Agrarian reform 
 
The second food sovereignty principle, agrarian reform is an especially important 
aspect in the South African food system where a very unequal distribution of land is 
one of the most important legacies of apartheid (de Schutter, 2012:8). Even with the 
range of policies discussed in the previous chapter, with immense budgets put in place 
in South Africa to address the land question, post-apartheid, the land picture is still 
very skewed, such that there are three different worlds of farming (de Schutter, 
2012:8). In 2003, 35 000 large scale, predominantly white commercial farmers 
occupied 87 per cent of all agricultural land and dominated 95 per cent of all 
agricultural output. Today these numbers have barely changed, while 200 000 black 
emerging farmers have benefited from post 1994 opportunities and public support 
such as agrarian reform and BEE policies) and about a remaining 2.5 million 
households practicing small-scale subsistence farming exist representing the third 
world of farming. These households undertake farming predominantly as an activity to 
complement other income sources, such as temporary work-related migration, social 
grants, off farm employment and remittances (de Schutter, 2012:8; Fukuda-Parr, 
2012:8). 
 
In terms of policy to address land inequality, land reform was seen as key to bridge 
the gap between these three different worlds of farming, however it has not been very 
successful for reasons stressed above. It has also been disconnected from agricultural 
development initiatives that would ensure post settlement support such as finance, 
markets, water and extension services and its inability to contribute to poverty 
alleviation (Fukuda-Parr, 2012:9; Pereira, 2014:25). Furthermore, and importantly, 
there has been enormous support and pressure from across the agricultural and 
private business sectors for government not to interfere with property relations or 
production, but to rather continue the current pattern of ownership and use of land 
(Lahiff, 2003:37). This pressure is orchestrated by well organised pressure groups who 
find receptive audiences in government circles, while on the other hand millions of 
poor people and small-scale farmers have no voice at all, and continue to eke out an 
existence from agriculture in overcrowded and often degraded environments (Lahiff, 
2003:38).  
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In short, there has been no pro-poor redistributive agrarian reform with extra 
supportive measures that would enable small-scale farmers to succeed. This would 
be the initial and necessary pathway by which South Africa could transition from the 
corporate regime toward a more food sovereign one. Moreover, land reform and 
additional farmer support on its own is not sufficient since it is clear that there are other 
preconditions that are needed to compliment successful land reform. Policy that 
addresses the needs of all food providers, those without land, and those with land, by 
providing certain secondary and vitally important steps is further required. In the face 
of failing government, a strong coordinated civil society is needed to take forward the 
land struggle. Past experiences have shown that they are not yet up to the task, but 
given the failure of land reform and small-scale farmer support and the lack of 
institutional channels for the poor to voice their concerns, Lahiff (2003:38) argues that 
‘it is likely that grievances will be expressed in informal and even extra-legal ways.’ 
South Africa is waiting for these grievances to be expressed in unison, and a food 
sovereignty approach could fill this gap by providing coordination to these affected 
voices. However, their cry would be in vain if they do not also demand additional 
measures that promote and value the providers of food, another principle of food 
sovereignty. Such preconditions would place South Africa on a smoother path to 
achieving food sovereignty as I discuss below. 
 
Values food providers 
 
The extent to which different types of food providers in South Africa are valued can be 
viewed by the various support measures offered by government policy. Of the three 
worlds of farming discussed above, it is the first group of producers which is prioritised 
by agricultural policies. The second is prioritised with land reform policy, while few of 
the second and most of the third group are not considered or covered by any 
substantial agricultural assistance to promote food production. On the other hand, 
migrants, pastoralists, fisher folk, indigenous people and other subsistence producers, 
receive no significant mention or attention in the various policies. For example, fisher 
folk have sometimes had subsistence quotas slashed without warning while 
commercial farmers quotas have been unaffected or even increased (Oxfam, 
2014:23). This is a clear example of naked bias towards commercial farmers. Support 
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for the smaller farming groups of all types is largely lacking because of post-apartheid 
government’s continued indulgence of agribusiness as it encourages a contract model 
of farming which seeks to integrate small-scale black farmers into the corporate value 
chain. While there has been some success in this regard, it has been largely 
unsuccessful and has left the fundamental agri-food structure still intact (Pereira, 
2014:25). This agri-food structure, particularly as it is proliferated by supermarkets, no 
matter how many inroads for small-scale farmers, is one of the largest barriers to their 
success as I discuss below.  
 
There is evidence that in South Africa the growth of supermarkets is leading to an 
increase of risks and reduction in rewards for local farmers, thus creating an 
environment much like that seen in industrialised countries with high levels of 
supermarket concentration. The fact that the small-scale farmers are not managing to 
survive in the agribusiness system is because first, policies are incomprehensive and 
second, a focus on incorporating small-scale farmers into the large retail scene is 
counterproductive. Improving the quality of production and the skills and asset base 
of small-scale farmers is important, but this is insufficient to guarantee access into 
modern supply chains. As such, the problem here is not of the small-scale farmers’ 
capacity, but the unequal playing field farmers might enter (Pereira, 2014). The same 
can be said for small-scale producers. There is little scope for small-scale producers 
or food processors to compete with or be integrated with large-scale food producers 
supplying the South African food system. In fact, those small-scale producers and 
processors supplying rice, bread, meat, traditional beer and dairy products to 
traditional markets often undergo financial stress or pressure and under such 
conditions are not in any position to challenge large-scale food processors in supplying 
large supermarkets (Crush & Frayne, 2010b:9).  
 
Because of the nature of the South African commercial farming sector which is 
characterised by large farming units, from which retailers have a large pool of big 
producers to choose from; and the nature of the food processing and retail sector, in 
which procurement practices and niche markets are being taken over by 
supermarkets, effective barriers to entry for smaller producers have been created. This 
is particularly important in South Africa given that the expansion of supermarkets is 
taking place at precisely the same time that policy is attempting to encourage the 
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integration of small producers into these markets (Pereira, 2014; ACB, nd:26-27). One 
may find that the expansion of local supermarket chains in South Africa is a means by 
which food systems can be localised, and Spar and Woolworths are leaders in this 
front as they attempt to source locally. However, the current system that favours the 
industrial farming model means that large farms, situated in areas far from shops will 
still supply Woolworths and Spar with the quality products they require. As such, 
localising food systems and reorganising trade, another precondition/principle for food 
sovereignty, is still difficult to achieve. It further becomes difficult to localise trade 
through supermarkets as local producers will always be competing with overseas 
products as long as trade relations with these countries exist. Thus, even though 
retailers like Woolworths and Spar encourage local sourcing, market conditions will 
still determine where they source their goods from, for after all, the food industry is all 
about profit. This precondition also rests on government trade policies as well as 
international relations which are deeply embedded in international markets, trade 
relations and the World Trade Organisation. As such, localising markets is as much a 
call to promote local markets as it is to tackle the power that the World Trade 
Organisation has over South Africa’s food system.  
 
This presents two avenues for the food sovereignty approach in South Africa to 
intervene in a corporatised national food system that values large scale, commercial 
and international producers of food. The first avenue is to again put pressure on the 
state to effectively restrict the internationalisation of the local food system by 
influencing international trade policies to prevent the infiltration of international 
corporations and supermarkets from entering local markets, and also restricting those 
actors who currently hold an unfair amount of power in the system already, such as 
Shoprite, Pick ń Pay, and even millers and bakers of staple foods. A second avenue 
for a food sovereignty approach to flourish is to showcase an alternative to the above. 
This includes creating alternative markets and promoting alternative ways of producing 
food ethically and sustainably, and thereby promoting localisation of the food system 
and reducing carbon emissions in the process. The food sovereignty approach in 
South Africa, as I show in the following chapters, even attempts to create a different 
economy, a solidarity economy, one based on values of democracy, solidarity and 
sustainability over profit. This alternative economy could be a useful way to start 
showing that a local food system is possible in South Africa.  
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Democratic control and local decision making 
 
Food sovereignty proponents stress that democratic control and local decision making 
is required at every node in the food system, from input choice by farmers to consumer 
choice at retail, if food sovereignty is to be achieved. Currently, however, at almost 
every node, the majority (small-scale farmers, informal traders and poor households 
for example) who are those with the least power are also those with no voice at all. 
The wheat to bread value chain reveals the stark reality of this lack of power on the 
part of the most vulnerable in contrast to the all-powerful corporations and monopolies. 
From wheat production, storage, milling, baking and retail, the South African wheat to 
bread commodity chain has been globalised and is marked by a concentration of 
ownership and control (Cock, 2015). This is as a result of the deregulation of 
agriculture in 1996 and the repealing of the bread subsidy in 1992 in which state 
support to farmers and tariffs on agricultural commodities were dismantled. Since then 
local South African farmers have been left to compete with state-subsidised farmers 
in the EU and USA (Cock, 2015). As a result, the wheat market has become more 
concentrated, responsive to global trends, affected by the changing rand to dollar 
exchange rate as well as international wheat commodity prices and commodity 
speculation (Cock, 2015; Pereira, 2014:19).  
 
Another way in which the choice of the locals is not heard in the food system is when 
one looks at the purchasing power of the majority of South Africa’s poor. For Cock 
(2015), ‘hunger is an aspect of poverty and powerlessness’ and this is true when 
assessing the consumer end of the food system. Having limited income to spend on 
food ultimately leads to an insufficient and non-nutritious food basket which is highly 
dependent on the price of food. What makes this situation more dire is when food price 
increases are not consistent with inflation. For example, between January 2011 and 
January 2012, food inflation was 10 per cent, while the price of white maize increased 
by 90 per cent over the same period (Pereira, 2014:12). Furthermore, the openness 
of South Africa’s market makes food prices even more volatile, and as a result the 
poorest households are even more vulnerable to food price increases as international 
food price shocks are transmitted all the way down to local wholesale and retail prices 
(Pereira, 2014:12; Greenberg, 2010b:7). Yet potential for forthcoming shocks remains 
unchanged, for since the 2002/2003 and 2007/2008 food price crises, no major policy 
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changes have taken into consideration the new recognition of the importance of 
domestic agriculture to act as a buffer to external market dynamics. Instead, South 
Africa’s reliance on second class policy interventions has been reinforced, such as 
increase on welfare payments (Pereira, 2014:12). While these interventions can act 
as a safety net to the poor, and are vitally important, they fall short of fundamentally 
addressing the inability of households to afford food, and therefore do not contribute 
toward creating a more just and democratic food system. It is clear here how a more 
democratic food system would lead to a more food sovereign one as choices are made 
by those who most need food. But without an organised voice of the poor and small-
scale farmers, that clearly articulates its concerns, and problems, that showcases the 
potential of their nature-friendly farming practices, as I discuss below, South Africa still 
has a long way to go in this regard (Andrews, 2007:218). This principle presents an 
important gap that a food sovereignty approach such as the SAFSC’s can fill as it 
engages with the poor, especially during the initial and planning stages of 
campaigning, and as it is attempting to create a more organised group of activists and 
organisations, voicing the same concerns.  
 
Works with and protects nature 
 
I now turn to assess the extent to which South African policy and practices protects or 
works with nature, another food sovereignty principle. South Africa is on the frontline 
of climate change, as such supporting the ability of its farmers to adapt and cope with 
the combined effects of climate change and resource scarcity is vital (de Schutter, 
2012). There is a common agreement among most actors, particularly the Department 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries as well as policy writers in South Africa, that 
sustainable use of natural resources is important to realise the right to food for all 
(Greenberg, 2010b:32), however there is little understanding of what sustainable use 
is and how it can be carried out. The National Development Plan, for example 
recognises that climate change is driven by emissions of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases, and that climate change in the form of erratic rainfall, droughts and 
floods have the potential to reduce food production (NPC, 2011:33). This plan does 
not give any practical suggestions through which emissions, particularly of large-scale 
commercial agriculture can be mitigated. The role of agriculture in the production of 
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greenhouse gasses is also not mentioned. Furthermore, government programmes or 
policies do not protect nature or build more knowledge on sustainable farming 
practices as they still endorse large-scale agriculture, AGRA’s green revolution model 
that encourages pesticides, improved seed and fertilisers (NPC, 2011:89), and the use 
of GMO’s and glyphosate, a chemical used in the production of maize which has 
harmful effects on biodiversity and humans. Here again the focus of policy is on the 
pandering of large corporates and agribusiness. While some hope does exist in the 
government’s National Climate Change Response White Paper, this has yet to 
translate into policy that mainstreams adaptation in everyday practice and longer-term 
planning in all spheres and levels of government (Ziervogel et al., 2014:605). 
 
Nevertheless, the fact that South Africa does have some agroecology knowledge, 
which is growing in popularity with increased social and climate crises, is a positive 
factor for the state of the environment, however its reach is not yet sufficient. This 
knowledge is evident and utilised in small-scale agriculture programmes of civil society 
organisations, the Durban/eThekwini agroecology initiative and even in Woolworth’s 
Farming For the Future initiative. These programmes share their knowledge and teach 
safe and sustainable farming practices. There are also a few seed savers in South 
Africa who are committed to saving heirloom seeds, to preserve South Africa’s seed 
heritage. These types of initiatives serve as important examples of what can be done 
in South African urban, peri-urban and rural communities to protect and work with 
nature to provide food. Yet since their reach is still insufficient, this presents another 
gap in the food production sphere, which could do well with further promotion, by 
showcasing these alternatives. The SAFSC seeks to do this in two ways, by raising 
awareness about the dangers of the industrial food production system, and second, 
by sharing agroecology knowledge and skills between actors in the campaign, an 
additional principle of food sovereignty, as I discuss below. 
 
Sharing knowledge and skills 
 
In terms of sharing knowledge and skills of sustainable farming practices, barriers to 
transmitting this knowledge lie in the youth’s unwillingness to learn, increased 
urbanisation and poor quality government training programmes. For example, 
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Comprehensive Agriculture Support Programme’s extension officers have proven 
insufficient, lack coordination and do not serve or reach those who need it most. 
Furthermore, the knowledge shared by these officers is questionable, as they have 
been convinced that the chemical model of farming is correct (Interview with Manana, 
23 June 2015). There is also a clear gap in sustainable knowledge transformation and 
resilience, especially when it comes to implementing practices that could strengthen 
resilience in the agricultural sector, and thus serve as disaster management strategies 
in the face of looming climate change. Climate change and environmental stress can 
also increase pressure on the food system to provide adequate food, and this is bound 
to increase the severity and frequency of riots caused by food price hikes (UNCTAD, 
2013:), as I discuss below in the next principle. 
 
Social peace  
 
Social peace is another key principle that has to exist before a country can become 
food sovereign, since marginalisation of communities along with growing oppression 
only serves to aggravate situations of injustice and hopelessness (Via Campesina, 
1996). Stress on resources and increased food prices is ensuring the opposite of 
social peace in South Africa as xenophobia and social unrest ensues. For example, 
analysts have linked social unrest in recent years in South Africa’s informal 
settlements, among farmworkers and in the mining sector to the rise in global food 
prices. As grains make up more than half of the food intake per capita in the country 
(of which 32 per cent was wheat and 57 per cent maize), mining riots in August 2014 
coincided with record prices for maize and other basic food stuffs. Xenophobic riots in 
South Africa have also occurred at the same time that other food riots were taking 
place around the world and were attributed to anger about foreigners competing for 
limited resources – arguably exacerbated by high food prices (von Bornmann and 
Gulati, 2014:8). Another cause of social stress and violence in South Africa could be 
the breakdown of social fibre as people become individualised and less socialised and 
as critical connections between humankind and nature in the current system are lost 
(De Schutter, 2015:3-4). As Radebe (Personal interview, 23 June 2015) claims, 
‘capitalism has… taken away that moral fibre. If you talk about crime, you talk about 
rape, you talk about all these elicit things that are happening as a result of this system 
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that we live under. Because it’s a dog eat dog. But [with food sovereignty], it would 
mean that now, no one will have reason to go and sin because they are hungry.’ Thus 
social peace is both a precondition to food sovereignty, and also a positive product of 
it.  
 
While government policy recognises the need to focus on the increasing pressure on 
natural resources, its implementation has still not dealt sufficiently with management 
of resources. This has been particularly evident during the 2015/2016 drought. 
However, these risks also provide an opportunity for food sovereignty to flourish as 
increased need is being placed on improving the domestic management of the links 
between water, energy and food. If this is done it can increase the resilience of the 
economy as a whole to withstand the risks of climate variability and economic volatility 
(von Bornmann and Gulati, 2014:7). But for this to be undertaken, a fundamental 
change in the common sense of South African’s is required. This is another large gap 
that neither government nor civil society is stepping up to adequately expose, and a 
food sovereignty approach would do well to highlight the need for a new common 
sense. This new common sense ought to view humankind as interlinked with nature 
and also view conventional agriculture implicated in the climate crisis.  
 
A new common sense 
 
A final precondition, namely a new common sense is promoted by food sovereignty 
actors to debunk various myths propagated by conventional agriculture, in particular 
that commercial agriculture is the only real agriculture. Such myths exist in South 
Africa, as conventional farmers stress the strategic importance of commercial farming 
for not only food production, but also export earnings. This narrative serves to 
strengthen the organisational power of the commercial farmers. As such, countering 
the commercial agriculture lobby and its widely held beliefs will mean tackling their 
power materially and ideologically (Cousins, 2007:240). This is still a major challenge 
in South Africa, especially since government has shares in the corporate food sector.  
 
Hope lies however in a myth that has already been debunked, and which is gaining 
traction as government continues to fail to protect its poorest people. This is the myth 
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that the current government in South Africa has the political will and capacity to meet 
the needs of its people particularly by ensuring the right to food. Since it has been 
established that this notion is merely a myth and further that in corporate South Africa, 
food is sold for a profit, not for people, a new common sense is gradually emerging. 
Until the preconditions of food sovereignty are met, this common sense promises to 
grow stronger. Sharing this common sense is a key step in tackling the ideological 
power that the government and corporations hold over the majority of the people. By 
promoting this new common sense, a food sovereignty alternative in South Africa has 
the potential to further bring various people together to challenge the food system, 
thus forming a new type of power, a power from below. I conclude this thought below. 
 
Consequences of these preconditions not being met 
 
The South African government has bought into the corporate food regime’s myths, 
believing that without corporate agriculture, there would be inadequate food to meet 
the growing population’s needs. However, the fact that one third of our food is wasted, 
that increased dependence on corporate agriculture is linked to the climate crisis, that 
the state of hunger in South Africa is not improving, and further that most of the food 
that is consumed has poor nutritional quality thus leading to increasing levels of 
malnutrition and obesity, is reason enough to reconsider the current model in South 
Africa. In addition, increasing inequality and poverty are giving rise to social conflict in 
the form of xenophobia and high rates of crime as people struggle to survive in unequal 
societies. Furthermore, a focus by government on protecting corporate interests and 
thus enabling high profits from high food prices, coupled with livelihood-threatening 
droughts which have already left vast amounts of land dry and barren, is only going to 
make the situation for the majority of the South African poor worse. 
 
As a result of the abovementioned conditions in South Africa, and the negative impacts 
causing citizens’ deepening unemployment and food insecurity, food initiatives are 
proliferating (Satgar, 2010:6). Some of these initiatives are critiqued by food 
sovereignty proponents because they merely reinforce the neoliberal agenda. These 
include various relief packages and business approaches as discussed in the previous 
chapter. While some of the approaches have had no real effect on food insecurity, 
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some have failed altogether and others have had relative success, none of them fully 
incorporate food sovereignty’s ambition to challenge the neoliberal policy agenda and 
try transform the food system. As such, power concentration in the hands of corporates 
and government in the food system is left largely untouched.  
 
Taking back the power in the food system will thus require additional initiatives and 
actions, from different actors who are opposed to the neoliberal food system. This is 
where great potential for a nascent food sovereignty campaign in South Africa resides. 
While, alternatives to the neoliberal project in South Africa are difficult to locate, they 
do exist in pockets, in various sectors and in practice. Some can be found in the 
grassroots solidarity economy movement, a movement ‘grounded in the recognition 
that the crisis of capitalism is a systemic crisis expressing itself as a complete 
civilizational crisis’ (COPAC in Satgar, 2010:8). Others can be found among civil 
society organisations, study groups, community forums and NGO’s who pursue 
different agendas relating to food. These include land reform justice, climate justice 
initiatives, the promotion of sustainable farming practices like agroecology, slow food 
movements, biodiversity and anti-GMO, to name a few. However, separately these 
initiatives do not have sufficient power to change the entire food system. For 
Greenberg (2010b:24), an overall coordinated approach will be required to link up 
these isolated demands to change the food system. However, he stresses that the 
question of who will lead this coordination is yet to be answered.  
 
In the following chapter I present a possible answer to Greenberg’s question, as I 
introduce and discuss the actors, strategies and objectives of the South African Food 
Sovereignty Campaign. A campaign that in various ways, by a range of tactics, seeks 
to fulfil some of the gaps that remain in different sectors of the South African food 
system. It is these gaps of an increasingly undemocratic system, social unrest, citizen 
disempowerment, a pro-business government and their failure to value small-scale 
producers, for example, that require filling before the hungry in South Africa can be 
fed. What this means is that a food sovereignty alternative (rather than a food security 
approach) is better equipped with solutions to promote the necessary principles to 
ensure that in a world of plenty, all people can have sufficient, nutritious and culturally 
acceptable food. This is because food sovereignty gets to the root of the systemic 
crisis of hunger and fills the fundamental gaps that a neoliberal state fails to see. 
101 
 
Ultimately, this is because a food sovereignty approach addresses the power 
imbalance in the food system. This process has gradually begun in South Africa as, 
fuelled by the crisis and brutalities in the food system, the SAFSC has sought to ignite 
a new kind of power in the food system, one that pursues food sovereignty and 
importantly, is inspired by people.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE FOOD SOVEREIGNTY ALTERNATIVE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Introduction  
 
From the previous two chapters it is clear that in many respects, government strategy, 
implementation and policy is falling short in a host of ways to promote the conditions 
necessary to ensure that its people have sufficient and sustainable supplies of 
nutritious food, even though the country is food secure. Furthermore, business is 
merely trying to ameliorate the problems they are directly creating, while civil society 
is employing these same mainstream poverty alleviation tactics and is also weak 
organisationally and on the ground. In this chapter I turn to explore alternative 
approaches to the abovementioned ameliorative measures –  approaches that instead 
focus on creating a more just food system in South Africa as they practice, advocate 
for and promote food sovereignty principles. While a range of approaches that embody 
various food sovereignty principles exist in South Africa, I have decided to focus on 
the nascent South African Food Sovereignty Campaign (SAFSC) as a case study. This 
campaign is comprised of progressive organisations in various sectors in the food 
system across the country and thus serves as a noteworthy case study to explore food 
sovereignty in South Africa.  
 
I begin this chapter by first providing examples of food sovereignty alternatives that 
exist in South Africa. Before SAFSC emerged these organisations or initiatives were 
to some extent on their own, however today they form part of a loose network of 
organisations who are promoting the food sovereignty principles, sharing knowledge, 
ideas, struggles and solutions. This chapter serves to explain the genesis of the 
campaign to show how these organisations in the food space have come together in 
response to the brutalities in the food system, and with the aim of fighting for a more 
just food system together. In doing so I reveal the grassroots nature of the campaign 
to show how it differs from other approaches (especially government approaches), in 
that it promotes the sharing of knowledge, not only from experts, but also those 
affected by the food system. Because food sovereignty looks different in diverse 
contexts, I also explore activists’ understandings of food sovereignty. These 
103 
 
understandings are shaped by the various actors’ different realities, their positions and 
their struggles in South Africa, as such they cannot be claimed as universal for the 
campaign. Nevertheless, these varying understandings of food sovereignty have been 
used to shape the way SAFSC develops and undertakes strategies that have emerged 
from the campaign since its launch. I describe these strategies too, some of which 
include nurturing activists, holding events for campaigning, such as pickets and 
tribunals, encouraging learning exchanges and communicating with those on the 
ground, as well as bringing the second generation of food sovereignty to the table 
through social media, local markets and festivals. Importantly, one key strategy, which 
is somewhat unique to SAFSC in South Africa when compared to other national 
campaigns or movements is its links with the Solidarity Economy Movement. While 
not solely unique to SAFSC as links with the solidarity economy have surfaced in other 
areas, for example in Europe where it is recognised ‘that agroecology and the 
solidarity economy are the logical vectors for the realisation of the right to food’ 
(Ripess, 2015), the Solidarity Economy’s potential and connection to the campaign 
are worth exploring. I now turn to explore some of the food sovereignty alternatives 
that existed in South Africa before the genesis of the campaign in 2015.  
 
Food sovereignty alternatives 
 
An important alternative action, formally defined as food sovereignty arose as a result 
of a popular education process undertaken by the Surplus People’s Project during 
2007-2008 in the Western and Northern Cape. This action was fuelled by the rural 
poor’s feelings of exclusion and injustice because of privatisation and neo-liberal land 
reform (SPP, 2009:27). The campaign sought to raise awareness around the negative 
impacts of the food system, and around the benefits of ecological land use with a 
specific focus on organic food production. It also sought to mobilise for agrarian 
transformation and was later called the Agrarian Reform for Food Sovereignty 
Campaign (Interview with Naude, 24 June 2015). The movement made a few 
demands, but was confined to the Western and Northern Cape and since then no 
further actions have formally been documented by the SPP. 
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Nevertheless, Surplus People’s Project is still functioning today, as is the campaign. 
They continue to promote popular education in order to emancipate the oppressed 
and expose the rural poor to alternative and critical ways of thinking and to develop 
activists. They also continue to focus on agrarian transformation to ensure secure 
access and tenure, ownership and control over productive land, water and national 
resources, and they also promote agro-ecological production for food sovereignty. All 
of the above is done to help ensure that communities have control over their food 
systems through local agro-ecological production, consumption of healthy food and 
local marketing and distributing (PESA, Webpage). Although government did not listen 
to the campaign’s original demands, this did not hinder activists from being active in 
communities, and since then forums have been established in different municipal 
areas. These forums serve as a platform for farmers to share knowledge, their 
struggles, voice their concerns and work together to find solutions (Interview with 
Naude, 24 June 2015). This is an example of an important organisation with valuable 
activities in the agrarian and food sovereignty space, however its reach is restricted to 
the Western and Northern Cape.  
 
Another land and agrarian reform organisation is Nkuzi Development Association, 
located in Limpopo. This organisation assists communities who apply for land 
redistribution and restitution, by taking them through the stages of application, helping 
them get post-settlement support and leading them to the right people if they don’t get 
the support they need. They also assist labour tenants secure their tenure. This is an 
important job as displacement from farms, particularly as they are being turned into 
game farms for tourism is occurring more frequently in South Africa. Recently Nkuzi 
assisted twenty-two families by negotiating with government to buy a portion of the 
land for the farmers who would have otherwise been displaced when kicked off the 
farm as they were no longer needed on a game farm (Interview with Manana, 23 June 
2015).  
 
There are also those organisations who assist with development, but particularly as it 
relates to international development projects with supposed benefits for locals. For 
example, Mining Affected Communities United in Action (MACUA) is an organisation 
that undertakes community awareness raising about environmental injustices that are 
caused by the presence of mining projects who enter into communities under the guise 
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of development. Often these companies uproot communities, damage ecosystems, 
soil and ultimately livelihoods, thus turning communities who were previously thriving 
by depending on the land, into communities dependent on aid, government support 
and handouts (Interview with Mahlangu, 23 June 2015). MACUA tries to organise 
these displaced communities so that they can fight for their rights in a coordinated 
manner. MACUA also engages with government to create a more inclusive and 
beneficial environment in the mining industry (Rutledge, 2015).  
 
Besides campaigns, in South Africa there are organisations and farmers who practise 
agroecology, form into unions and engage in struggles to address challenges, 
particularly relating to land, water access and political issues; for example, Ilizwi 
Lamafama (translated as ‘voice of the regional farmers’) Farmers’ Union, a union of 
more than 3 000 members in the Eastern Cape. Members of the union spoke up to 
support the repealing of the Black Authorities Act in 2010, an act which has led to 
division in villages as chiefs abuse power (PMG, 2010:1). This union is made up of 
cooperatives, for example one cooperative consisting of 15 women which has been 
growing food on a piece of school land that has been leased to them. The farmers 
practice agroecology, plant indigenous seeds and herbs and supply the nutrition 
programme at the school with nutritious food. In addition, members of the farmers’ 
union have been taught agroecology and as a result most of the households in the 
nearby areas learn about agroecology at community meetings (Interview with Baloyi, 
23 June 2015).  
 
There are also organisations, like Ntinga Ntaba kaNdoda, a community organisation 
in Keiskammahoek South, which promotes development that is equitable, community 
driven, and ecologically sustainable, with a focus on education about the environment, 
ecology, conservation and sustainability (Ntinga, 2012:1). This organisation works with 
small-scale farmers to assist them in registering and forming worker cooperatives, 
particularly cooperatives that align to solidarity economy principles (Interview with 
Hugo, 24 June 2015), which leads to another type of organisation, namely social 
movements, such as the Solidarity Economy Movement.  
 
The Solidarity Economy Movement is a grassroots movement that seeks to initiate an 
alternative type of economy in South Africa, one which is informed by ethical and social 
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goals and which is ‘organised through collective struggle and conscious choice to 
establish new patterns of democratic production, consumption and living that promotes 
the realisation of human needs and environmental justice’ (COPAC, 2010:2-3). In 
South Africa it is comprised of worker cooperatives, farms organised as worker 
cooperatives, the South African Waste Pickers Association, cooperative bakeries, 
education and communication cooperatives, and farming communities who form into 
worker cooperatives, as discussed below.  
 
In South Africa there are also those farming communities who successfully form into 
cooperatives, realising their potential of collectivising as small-scale farmers. For 
example, with the help of Environmental Monitoring Group, rooibos tea farmers were 
able to set up the Highveld Cooperative and obtain an Organic and Fairtrade 
Certification (Missouris, 2012:17). In addition, there exist environmental NGOs in 
South Africa who promote food sovereignty by trying to protect seed sovereignty and 
biodiversity in South Africa. For example, the African Centre for Biodiversity, a non-
profit organisation based in Johannesburg, campaigns against the privatisation and 
consolidation of African food systems by international capital and also against the 
proliferation of genetically modified food in South Africa and the wider African continent 
(Jones, 2012:12), fighting the imposition of GM of the food system. While Biowatch, 
on the other hand challenges industrial agriculture by demonstrating ecologically 
sustainable alternatives to ensure biodiversity, food sovereignty and social justice. 
Biowatch also works with small-holder farmers to ensure that people have control over 
their food, agricultural processes and resources (Williams, 2013:17).  
 
Finally, there are also various academics and researchers, health practitioners, and 
food price activists like Imraahn Mukkadam who I introduced in the introduction to this 
research, as well as others who do research and advocacy into the power 
concentration in the food system.   
 
What all of these organisations, actors and activists, with varying approaches and 
goals, have in common, is that they are fighting against an unjust food system, and 
are in some or other way seeking to fill gaps left by food security strategies pursued 
by government, business and Civil Society Organisations, as described in the previous 
chapter. For example, Nkuzi urges government to value small-scale farmers, to 
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provide additional support measures, and land reform, while the African Center for 
Biodiversity advocates for biodiversity as a vital feature of healthy food systems. 
Individually these organisations, farmers, academics and advocacy groups (and many 
others that have not been mentioned) are doing valuable work to support the hungry, 
communities and small-scale farmers to shift power in their specific fields and localities 
(whether national, provincial or local). However, given the many challenges in the food 
system, the entrenched power in the hands of corporates and the lack of political will 
from the state to respond to requests of communities, for example in the Surplus 
People Project’s case, it was realised that these and other campaigns and initiatives 
needed to do so much more to elevate the voice of the powerless and challenge the 
injustices in the food system. 
 
The genesis of the SAFSC  
 
On 28 February to 1 March 2015, representatives from over 60 organisations met in 
Johannesburg to officially launch SAFSC at the Food Sovereignty Campaign 
Assembly. It should be noted however, that this meeting of dynamic forces from within 
South Africa’s grassroots organisations, farmers, communities, students, volunteers, 
activists and experts in the food system did not arise out of nowhere. It was pre-empted 
by lengthy processes, relationships and strategies that were birthed years before this 
historic meeting. The idea had been discussed at the right to food dialogues which 
were conducted the previous year (during 2014) and culminated in an inter-provincial 
conference on the right to food in March 2014. These dialogues were undertaken to 
discover what issues farmers, workers, faith groups, NGOs and communities face in 
relation to food, farming and land (COPAC, 2014:1). The dialogues were integral to 
the development of the Campaign because they initiated ideas and built 
understandings of the right to food and food sovereignty. They served to educate 
attendants, and to encourage learning from those most affected by the food system 
about their struggles, and also to formulate ideas about what food sovereignty would 
mean for them.  
 
During these dialogues the idea of a national campaign was born, but this was not the 
first time that the idea of a food sovereignty campaign was conceived among some of 
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these parties. For two years earlier, in 2012, the Solidarity Economy Movement 
initiated a similar food sovereignty campaign. As their newsletter states, ‘a decision 
was taken at the first South African international solidarity economy conference in 
October 2012 to launch a national food sovereignty campaign. This is an exciting 
prospect. The work to do this begins largely in local sites, where effort can be made 
at developing local independence in production and supply of food, as part of building 
the solidarity economy and addressing hunger’ (Bennie, 2012:7). Therefore, the South 
African Food Sovereignty Campaign is a product of both the Solidarity Economy 
Movement and the right to food dialogues, but it differs substantially from the former’s 
campaign because it is carried out at a larger scale, with more reach and with a larger 
mandate; to transform the South African food system from the ground up.  
 
At the right to food dialogues it was realised that in order to achieve food sovereignty, 
communities, farmers and workers had needs that would first have to be met. These 
include some of the food sovereignty principles, which Akram-Lodhi further formulates 
into preconditions, and others specific to South Africa. For example, the realisation 
that a culture of pride in agriculture and food production would need to be rebuilt, 
farmers would need to be educated and they would need secure tenure and access 
to land for food production. Access to land would have to involve a process of land 
and agrarian reform. As such, it was stressed that organisations should work together 
with existing campaigns and initiatives for land and agrarian reform, a key principle of 
food sovereignty. Farmers would also require infrastructure for local markets – this is 
currently a challenge for small-scale farmers as they fail to access existing markets or 
find alternative markets. It would thus be a gap that the campaign must address to 
ensure that farmers are connected to households that need food. This, it was agreed, 
could be overcome by building Solidarity Economy institutions like producer 
cooperatives, food markets, bakeries and people’s restaurants that are cooperatively 
controlled. In addition, for food sovereignty to be achieved, it was strongly suggested 
that the state would have to play a supportive role. As such, an important action would 
entail challenging the state to ensure supportive government policies that enable 
active roles for small holder farmers, faster land redistribution, government support for 
agroecology, and protection measures for local markets, including protection from 
cheap imports and dumping (COPAC, 2014:16). It is clear that many of these 
preconditions are similar to those presented in the literature, thus revealing the extent 
109 
 
of co-optation by the corporate regime in South Africa. However, they do differ as they 
introduce the Solidarity Economy concept. The ways in which these preconditions 
would be met also differ significantly. This is because in South Africa there was no 
pre-existing national rural people’s movement like that which had emerged in Latin 
America, as such something similar would have to be orchestrated to raise awareness 
about the food sovereignty alternative, thus a campaign was birthed, as I discuss 
below. 
 
Since it was realised that the above preconditions to food sovereignty would not be 
met in individual pockets in South Africa, as somewhat isolated organisations worked 
on their own, it was agreed that a campaign and advocacy plan would be necessary 
to build food sovereignty, mobilise communities, put pressure on corporations who 
profit from food, and importantly put pressure on the state to protect its food system 
and create an enabling environment for food sovereignty (COPAC, 2014:15).  
 
The right to food dialogues highlighted the need for a food sovereignty campaign to 
unite struggles on the ground and to promote preconditions for food sovereignty. Here 
it was also realised that many of the challenges faced by communities were interlinked 
and a key challenge for the campaign would thus be to knit the struggles together on 
common platforms where a united vision in the struggle for food sovereignty could be 
intensified. This would mean linking and amplifying those organisations already 
engaged in alternative forms of food production and distribution, with small scale 
farmers and with social forces who are not benefitting from the food system (including 
the thirteen million hungry). It was also stressed that those organisations currently 
fighting for food sovereignty alternatives should be linked together in a way that 
commonly advances such alternatives on a national scale (COPAC, 2014:15).  
 
The idea for a campaign was well deliberated, researched and discussed throughout 
the process of the inter-provincial dialogues on the right to food. It is evident from the 
discussion documents that before SAFSC was initiated, challenges and preconditions 
were already thought through. The discussion paper reveals the outcome of the 
deliberations as follows:  
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‘What is clear, therefore, is that with this range of challenges experienced, a 
campaign that unites the struggles of farmers, communities, workers, faith 
groups and NGOs is necessary to advance a campaign for the right to food 
and food sovereignty, and that is able to tackle these issues based on seeing 
them as inter-connected’ (COPAC, 2014:2). 
 
Therefore, a campaign would be appropriate because ‘it allows for grassroots forces 
to drive, shape and strengthen the campaign’ (SAFSC, 2015b:18). The need for a 
campaign was also addressed at the assembly and it was agreed that a campaign 
would be necessary to build power, to create a united force that challenges 
governments and corporations (SAFSC, 2015d:7). For some activists the campaign is 
a means to pledge solidarity with other communities in the country and to initiate a 
broader movement for food sovereignty, for they argue that once a movement is strong 
‘we will overwhelm the government with our demands’ (Interview with Manana, 23 
June 2015). And this is one of the reasons the campaign was launched, to overwhelm 
the government, the media, the corporations and all those who currently hold unequal 
power over the food system. By building unity, sharing knowledge and by showing that 
alternatives to the current system do exist, organisations under SAFSC banner hope 
to gradually take back the power collectively.  
 
Engaging in these dialogues was an important first step in deviating from the process 
by which the government (and sometimes NGOs and business) might initiate a 
programme or policy. This is because the process involved in forming the campaign 
and in establishing campaign priorities was very participatory and it took into 
consideration the voices, experiences and knowledge of those most affected by the 
problems in the food system. By this it is evident that the SAFSC seeks to pursue the 
principle of democratic control and local decision making as it engages with various 
actors in the food system. By doing so, the SAFSC already shows that there are 
alternatives to the top-down approach, that these alternatives can work, that the poor 
and marginalised are fully aware of what is affecting them, and that they too have 
ideas of how their problems can be solved. As such, by ensuring that the process was 
participatory, the members present were able to gain a greater understanding of the 
issues that affect the poor, and in doing so, more relevant solutions to their struggles 
could be sought. One of which was clearly the establishment of a broad campaign to 
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challenge the injustices in the food system. Shortly thereafter, this idea was launched 
by the very same people who dreamt it up, and not only a small body of professionals. 
 
The launch of the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign 
 
After this lengthy process SAFSC was launched, and participation with those most 
affected continued. A key aspect of any of the dialogues or activities involves learning 
from experts, activists, the hungry and farmers alike. The dialogues and thereafter, the 
assembly set the standard for this participation as both events allowed for many group 
discussions and plenary feedback sessions, as well as informative sessions to help 
educate those who are there around problems in the food system that they are not 
aware of, but may be affecting them. At the assembly, experts presented on the crises 
in the corporate food regime and also clarified that challenges faced in all communities 
in South Africa regarding hunger are as a result of a broken food system. An 
opportunity was also given to those activists, organisations and farmers who are 
already working toward food sovereignty to showcase what they had been doing and 
provide concrete examples of how food sovereignty is being achieved in local 
communities. The assembly had three objectives, first to educate everyone around 
issues of food and hunger and the broken food system, second, it sought to showcase 
alternatives and examples of solutions of food sovereignty in practice; and finally, it 
created a platform for all present to discuss challenges, solutions and importantly the 
strategy for SAFSC and partner organisations to take the campaign forward.  
 
What the assembly and right to food dialogues also did, was deepen the 
understanding of what food sovereignty is, and what it means to different people in 
different food sectors and positions. Below I present some of these understandings of 
food sovereignty.  
 
Understandings of food sovereignty in South Africa 
 
Food sovereignty in South Africa takes on a range of different definitions and 
understandings. In this section I present these understandings in four themes. First, 
food sovereignty understands food as a right, second, it entails full and fair access to 
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land, farming inputs and markets. Third, food sovereignty means independence and 
freedom to choose all of the above, and finally it is an alternative to the individualism 
that governs the current food system. In this section I explore these four different 
understandings of food sovereignty according to different actors and activists in the 
campaign as gathered from discussion documents and interviews. 
 
The first understanding of food sovereignty coincides with the first principle, namely 
that food is a right. This was stressed at the right to food dialogues, where it was further 
elaborated that food sovereignty involves reclaiming this right as a human need and 
not something to be sold for a profit on the market (COPAC, 2014:15). Food 
sovereignty activists and community practitioners also stress that food is a right 
(Interview with Hugo, 24 June 2015) and further that food sovereignty is an element 
of true democracy ‘because community members play a role in determining that which 
they must eat, not that which is marketed to them’ (Interview with Mahlangu, 23 June 
2015). In addition, food sovereignty entails a right to producing that which people want 
to produce, not just for the sake of consumption, but for nutritional value (Interview 
with Radebe, 23 June 2015), and also to benefit the community and the environment 
(Interview with Hugo, 24 June 2015). Respondents did not specifically suggest who 
was responsible to ensure this right as they provided their understandings of food 
sovereignty, but answers to other questions made reference to the state. First, to the 
obstacle that the state can be in ensuring food sovereignty because it promotes a 
neoliberal agenda (Interview with Jali, 23 June 2015) and favours industrial agriculture 
over small-scale farmers with support that is given to them (Interview with Jali, 23 June 
2015). This obstacle has been raised in the literature. Overcoming such obstacles 
were also stressed by actors in the campaign, as involving constructing alternatives 
outside of the state, such as the solidarity economy (Interview with Radebe, 23 June 
2015; Interview with Jali, 23 June 2015).  
 
In many areas actors and activists also recognised that the state is failing in a host of 
ways to promote the right to food. For example, the state is currently not fulfilling its 
commitment of budgeting ten per cent of their GDP to agriculture, and as a result 
small-scale farmers are suffering (Interview with Manana, 23 June 2015). As such, 
while actors do not directly address it in their definitions, in order to achieve food 
sovereignty, they do stress that it involves both creating alternatives outside the state, 
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but also engaging in a struggle with the state to ensure that it fulfils its obligation to the 
right to food. This can be done by unlatching the state from capital’s hold, so that it 
stops supporting corporations who are profiteering out of food, and at the same time 
destroying the environment and exacerbating hunger. Activists also suggest that the 
state supports those who are producing food sustainably and ecologically.  
 
Importantly, to achieve right to food, it entails ensuring a right for ordinary people to 
produce food, it involves supporting small-scale farmers who are practicing 
agroecology and supporting each other (Interview with Baloyi, 23 June 2015). For 
some, a precondition to achieve this right rests on better control and distribution of 
resources, particularly land (Interview with Naude, 24 June 2015; Interview with 
Mahlangu, 23 June 2015; Interview with Radebe, 23 June 2015).  
 
This leads us to the second understanding of food sovereignty, namely that it involves 
access. In South Africa where the right to produce is constantly being eroded by mining 
companies, and by lack of access to land (as a result of apartheid dispossession), this 
understanding forms an integral part of food sovereignty, such that many farmers’ 
understandings of food sovereignty focussed on control of means of production and 
inputs. While experts and community practitioners highlighted similar concerns, they 
stressed that those who want to participate in agriculture must be given a chance 
(Interview with Dube, 29 July 2015) and ought to be awarded the support they require 
(Interview with Manana, 23 June 2015). In addition, food sovereignty as restoration of 
land and production of food means restoration of dignity: 
 
‘When land is returned to the people who it has been taken from it would 
mean the restoration of our dignity, fundamentally because we have lost 
that and because it would mean once our land is returned to us then we 
will be able to live in harmony. If we can get our land back, and we do 
food sovereignty, then we can produce for the whole community and also 
for the country’ (Interview with Radebe, 23 June 2015).  
 
Actors and activists recognise that government is delaying the process of land 
distribution and further argue that support measures from government are not 
sufficient. In the face of a weakening political will of government, Naude (Interview, 24 
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June 2015) stresses that a strong activist group is key ‘if we want to fight all the battles’ 
for land and inputs. Others stress the importance of seeds and markets, highlighting 
the simple correlation between access to seeds and markets and the reduction of 
poverty (Interview with Molefe, 25 June 2016).  
 
Food sovereignty therefore also means access to inputs and markets, which is in line 
with the food sovereignty principle of valuing food producers. Access to inputs for 
producing food is viewed as integral to food sovereignty, as is the choice to produce 
food by working with nature, not against it. For farmers, food sovereignty involves 
packing away the books of chemical farming and learning to work with nature 
(Interview with Naude, 24 June 2015). For activists and experts, it involves rejecting 
GMOs and protecting seed sovereignty so that farmers have access to appropriate 
seed (Interview with Ngwenya, 24 June 2015; ACB, 2012). Food sovereignty, for those 
facing issues of water, especially in the drought also means access to water (Interview 
with Dube, 29 July 2015).  
 
Food sovereignty is when you are a farmer producing agroecology, you 
are taking your own decisions about your own seeds, about your own 
market, about your own everything.’ (Interview with Baloyi, 23 June 
2015).  
 
Access to markets for small scale farmers is another key concern as markets for them 
are currently unstable and unpredictable. In order to promote such access, activists 
stress the importance of building solidarity economy institutions, such as cooperatives 
in food production and distribution to help provide ways for local control of food 
(COPAC, 2014:15, Interview with Manana, 23 June 2015).  
 
A third understanding of food sovereignty is independence. This was stressed by most 
respondents, farmers and experts alike. For them food sovereignty involves autonomy, 
freedom to choose, and is an element of true democracy (Interview with Mahlangu, 23 
June 2015; Interview with Jali, 23 June 2015; Interview with Radebe, 23 June 2015). 
Independence can be ensured as people have freedom to choose, freedom to 
produce, and freedom to decide. This can only be ensured if there is democratic 
control of the food system, another important principle of food sovereignty stressed in 
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the literature. This principle can be promoted at both the producer and the consumer 
level. At the producer level, Via Campesina stresses that small-scale food producers 
should have direct input into formulating policies at all levels. It is clear that this does 
not happen when developing policies in South Africa, particularly with the latest Food 
Security and Nutrition policy. However, respondents did not make mention of this 
element when talking about their understanding of food sovereignty, neither did they 
make reference to the role of the state directly. Instead they commented what they are 
doing to ensure independence from the current food system, for example, by reviving 
indigenous knowledge systems, by providing agroecology training, establishing their 
own markets, sharing knowledge and resources, and by doing so creating their own 
form of freedom and democratic food systems on a smaller scale. One respondent did 
however allude to the ineffectiveness of government but did not state how to overcome 
this ineffectiveness. The reason for this could be because some have given up on the 
state due to its embeddedness in capital and unresponsiveness to small-scale farmers 
and the poor. Instead such activists find it easier and necessary to create alternative 
pathways first. Further, perhaps democratic control of the entire South African food 
system is something that individuals feel they cannot tackle on their own, and it is for 
this reason that they have established a campaign. Within the campaign at a national 
level, more democratic processes are envisioned as a participatory process of 
developing a food sovereignty act (which I discuss as a tactic in the following sections) 
is planned for 2016. This will be a symbolic means by which people can develop their 
own act through a democratic grassroots process. These processes and the act can 
serve as an important mechanism to fill the gap of the first precondition, namely the 
right to food for all people, as it has the potential (more likely in the long run – if it is 
adopted) to engage government, hold it accountable to meeting the needs of its people 
and ensuring a more food sovereign food system. This act will present the case for a 
food sovereign South Africa. Even if it is not adopted, the act will be created in a 
participatory manner, and will in effect create a democratic space for small-scale 
farmers, the poor and the hungry to voice their concerns, create policy, and thus fill an 
important gap that currently exists, in doing so it will serve as a tool that empowers 
people and communities. 
 
In addition to recognising state failure to engage in participatory processes, actors also 
recognise the inadequacy of government to support small-scale farmers and this has 
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been raised at most meetings, such that a priority for 2016 campaigning will be to 
engage government to strengthen support for small-scale farmers (this initiative can 
serve as important in filling the current gap where small-scale producers are not 
valued). 
 
At the consumer level, food sovereignty also means democracy, and doing away with 
dependency. It means not relying on handouts or bad food that is being sold at the 
shops (Interview with Naude, 24 June 2015). Ultimately it means that communities are 
able to consume the food that they have produced at a local level. While internationally 
the second generation is making great strides in ensuring that consumers have more 
choice to eat healthy food as it is produced by local farmers or by people themselves, 
the food sovereignty actors and activists in South Africa also see this as a key pathway 
to achieving food sovereignty, which for some is when ‘communities are able to sustain 
themselves for years, without depending, they will be free to make choices. They will 
begin to enjoy life with dignity’ (Interview with Mahlangu, 23 June 2015). 
  
Finally, food sovereignty is about promoting the commons and a value system that 
embodies solidarity and Ubuntu. This is best summarised by a farmer, Dube 
(interview, 29 July 2015) as he claims that food sovereignty is Ubuntu, going back to 
old traditional ways of sharing and caring for community members. In the old days’ 
people did not let their neighbours go hungry. What this means is that food sovereignty 
involves challenging the individualism that De Schutter talks about in the literature. 
This individualism has exacerbated since the penetration of market relationships into 
all areas of life, particularly food, and has accompanied the loss of critical relationships 
that humankind has with each other and with nature. Ways by which food sovereignty 
challenges this possessive individualism and consumerism is by sharing ideas, 
knowledge, land and seed, as well as traditional farming methods (Interview with 
Radebe, 23 June 2015). Sharing of knowledge is done simply by talking about issues 
of GMOs, and talking about the effect of chemical farming, as well as where our food 
comes from and what the quality of the food is (Interview with Ngwenya, 24 June 
2015). In terms of sharing land, Mahlangu (Interview on 23 June 2015) states it frankly 
when talking about commonage of land, ‘it is simple, no individuals must have control 
over hectares of land. Food sovereignty means there has to be communal ownership 
of hand. Then the community will feel a part of the economy and play a role. If this 
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happens then the number of hungry people will drastically reduce.’ Thus food 
sovereignty proposes an alternative to the individualism present in the food system 
today, and stresses instead communal control over food production and those assets 
(land, community, knowledge, support for example) that give one access to produce 
and consume culturally acceptable, nutritious food in harmony with nature.  
 
Interestingly, understandings of food sovereignty correspond with the role of the 
activist and their chief occupation. For example, food sovereignty for a farmer means 
land access and agroecology. Food sovereignty for a development practitioner in the 
land sector means equal access to land. While food sovereignty for development 
actors means democracy and independence (as opposed to dependence on 
supposed development interventions such as mines and hand-outs). As such, 
definitions of food sovereignty often align with the role of the organisations, for 
example those involved in saving seeds, or protecting seeds, it means seed 
sovereignty. Although there are varying definitions that emphasise different aspects of 
food sovereignty in South Africa, these variations expose the nature of the extent of 
the brutalities in the food system, and further reveal the need to coordinate efforts to 
fight against a system that disadvantages so many people. These broad 
understandings are in no way contradictory, but share the idea that the current food 
system is unjust, undemocratic and individualistic. The fact that people in the SAFSC 
have various definitions and understandings of food sovereignty also allow for various 
actors to converge under one umbrella of food sovereignty to attempt to pursue all of 
the food sovereignty principles.  
 
Understandings of food sovereignty also determine bias toward actions and strategy 
that are be followed by the campaign. For example, during the national assembly in 
October 2015, the question was posed to groups of what the focus of the campaign 
should be for 2016. For farmers at one of the discussion tables the focus was clear, it 
should be agroecology, for that is the main way in which farmers promote food 
sovereignty. While agroecology was not agreed on as the key campaigning priority, it 
does however fall under the four key campaigning priorities that were decided on, 
these include GMO’s awareness, support to small-scale farmers, climate change and 
a food sovereignty act, and finally a #FoodPricesMustFall campaign. Agroecology 
promotion is a concrete alternative that can address and inform all of the above issues 
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and is indeed integral to achieving food sovereignty as it forms one of the key 
principles for Via Campesina. As such, it is possible to incorporate all of these different 
understandings of food sovereignty into action plans and allow for those actors (like 
farmers promoting agroecology) and organisations to continue specialising in their 
area. However, because the nature of a campaign is to create awareness, it is also 
important that on a national level key priorities guide the campaigning initiatives 
through various strategies decided on collectively by the partners and thereafter by 
the National Coordinating Committee. These key campaigning priorities were thus duly 
accepted and thereafter the National Coordinating Committee was tasked with putting 
together a strategy and implementation plan. Before discussing these strategies, I turn 
to outline the structure of SAFSC and the various partner organisations involved. 
Importantly, I explain further who the Cooperative and Policy Alternative Center, as 
the catalyst to the campaign is, and their role in initiating the campaign.   
 
Constituency and structure of the campaign 
  
As mentioned, SAFSC is coordinated by a National Coordinating Committee and is 
comprised of partner organisations and various supporters of the campaign. I describe 
the partners and the National Coordinating Committee in this section below, but first I 
begin by explaining how all the partners came together.   
 
I have established previously that a portion of the partner organisations of SAFSC 
were invited to the right to food dialogues because of their affiliation to the Solidarity 
Economy Movement. However, interviews reveal that it was first through links with the 
Cooperative and Policy Alternative Center (COPAC), that organisations came to be 
involved in Solidarity Economy Movement and also the SAFSC. COPAC is a 
grassroots NGO that coordinates the Solidarity Economy Movement, undertakes 
activist training and schools and is also a research organisation that provides open 
access resources such as activist training guides on food sovereignty and worker 
cooperatives. In 2013, COPAC, in partnership with the Foundation for Human Rights 
undertook right to food dialogues in three provinces, Gauteng, Limpopo and North-
West to understand people’s experiences of the right to food (Bennie, 2013:17). 
Various organisations were invited to take part in these dialogues and thereafter in the 
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assembly. These organisations were those already part of the Solidarity Economy 
Movement and a host of others who would be seen as important partners in the 
campaign, particularly those working with food issues in South Africa. To ensure that 
all organisations had equal opportunity, COPAC paid for accommodation and 
transport of delegates to the assembly. At the close of the assembly, a list comprising 
of 66 organisations was drafted, these were officially recognised as partners of SAFSC 
(SAFSC, 2015c:2). COPAC has since taken on the role of the secretariat to SAFSC 
and has agreed to do this for two years. By doing so, they use their own resources to 
fund events, host national coordinating committee meetings and initiate 
communication and social media platforms. While there have been a few concerns 
about the nature of funding for the campaign and the campaign priorities, it is clear 
that COPAC does not dictate the direction of the campaign nor make final decisions. 
In addition, COPAC, as a partner organisation to the campaign makes its own funding 
contribution to the campaign, as all partner organisations are also encouraged to do. 
In this way, the issue of funding and accountability rests on each organisation and 
their funders, and no funds are handled by the National Coordinating Committee. 
While the campaign is exploring funding options, currently all projects are intended to 
be self-funded by the organisations leading them.  
 
COPAC’s role in the initiation of SAFSC is unique as there has never before been a 
campaign for food sovereignty at a national level. This thus leads one to ask the 
counter-factual question of what would have happened if COPAC had not initiated a 
national campaign? Would the Solidarity Economy Movement’s campaign have 
achieved such media attention, would the activists trained have received the training 
elsewhere, and what would have happened to the farmers who were desperate for 
solutions and who were later approached by members of the campaign with 
agroecology solutions? While the impacts of the campaign thus far have been 
profound, I discuss these in the next section, some of the connections may have 
indeed been made without the existence of the campaign, and partners would continue 
their beneficial work, but the networks that have been formed, the solidarity forged and 
expressed between a range of different people and organisations in the food space 
would not have happened without the campaign or COPAC. As such, their involvement 
has been vital and impactful.  
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What this reveals is that in South Africa where grassroots movements and 
organisations are at times weak, a catalyst is sometimes required (even an NGO) to 
initiate these grassroots processes of sharing knowledge, networking and 
coordinating. COPAC has been that vital catalyst in the national food sovereignty 
space in South Africa. Even though there exists a National Coordinating Committee 
who is responsible for carrying out the campaign priorities, without COPAC, the 
meetings and coordination, which is still dependent on COPAC, would also not 
happen. COPAC has realised the importance of their role so has agreed to carry out 
the secretariat role of the campaign for the second year running. I now discuss the 
role of the National Coordinating Committee.  
 
National Coordinating Committee 
 
A National Coordinating Committee (referred to hereafter as the Committee) was 
elected by the members present at the first assembly to be representative of various 
sectors championing food sovereignty. The initial elected Committee comprised of 
fifteen people, and was representative of the Solidarity Economy Movement, small-
scale farmers and cooperatives, the agrarian sector, environmental justice actors and 
a representative from the food price sector (SAFSC, 2015d:25). Later representatives 
from the youth and students were included in the Committee after the suggestion was 
raised at a national meeting. The Committee is tasked with the coordination of the 
campaign, facilitation of grassroots-driven actions, capacity building and 
communication. The Committee has also been given a mandate to develop and 
finalise the programme of actions for the campaign (SAFSC, 2015a:4). Since its 
election, the Committee has held meetings to discuss the campaign themes for the 
year, organise and promote the campaign. It has been transparent as it undergoes 
these processes and shares detailed minutes from its meetings with the greater food 
sovereignty community. In these minutes the Committee has been open with progress, 
challenges and finances.  
 
While it was agreed that the Committee was to work in manner that ‘builds the alliance 
across the country, in various sectors and in communities in a bottom up and 
democratic manner’ (SAFSC, 2015a:4), the extent to which this has been achieved is 
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questionable since only two small-scale farmers are represented in the committee, 
and their views may not be representative of all farmers in the campaign, thus at the 
national level the campaign is not entirely grassroots driven. This is not to say that 
grassroots voices are not heard in the planning stages of the campaign. For at the 
assembly, where the plan was drafted, representatives from over 60 organisations 
were present and had the opportunity to provide input into the strategy. It was only 
after the assembly that the Committee met to fulfil their task of putting the ideas into a 
plan of action. The same process happened at the end of the first year of campaigning. 
From my observations at these assemblies and the Committee meetings, I have 
realised that because capacity on the ground in communities and community 
organisations in South Africa is at times weak, (for example, some lack financial and 
human resources, others lack organising capacity or campaign skills, such as skills 
required to draft documents) the Committee and COPAC as the secretariat have put 
in place extra measures to include grassroots voices in the planning and campaigning. 
They have done this well through various events focussed on engaging the 
marginalised. As mentioned, this began right at the beginning with the right to food 
dialogues, thereafter through the assembly interactions, and further through various 
capacity-building initiatives, such as activist schools and learning exchange visits. The 
Committee has also planned events which create platforms for the marginalised to 
share their stories, for example at a people’s tribunal on hunger and landlessness. 
These and other inclusionary activities are discussed in more detail in the strategy 
section below. First I introduce the different types of partners in the campaign. 
 
Partners of the campaign 
 
Partners of the campaign include many of those progressive organisations introduced 
in the beginning of the chapter, such as Nkuzi Development Association, the Solidarity 
Economy Network and the African Center for Biodiversity, to name a few. These 
organisations can be categorised into three groups, each playing a vital role in the 
campaign. They include, first, organisations providing training and education for food 
sovereignty ends (even though some do not explicitly call it food sovereignty), second, 
initiatives at community level alternatives like farmers organisations and finally, 
initiatives promoting the right to food and food sovereignty. Below I discuss these 
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organisations and the activities they undertake to promote food sovereignty. Findings 
for this section come from observations from volunteering in the COPAC office and 
from campaign documents and interviews.  
 
Organisations providing training and education for food sovereignty include those 
organisations involved in urban farming and knowledge building initiatives; 
agroecology training centers; research organisations, such as the African Center for 
Biodiversity, and relief projects working in townships to promote community 
development, such as organisations like the South African Slow Food network who 
work with the youth and promote food gardens to advance sustainable food production 
(COPAC, 2014:12). Through observations and interviews I found that most 
organisations or activists provided training and education in some form. Farmers and 
farming organisations all sought to share their knowledge at the community level, to 
raise community awareness about agroecology, while some organisations working in 
the land reform sector, like Nkuzi Development Association raise awareness and try 
assist people with land reform applications and post settlement support. COPAC is 
also one of these training centers, as they provide training materials and host activist 
schools to promote food sovereignty knowledge and practice, and worker cooperative 
training as part of their contribution to the campaign.  
 
In addition, there are initiatives at community-level that also promote food sovereignty, 
including farmers’ organisations, farmers’ unions, farms that have shifted to 
agroecology, farmers’ forums which promote only organic agriculture, seed banks that 
save indigenous and heirloom seeds; and even examples of land occupations, for 
example a pastor in Pretoria who has managed to legally occupy land for growing 
crops. All of these forms of initiatives and organisations currently exist in SAFSC. 
Furthermore, since the initiation of the campaign, forums have been promoted, and 
successfully so. For example, a forum on food sovereignty and climate justice at Wits 
University was established, initiated by COPAC and is now run by students. The forum 
creates awareness around food sovereignty and climate change among university 
students, has initiated a food garden on the main campus and has had talks with 
management to negotiate setting up a food forest and other initiatives to help eradicate 
student hunger at Wits. Farmer and community forums that already existed have 
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directed discussions towards agroecology, rejecting Genetically Modified seeds and 
promoting food sovereignty education (Interview with Molefe, 25 June 2015). 
 
A final group of organisations or initiatives in the SAFSC include campaigns and 
processes such as land forums which bring together communities with similar issues: 
struggling for land and land reform; farmers’ cooperatives working to establish 
cooperatives for member farmers with the aim of establishing economies of scale for 
African emerging farmers, such as the Rooibos tea cooperative; organisations for 
organising small-scale farmers into forums; and campaigns to fast-track land reform 
such as Nkuzi; and finally legal capacities who focus attention on legal and advocacy 
work around the right to food and food related issues – for example the African Centre 
for Biodiversity, as they initiate petitions to try ban the use glyphosate, a harmful 
chemical used in pesticides; and campaigns promoting collective control over the food 
system, such as the Solidarity Economy Movement (COPAC, 2014:14). The Solidarity 
Economy Movement is a movement of particular importance to SAFSC not only 
because it had an integral part to play in the initiation of SAFSC, but also because it 
could be a key avenue through which food markets for food sovereignty ends are 
achieved. I briefly touch on its importance below.  
 
The Solidarity Economy Movement is viewed by its members and by SAFSC as an 
integral mechanism to promote food sovereignty because it aims to create new 
patterns of production, consumption and living that places human needs at the centre. 
In doing so it has the potential to provide institutions such as food producing worker 
cooperatives, producer cooperatives, consumer cooperatives and community 
marketplaces which, if functioning together, can promote a system that enables 
democracy over food (COPAC, 2014:14; Bennie, 2012:8). The potential of the 
Solidarity Economy Movement has been accepted and praised, particularly because 
it can provide alternative marketing structures for local economies and thus contribute 
to ensuring that preconditions of valuing providers and localising trade are met. 
However, in South Africa there exists a big gap in actual successful examples of 
solidarity economy initiatives, nevertheless it is one of their aims to promote worker 
cooperatives and alternative avenues for food production and retail. Some of these 
avenues do exist, for example the Ethical Co-op, an online shop for marketing and 
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selling products sourced locally from farmers and producers in South Africa, but more 
concrete examples are indeed needed to show that the alternative can and does exist.   
 
Nevertheless, as the Solidarity Economy Movement and other partner organisations, 
campaigns and actors continue to undertake their main functions, they all continue to 
promote the preconditions to food sovereignty in various ways. The networks created 
in the campaign serve to encourage them in their beneficial work, and also to inspire 
partners to include food sovereignty campaigning in their planning, which many 
organisations agree to. For example, some have agreed to host activist workshops on 
agroecology, some do exchange visits to other partners to share agroecology skills 
and knowledge, while others are encouraged to pass on the good news of food 
sovereignty, as they have learned about it at various SAFSC events, in doing so, are 
informing and equipping ordinary citizens with knowledge not only about where their 
food comes from, but also how the corporate controlled food system is causing the 
vast brutalities that they might be experiencing. Organisations are keen to undertake 
these campaigning initiatives and are excited to give feedback on their campaigning 
progress at various national events. However, the onus is on each organisation to 
carry out what they have agreed to while no monitoring measures are in place to 
ensure that this gets done. This can be a challenge for the national campaign as it is 
difficult to know the impact of interventions such as activist schools, besides from 
feedback at various events and through the communication portals, for example the 
Google group and newsletter. Furthermore, because it is difficult to track 
organisations’ activities, it is also difficult to track organisations’ support of the 
campaign. As a result, some organisations have gradually lost interest in SAFSC.  
 
Besides losing interest in the campaign, others have left the campaign for ideological 
reasons, for example, tensions with two partner organisations have evolved since the 
launch. The first was with an organisation who wrote an official letter to leave SAFSC 
because their principles did not agree with those of SAFSC. A second was with an 
individual from an organisation who tried to bring division into the campaign in order 
to secure funding for his own projects. In both instances the groups or individuals 
differed with the organisation, strategy and principles of SAFSC. Here Patel’s words 
ring true when he suggests that initially movements may have a broad definition of 
food sovereignty, under which many can advocate, however as the concept is more 
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precisely articulated, it will likely lose some of its supporters (Patel in Clapp, 2012:176). 
These are issues which the National Coordinating Committee has had to deal with, 
but have done so in a collective and transparent way by sharing these challenges with 
the broader SAFSC community, and by choosing to part ways with those organisations 
who don’t embody SAFSC principles. Below I give more examples of national and 
local strategies of the campaign and its partners.   
 
Strategy of the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign 
 
A few of the objectives, strategies and activities initially planned for the SAFSC have 
been discussed above, these include the initiatives that individual organisations 
undertake to promote food sovereignty, such as the promotion of indigenous 
knowledge, training, agroecology, as well as placing demands on corporations and the 
state and creating a food sovereignty act. These and additional objectives and 
strategies at a national level are covered in this section below as I explain the strategy, 
and the achievements of the campaign thus far. Each of these strategies also attempt 
to fill various gaps that exist in the unsovereign food system in South Africa by 
promoting food sovereignty principles in various sectors and spaces. I draw on these 
links in the strategies below, but first begin by outlining the objectives of the SAFSC.  
 
Objectives of the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign 
 
Coming out of the assembly, the objectives of the campaign were clearly articulated 
as:  
 
i) To tackle the systemic roots of hunger and the climate crisis. To confront the state, 
capital and false solutions in South Africa; 
ii) To advance food sovereignty alternatives from below to sustain life and survive the 
climate crisis; 
iii) To provide a unified platform for all sectors, movements, communities and 
organisations championing food sovereignty (SAFSC, 2015d:3).  
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Already it is clear that these objectives are radically different from other organisations 
and policy we see in South Africa that try work within the current neoliberal framework 
without challenging it, but rather taking it as a given. Instead SAFSC aims to tackle the 
unjust root of hunger by confronting the state, capital and false solutions to hunger 
that they support in South Africa. How SAFSC intends to do this is alluded to in the 
second objective, by showing that alternatives are possible and advancing those 
alternatives that promote life in the midst of a climate crisis. And finally, it is evident 
from the second and third objectives that food sovereignty campaigning is also about 
taking back power, and this can only be done by putting power into the hands of the 
marginalised, the hungry, landless and workers. 
 
To what extent the above objectives have been achieved is uncertain, however below 
I discuss progress and key activities that have been implemented to ensure these 
objectives and underlying food sovereignty principles are achieved by the national 
campaign and by partner organisations in their local communities. 
 
Call for a food sovereignty act  
 
As discussed, one of the preconditions to achieving food sovereignty according to 
SAFSC would be to develop a food sovereignty act to fill the void of legislation that 
specifically addresses the right to food in South Africa. The act would be drafted by 
the people and would include in it limitations on the corporate controlled food system, 
and affirm what is required for food sovereignty (Satgar, 2015b:3). As such, an act 
would serve to strengthen and support efforts from below while also give answers to 
questions around how to achieve food sovereignty to those on the ground. Such an 
act would serve as a basis to transform the food system and reposition the state in 
favour of food sovereignty as a systemic alternative (Satgar, 2015b:3). Importantly, 
this act would not serve as a way by which the SAFSC can gradually rid itself of its 
role, should government accept the act and try implement it. This would be a bold step 
as it was realised that government probably would not accept it. Rather, the purpose 
of the act is to serve as a campaigning tool to strengthen and support efforts from 
below. While the food sovereignty movement in Ecuador has managed to engage with 
the state to address policy around the right to food, the process in South Africa might 
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take a little longer as the SAFSC is still young. Nevertheless, developing an act is one 
step in the right direction toward creating awareness about food sovereignty and the 
responsibility that the state should be taking up to ensure its citizens have access to 
appropriate, nutritious food. This act could also be used at a later stage to engage the 
state and other progressive and non-progressive movements to promote the food 
sovereignty principle of the right to food. In the near future the process of developing 
the act and thereafter disseminating it also serves to create greater awareness about 
the food sovereignty alternative.  
 
The idea to draft an act was discussed in the provincial dialogues at the food 
sovereignty assembly and was further deliberated at the National Coordinating 
Committee meetings. Not much has been done yet in terms of developing an actual 
act, while the topic has been raised frequently at SAFSC events, it has since been 
discussed as one of the four campaigning priorities for 2016 which will be led by 
COPAC and coordinated by the Committee. Developing the act will involve a 
participatory process once again, but also include legal advice and research on the 
South African food system.  
 
Linked to the need for an act, SAFSC also tries to fill the democracy void in the South 
African food system by substantiating its requests with voices from the ground and 
with research. As such they have hosted various events to ensure that grassroots 
voices are heard, and thereafter have attempted to share the documents generated 
from these events with those in ‘powerful’ positions, such as government, corporations 
and the media. They have not always been successful though, and in such cases they 
have used the lack of the state or the media’s interest in their activities as symbolic 
actions, as I discuss in the SAFSC campaigning tactics below.  
 
Campaigning   
 
Creating awareness in the broader public about issues of hunger is one of SAFSC’s 
objectives. It does this by sharing information through petitions. For example, a petition 
on glyphosate has been shared with all SAFSC partners to take to their communities. 
Awareness raising on GMO’s on climate change has also taken place as SAFSC 
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supports marches for climate justice, for example. Plans for 2016 include developing 
awareness raising tools, such as pamphlets, infographics and a short animation film 
on the climate crisis. Another key way in which SAFSC seeks to increase the reach of 
knowledge is through campaigning initiatives. Integral to its campaigning strategies 
are activities that engage the powers in South Africa that control the food system. As 
such, some of its campaigning activities are directed at confronting the state, media 
and capital. It is argued that while doing so, support for the campaign will be garnered 
and a greater support base will ensue.  
 
Campaigning against state and corporations is encouraged at different levels. For 
example, local organisations and activists (who attend activist schools as detailed 
below) are encouraged to picket at their local supermarkets. In addition, partner 
organisations have represented SAFSC in national marches, for example against 
Monsanto – a march not affiliated with SAFSC but endorsed by them. Participants 
were encouraged to represent SAFSC in different regions of the country. Other 
campaigning is done at a national level, for example at the people’s tribunal.  
 
The people’s tribunal on hunger, food prices and land was the first nationally 
coordinated event hosted by SAFSC after the assembly. It brought together twenty-
one grassroots voices and ten experts from different parts of the country. Grassroots 
voices included women and men representing small-scale farmers, cooperatives, 
students, youth, the unemployed, retrenched workers, mining affected communities, 
waste-pickers and trade unions. The experts included researchers, academics and 
representatives from NGOs. ‘Hunger’ for those giving testimony was expressed 
differently, and included ‘genocide of the mind’, ‘the thief of our dignity’, ‘an empty 
stomach’, and ‘what the politicians refuse to see’ (SAFSC, 2015e:1).  
 
The event was a success in many respects because it achieved what it intended to, 
namely to put corporations, the state and food corporations on trial and to then hear 
the testimonies of those experiencing the ‘crimes’ that the state and corporations were 
later found guilty of perpetuating. For example, food corporations were found guilty of 
perpetuating hunger through contributing to income inequality in South Africa, for 
treating food as a commodity, through profiteering from food, price fixing, using waste 
to make profits, controlling seeds, using the media to promote fast food and industrial 
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diets, to name a few. In addition, the state was held responsible and complicit in 
perpetuating hunger by advancing neoliberal economic policies, undermining water 
resources, supporting and promoting mining and not being committed to adapting the 
food system to climate change as a result of its failing land and food policies, among 
other crimes (SAFSC, 2015e:4-5).  
 
The event can thus be regarded as a success because the guilty were put on trial and 
the voices from the ground were heard. However, the extent to which the guilty parties 
will serve their ‘trial’ and respond to the demands made to the state in the verdict 
document is still to be seen. But this was never expected. Rather a key objective of 
the tribunal was to highlight the moral bankruptcy of the state and corporations, and 
at the same time give more legitimacy to the food sovereignty struggle across the 
public. This legitimacy was achieved by inviting those with moral authority in society, 
such as representatives from faith based organisations, the Human Rights 
Commission, unions, advocacy campaigns and grassroots organisations to sit on the 
panel of judges and present the verdict. The tribunal was thus a symbolic act. This 
symbolism was further displayed in the empty chairs that were demarcated for the 
Media and government at the tribunal. Their absence which was evident to all 
symbolised the lack of concern that these actors have for the hungry. According to 
those involved, this just provides more reason to keep the campaigning alive and 
strong. Further, since the tribunal, the Human Rights Commission has taken up the 
issue of hunger as a strategic focus for future work. 
 
What the tribunal ensured is that the plight of the hungry and the complicit role of 
business and media was exposed.  Indeed, to achieve food sovereignty and its various 
principles it is important to understand that business and media are directly 
contributing to hunger. A tribunal was a unique way to reveal this at a national level. 
Further, the tribunal also served as an important starting point to usher in a new 
common sense. One that is necessary in a country where media continues to sell the 
benefits of fast food and processed diets, thus contributing to more non-communicable 
diseases. At the tribunal the SAFSC was able to paint the corporate food system as a 
villain, thus instilling a new common sense among those who attended the tribunal, 
and who read the tribunal report.  
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Some activity from the tribunal did garner media attention. For example, after the 
tribunal proceedings on the first two days, pickets at the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange and at Media houses were also held to campaign high food prices, hunger 
and landlessness. These were attended by many of the representatives at the tribunal, 
including the landless, the hungry, the farmers, and members from partner 
organisations. After the pickets, the group handed memorandums to these two parties, 
namely the JSE and the Media houses, but neither of the organisations received the 
memorandums. The pickets did still garner some media attention, as the next day an 
article was posted online from one of the media houses, entitled South Africa’s food 
system is broken – Protesters say. In this article the pickets were detailed and 
demands of the campaign were explained, for example that the ‘massive corporate 
cartels should be broken up’ (Times Live, 7.08.2015). The article did not say anything 
about the demands that were made to the media houses, however. Nevertheless, the 
campaign still aims to garner increased media attention. At the time of writing SAFSC 
has received coverage in at least eight media articles, and representatives have had 
interviews with various radio stations and online news agencies (at least eleven of 
these have been documented), as a result of its campaigning and activities.  
 
Another means by which the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign seeks to 
promote the campaign and food sovereignty principles, such as sharing knowledge, 
promoting agroecology and valuing providers, is by hosting food sovereignty festivals. 
Their first food sovereignty festival, which took place on 16 October 2015 world food 
day, celebrated food sovereignty alternatives and at the same time educated the public 
about food sovereignty. The festival included activities and learning sessions, such as 
creative campaigning workshops, agroecology training, climate change workshops 
and an exhibition to showcase food sovereignty alternatives where products, 
pamphlets, resources and pictures could be shared. The festival was open to the 
public and was attended by over 200 people. Feedback on the festival was shared at 
a Committee meeting the day after the festival, where it was highlighted that greater 
emphasis should be placed on profiling the festival the following year, so that more 
people could learn about food sovereignty. Nevertheless, feedback that people 
received from participants was that they thoroughly enjoyed the festival, that sessions 
were informative, especially about genetically modified seeds. Some people stressed 
that they would have liked to attend more sessions so suggested that the next festival 
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be held over two days (SAFSC, 2015f:7).  Another way by which the SAFSC seeks to 
achieve its objectives, namely to bring attention to the brutalities of the current food 
system and highlight failed solutions, is to critique and challenge government, 
corporations and media as I discuss below. 
 
Critique and challenge government, corporations and media 
 
SAFSC and its partners have engaged government and policy at various levels. One 
example is of the pastor in Pretoria who approached the local municipality for rights to 
occupy unused land. He drafted a document with local government officials that 
entitled him to use the vacant land, and his actions have led to others requesting the 
same document for occupation of land for farming. At a national level, SAFSC critiques 
government policy and supports plans that engage government policy, for example 
civil society commented on the National Food and Nutrition Security policy. It has 
already been very critical of this policy for not addressing the structural roots of hunger 
and for not attempting to regulate food corporations who profit from food (SAFSC, 
2015c:1). SAFSC has also critiqued the Plant Breeders Rights Bill and Plant 
Improvement Bill, which they stress, will ‘commodify local knowledge around seeds 
and indigenous plant propagation.’  
 
Plans for the second year of campaigning involve critiquing government inaction on 
support for small-scale farmers at a local and national level, and will also focus on 
petitioning against Glyphosate, as discussed previously. While critiques of national 
level policy usually involve higher levels of skill and technical expertise on the topic, it 
is usually handled by experts in the campaign. Data to support these critiques is often 
drawn from events like the hunger tribunal, or from research and experiences of 
SAFSC farmers and partners who are working on the ground in various communities 
or who themselves are affected by brutalities of the system. Another way to hear about 
people’s experiences on the ground and to encourage the sharing of these 
experiences is to bring partners together at activist schools, as I discuss below.  
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Nurturing activists through activist schools 
 
Activist schools are integral to campaign building. It was realised at a National 
Coordinating Committee meeting that the campaign should not draw organisations 
away from what they are currently doing, but it should rather complement their work, 
and bring more coordination, knowledge-building and knowledge-sharing into pre-
existing attempts to bring about food sovereignty (SAFSC, 2015b:12). In order to do 
this, it was decided that each organisation should elect one representative to take part 
in activist schools. The idea behind this was that the activist would be trained to do the 
‘politics’ and then return to their communities to ‘dynamise’ (SAFSC, 2015b:12). Two 
activist schools were initiated by COPAC during 2015. These were not novel ideas to 
COPAC as they hosted similar schools before the campaign was established, 
nevertheless the objectives of these schools did change in the context of SAFSC. 
COPAC planned, facilitated and funded the schools to ensure participation of activists 
from various parts of the country. The National Coordinating Committee and COPAC 
realised that if activists had to pay their own way, they would probably not attend due 
to lack of resources.  
 
The first activist school was attended by about 40 activists. It focussed on food 
sovereignty and agroecology. This school was aimed at creating awareness about the 
food sovereignty alternative amongst activists in the campaign and included a section 
of teaching on the origins of food sovereignty, as well as a practical module on 
agroecology. The second activist school focussed on worker cooperatives and was 
also attended by about 40 people. At this school it became clear to the activists that 
the solidarity economy movement’s institutions, such as cooperatives is a necessary 
precondition to the establishment of food sovereignty, as it offers alternative models 
for business, markets and sharing of profits. Attendees at the second school were 
convinced of the alternative, and were given the opportunity to run through the 
development of example cooperatives. Activities included developing plans for the 
initial start-up of farming worker cooperatives as well as strategising for worker 
takeovers of a factory. The programme for each school was guided by an activist guide 
which had been pre-developed by COPAC staff through a process of workshopping 
and feedback with grassroots actors, and was made freely available to the attendees. 
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The expected outcomes from the schools were thus to equip those who attended with 
skills, knowledge and resources to return to their communities and share and 
implement what they had learned, for example to share agroecology knowledge, food 
sovereignty principles, worker cooperative ideas, and to get their organisations and 
communities motivated around such ideas. In addition, the school served as a space 
for building networks and sharing knowledge between participants – this is a key 
component of the international food sovereignty movement as I discuss in detail in one 
of the sections following. Finally, the school served to equip activists with the capacity 
to return to their communities and host activist schools, and further create forums 
where they can keep the discussion going, promote the campaign and work on 
strategies in their communities that can ensure that food sovereignty principles are 
met, particularly at a local level.  
 
The success of these schools can be seen by the number of activist schools and 
forums that have been hosted by activists who attended the schools. After the first 
school, no other local schools were recorded. While attendants did stress that they 
had shared their knowledge in other ways, for example, by holding community 
meetings and using existing forums and events to share their knowledge about food 
sovereignty. This is a key way in which food sovereignty has been promoted in the 
literature and by the SAFSC, which I touch on more in the section following. This 
section merely raises the point that perhaps some partners require more assistance 
in formally sharing their knowledge in activist schools that they themselves host.  
 
After the second school some activist schools in local areas had taken place, however 
most of them occurred only with the assistance of someone at COPAC. This suggests 
that perhaps just attending one school is insufficient to learn all the skills required for 
facilitating and coordinating a similar school in one’s community. More support and 
training might thus be required before a school can be hosted. The same can be said 
for initiating forums. The forum at Wits was initiated by COPAC and thereafter students 
could take over. While another forum in Mount Frere was also established only after a 
staff member from COPAC visited that area. Nevertheless, it does show that it is 
possible to see these forums and schools take place in communities, but more support 
is first required. I discuss community forums as a tactic for building the campaign in 
more detail below.  
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Building community forums and drafting community declarations 
 
Community forums are viewed as integral to promoting food sovereignty in 
communities as they provide a means by which effective popular education can be 
conducted at the ground level. Forums are also viewed as necessary to localise the 
campaign and advance it in different communities all around South Africa (SAFSC, 
2015b:12). Currently, existing forums that farmers are already part of have been used 
successfully to share the food sovereignty knowledge with the rest of the members in 
local communities. Other farmers and organisations have since established forums to 
discuss food sovereignty and the campaign, for example the Wits university forum. In 
addition, regional forums have been initiated for greater areas, such as the Western 
Cape, and similarly in Durban, to connect food sovereignty actors and advance the 
campaign regionally. The importance of forums goes further than to merely discuss 
and promote food sovereignty alternatives, but it is also an important mechanism for 
establishing social links and platforms by which people from various backgrounds, 
cultures, classes and nodes along the food system can sit together in a meeting and 
discuss their issues, thus forging closer social ties, establishing greater sense of 
community and solidarity. Forums are not only intended for food producers to sit and 
discuss production issues, but can include conscious consumers, community 
members, youth, students, farm-workers and all people affected by the food system. 
They are thus an important mechanism to establish and promote social peace and 
social cohesion around a common cause – a necessary condition for food sovereignty 
to exist. In addition, forums are spaces for sharing indigenous knowledge, and 
importantly for planting seeds of a different way of thinking, thereby gradually ridding 
people of their indoctrinated common senses. The Wits forum has drawn in people 
who merely want to learn how to grow food and help hungry people, but in the process 
these members have been exposed to the real causes of hunger and have each 
become food sovereignty activists in their own way. Forums, if used to their full 
potential, are thus spaces to inspire a new type of social activist.  
 
It was realised by the Committee however, that not all communities currently have 
forums, nor do some partners have the capacity to establish forums in their 
communities. As such, it was agreed that a set of guidelines for setting up forums be 
created and distributed to SAFSC community. The document has been created and 
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circulated, however the extent to which the guidelines have been read is unknown as 
there are no monitoring strategies in place except to rely on feedback from the ground, 
which can at times be sparse. Establishing forums still remains a challenge for some 
communities who lack coordinating capacity, who lack resources, or are widely 
dispersed across an area of land, and logistics do not permit frequent forum meetings. 
Activist schools did address this problem to some extent as during the first activist 
school on food sovereignty, a session was set aside to discuss the creation of forums, 
and participants were asked to discuss who they could involve in their forums and 
what they would practically need to do to establish the first forum meeting, for example, 
find a venue, send an invitation etc. But even though activists have been ‘trained’ on 
how to start a forum, still very few have set up forums which suggests that there are 
stumbling blocks to establishing forums locally.  
 
Once a forum is established, facilitators are encouraged to draft community 
declarations on food sovereignty. These declarations are to be used for local 
campaigning, and sharing with local newspapers and local radio. The progress here 
is also slow as only one declaration has been submitted to be included on the SAFSC 
website, and this is one from COPAC. Perhaps tighter coordination and monitoring 
could assist with obtaining more commitments to writing community and organisational 
declarations.  
 
Sharing and building knowledge 
 
Knowledge sharing is integral to building food sovereignty in practice. It is included in 
one of the principles of food sovereignty and is key to achieving the preconditions for 
food sovereignty as argued by Akram-Lodhi. Of particular importance is the sharing of 
indigenous knowledge. Since the initiation of the first activist schools where networks 
were formed and contacts were exchanged, the campaign has seen a proliferation of 
learning exchanges between different partners in the campaign. Learning exchanges 
are brief exchanges (of usually between two to five days) that involve members from 
one partner organisation travelling to visit another organisation in their location to 
observe, in most cases farming methods, but could include seed saving, organisation 
and cooperative models. Learning exchanges are intended to develop horizontal 
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learning in SAFSC, as such partners are encouraged to share with the rest of the 
campaign what they can offer in training. Those who require training in those areas 
can then request a learning exchange. Learning exchanges aim to be self-funded, but 
where organisations cannot pay for their representatives, COPAC has offered to pay 
for transport if it has the funds. The accommodation and food is usually provided by 
the host. For example, during September 2015, farmers from Dimbaza travelled to 
Nqamakwe in the Eastern Cape to demonstrate seed saving and conduct agroecology 
training. Farmers in the greenhouse project also travelled to assist Wits students with 
the initiation of the food garden on campus. The exchange involved teaching students 
how to create raised beds for permaculture vegetable gardening. The feedback from 
these exchanges has been encouraging and those providing the exchanges and 
attending training have expressed their gratitude for the lessons learned. 
 
Other ways that SAFSC has promoted the sharing of knowledge is through hosting 
national events, for example the assembly, the activist schools, the food sovereignty 
festival as well as specific events coordinated to produce education tools, for example, 
SAFSC is in the process of developing a seed bank guide. This guide was developed 
as the need for seed-banking and seed saving became apparent, especially when it 
was observed that people are accepting government handouts consisting of hybrid 
and in some cases Genetically Modified seeds, in the absence of availability of 
traditional/heirloom seeds.  This tool was initially drafted at a seed-saving workshop 
where, under COPAC’s facilitation, various seed savers were brought together, these 
include grassroots activists who currently save seeds and have established 
community seed banks, seed savers who save seeds for a living and as a passion, as 
well as traditional seed savers. Seed saving methods, challenges and lessons were 
shared with all the participants. These methods included traditional methods of saving 
seeds, for example in clay pots, in ash and underground to keep them cool. The 
discussions were documented and are in the process of being developed into an 
activist guide that will show in simple terms and with pictures how to develop a 
community seed bank. This guide will be printed and freely distributed to communities 
to assist them set up alternatives to current seed models. It is evident, that in no way 
does the SAFSC seek to create dependency and provide unsustainable solutions. But 
rather, as it inspires new activists to adopt and support alternative food systems, it is 
indeed filling the gap that exists in South African policy, particularly as it encourages 
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going back to the old and more nutritious ways of growing food, saving food and 
sharing food. These activities seek to pave the way to a more independent food system 
for many communities.  
 
There are however those people who do not join the activist schools and do not take 
part in workshops, events or learning exchanges. These are people who are not 
presently or noticeably suffering from the broken food system, such as those in middle 
class, who still want to fight for the food sovereignty cause. These individuals and 
organisations, referred to as the second generation of food sovereignty by de Schutter 
(2015) are gradually emerging in South Africa, and include some of the 900 people 
who have liked the Facebook page, or 300 people who have subscribed to the SAFSC 
newsletter. There are also those more established NGOs who would like to remain 
updated, share knowledge, learn about indigenous food practices and get involved in 
the campaign. SAFSC has an information and communication strategy to keep all of 
these people updated in this regard, for example the Google group or Facebook page 
which provide virtual platforms for sharing information, campaign and local updates 
and knowledge. I discuss SAFSC’s communication strategy below.  
 
Communication and coordination 
 
At each national event COPAC staff ensure that a register documenting contact details 
of all the attendees is filled out. These email addresses and contact numbers are then 
entered into a database and the email addresses are also included on the campaign’s 
google-groups emailing list. This google group serves as a platform for the National 
Coordinating Committee to share meeting outcomes and major events (SAFSC, 
2015d:16). In addition, it is a platform for all those who are part of the campaign 
(individuals or organisations) to share information, events, knowledge and useful 
research. It is also a platform for people to give feedback to the wider SAFSC 
community on what they are undertaking to promote food sovereignty in their 
communities, and to send requests for training and skills development. So far the 
forum has been used for the above purposes and it has created an ideal space to 
share what has been going on in the grassroots with the rest of the campaign. 
However, not all who are party to the campaign have frequent access to the internet, 
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and some do also not have email addresses. One particular farmer who I needed to 
communicate with over email had to use the email address for the organisation she 
was affiliated with. When sending her an email it was imperative that I gave her a call 
on her cell phone to notify her that I had sent the email. Thereafter she would have to 
travel to the office to retrieve her email, this journey would sometimes only happen a 
couple days later. The National Coordinating Committee has recognised these 
challenges and tries to overcome them by providing training on setting up email and 
social media accounts. For those who do not have access to emails, the Committee 
makes sure that at each event, everyone is provided with the latest reports and 
newsletters in print form. Because of the challenge with internet (which I will address 
in more detail later), the chief way by which COPAC and the National Coordinating 
Committee communicate with actors on the ground for coordination and follow up 
purposes, is by cell phone.  
 
The campaign also uses social media, such as Facebook and Twitter and has recently 
developed a South African Food Sovereignty Campaign webpage. The Facebook 
page is maintained by various people in the National Coordinating Committee who are 
encouraged to post information and events that pertain to the food system and 
SAFSC. The campaign has also developed a webpage for profiling organisations, 
activists, and sharing resources on food sovereignty, agroecology, land reform and 
climate change, for example. These methods of sharing information have been 
referred to as the ‘cyber commons’ in which information flows are used to build 
knowledge, share experiences, problem solve and promote popular education 
(Satgar, 2015b:3). This platform has been very successful in drawing in the second 
generation for food sovereignty and in sharing about food sovereignty alternatives and 
information. However, the extent to which those on the ground have access to internet 
is unknown. While statistics on internet usage in South Africa for 2013 suggest that 
40.9 per cent of households in South Africa had at least one member who had access 
to or used internet either at home, work, place of study or internet café’s, other findings 
suggest that there are however some households, 6.3 per cent who do not have 
access to landlines or cell phones at all (StatsSA, 2014:51). In the campaign there are 
a number of partners from communities who do not have access to all of the 
communication methods that SAFSC makes use of, particularly internet sources. This 
has been evident at activist schools when the question has been asked of who is on 
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Twitter or Facebook. Usually not more than a third of the people present raise their 
hands. This is why partner organisations, who are embedded in communities are 
integral to the campaign, for they can be the mouthpiece for the campaign in areas 
that the campaign’s key communication methods do not reach. They can further serve 
as a mouthpiece for those affected by hunger who currently have no voice. As such, 
the cyber commons has the potential to be a vital platform for partners to tell the 
second generation the stories of those in South Africa who are suffering most from the 
brutalities in the system, but have no means to let their voices be heard.  
 
Growing the network and keeping the momentum going 
 
Currently each campaigning initiative is aimed at growing the network, as people in 
communities attend workshops and forum meetings, as partners continue their work, 
as individuals take part in dialogues for developing the food sovereignty act, or as they 
join in to picket at local supermarkets to campaign for #FoodPricesMustFall. All of 
these initiatives are aimed at creating awareness and garnering support for the 
campaign. Support for the campaign thus far has been positive, as is evident by 
feedback at assemblies and attendance at the food sovereignty festival. However, as 
crises in South Africa deepen, and as the brutalities in the food system become more 
pronounced, the campaign may potentially garner even more support. In the event 
that this happens, it is important that coordination is strong, that roles between the 
partners are clear and that partners or new members know how to get involved. This 
will also ensure that duplication of efforts is prevented. Further, it is important that 
through these processes more capacity is built on the ground so that exchange visits, 
which are currently very successful strategies of the campaign, can become the next 
tool for learning how to lead activist schools, initiate forums and start worker 
cooperatives. In this way it won’t be the task of COPAC staff alone to support the start-
up of such initiatives.  
 
Communication and a media strategy is also a key for keeping the momentum going, 
both with the grassroots actors and with the second generation of food sovereignty. 
However, in order to keep this communication going, as stressed, follow up and 
feedback is key so that all parties can learn and be encouraged by activities that are 
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taking place. For example, sharing about a picket against food prices in Cape Town, 
might spur on people in Gauteng to do the same, and in turn encourage people in rural 
areas to follow suit. Such events and learning exchanges do not have to depend on 
the support from COPAC and will allow the campaign to take off in various local spaces 
across the country. Furthermore, growing the network also entails reaching out to 
other small-scale farmers, progressive organisations who are working in the food 
system, community forums and even trade unions, by introducing the campaign to 
these parties and inviting them to get involved. This task is not only the duty of COPAC 
or the National Coordinating Committee, but partners would ideally also be equipped 
to promote the food sovereignty principles in South Africa, share the knowledge food 
sovereignty and the importance of the SAFSC in their communities. As such, an 
important thrust of SAFSC, as it tries to build the campaign, is to educate and 
strengthen capacity of local actors and activists in SAFSC. Thereafter the campaign 
and various food sovereignty initiatives can grow organically among the first and 
second generation of food sovereignty actors and activists who, in their own, diverse 
and important ways promote the principles of food sovereignty, thereby dealing with 
the gaps that current solutions to hunger in a food unsovereign South Africa fail to 
address.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have discussed what food sovereignty means to different actors in 
SAFSC. While it is clear that understandings between actors differ, they are 
nevertheless complimentary. Furthermore, there are a few understandings that make 
SAFSC’s approach unique, such as emphasis on the solidarity economy and a large 
emphasis on land as a physical but also symbolic asset which can restore a whole 
community’s dignity and independence. Just as food sovereignty understandings are 
unique in South Africa, I argue too that the two generations of food sovereignty 
proposed by de Schutter (the first, supposedly the rural actors and the second, the 
conscious consumers), have not taken the same course as in other countries. For 
example, in South Africa we have not witnessed the rise of the first generation of food 
sovereignty actors as it happened in La Via Campesina and we have also not seen 
groups of peasants and landless people taking back their land in swathes, nor have 
141 
 
we seen people challenging the government collectively from across the country to 
demand the right to food. What we have seen is both the first and the second 
generation of food sovereignty emerging together, in response to a brutal food system. 
Further, while pockets of resistance in South Africa have been documented, for 
example in the Food Sovereignty Campaign in the Western Cape, this action needed 
to first be initiated by an NGO, the Surplus People Project who, with experts and 
facilitators were able to undertake a popular education process.  
 
In South Africa we have also seen the existence of organisations that offer support to 
communities through land reform processes, while others educate neighbours in 
agroecology and picket against Monsanto, these too have been initiated by community 
based NGO’s who are investing in educating the people. These actions, while isolated 
to some extent have not garnered the necessary support to take back the power from 
the corporate food regime or the required support from government. Furthermore, 
these actions did not arise out of nowhere. They were often preceded by popular 
education strategies. Arguably, because of the conditions on the ground in South 
Africa, it was popular education that stimulated people to think about how to address 
their problems and thus march to government and demand land; it was a community 
practitioner sharing knowledge of agroecology that inspired the community to initiate 
agroecology household gardens. It was also possibly a post on Facebook about the 
unknown effects of GM maize that inspired a group of people to attend a local march 
against Monsanto.  
 
In South Africa the brutalities of the food system have created an environment in which 
the people are suffering, but all people are not yet vexed. In many cases food handouts 
from the Food Bank which is supported by Pick ‘n Pay and Pioneer foods (who I have 
shown and SAFSC partners argue, are key perpetrators of hunger) are keeping people 
from rupturing the very system that gives them the handouts. What research into food 
sovereignty in South Africa has shown, however, is that people require information to 
break the myths of the food system and make them aware that their problems are not 
unique to their situations, but rather that the structure of the food system in South 
Africa is ravaging more than thirteen million of its people, destroying the environment, 
causing a nutrition transition and pushing out small-scale farmers. It is for this reason 
that a campaign for food sovereignty arose and is necessary in South Africa, to 
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educate, encourage, and motivate grassroots activists and ordinary citizens. And while 
only a campaign for food sovereignty at a national level might not be able to achieve 
huge shifts in government policy or implementation for that matter (not that it cannot 
achieve this), it will be able to educate South African citizens, form networks of 
solidarity, and showcase alternatives as it already is doing. Through these three 
activities power will gradually be put back in the hands of the people, the hungry and 
the small-scale farmers. Perhaps together, the emerging second and first generation 
of food sovereignty in South Africa, if coordinated well, will be able to take back the 
power over the food system.  
 
Some might remark that the SAFSC initiative has no place in grassroots food 
sovereignty movements because it was not initiated by the so-called first generation 
of landless peasants. However, I argue that while the campaign did not emerge as a 
grassroots action, initiated solely by peasants and landless communities, it was 
inspired by their challenges, their voices and their alternatives. Importantly the 
campaign was also inspired by a crisis ridden, unjust, unsafe and unsustainable South 
African food system, a system that creates vast brutalities to the South African 
population. The right to food dialogues and the Food Sovereignty Assembly ensured 
that the voices of those most affected by the broken system were heard. Furthermore, 
I argue that the SAFSC doesn’t claim to be a movement, but merely a campaign, which 
is finite in nature, and which is making great strides in the radical food space (perhaps 
greater than some radical movements in South Africa have done since the end of 
apartheid). This is because, first it is directed at a national level and second, because 
as the principles of food sovereignty are followed, the preconditions are pursued, the 
gaps in the current approaches to hunger can gradually be bridged; gaps which were 
not evident by the food security framework in South Africa, thus gaps which might not 
have otherwise been filled. Furthermore, there is no fixed definition of what food 
sovereignty should entail, as such the campaign in South Africa is free to take on any 
form it wishes, driven by grassroots voices. This is one of the beauties of food 
sovereignty; it does not prescribe, but merely proposes principles. As the SAFSC is 
emerging in South Africa, I have shown how it is attempting to uphold and promote 
these principles.  
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At the outset of this research, literature stressed that in every context, the way in which 
food sovereignty is understood and practised is different. In this chapter I have outlined 
the characteristics of food sovereignty and I have also shown how South Africa is 
different. There is a final way in which South Africa differs, however, and it is in the 
way that the first generation did not inspire the second, but instead, international 
examples of movements in other parts of the world have inspired the need to educate 
both the first and second generation of food sovereignty activists and ordinary citizens 
who are emerging somewhat simultaneously as a result of the campaign and its 
partner organisations, but ultimately as a result of the worsening brutalities in the 
South African food system.  
 
In this chapter I have shown how food sovereignty is emerging in South Africa, as a 
campaign, supported by various actors in the food system, employing strategies 
learned from food sovereignty movements internationally, while it experiments with 
and refines its own local versions too. Ultimately, and this is where its greatest links 
are with the rest of the international food sovereignty community, food sovereignty in 
South Africa is inspired by the desire to transform the current food system into one 
which is more just, equitable and sustainable for all. I now turn to conclude this 
research in the following chapter by highlighting strengths and challenges of SAFSC 
and its potential to fulfil the food sovereignty principles in a very food unsovereign 
South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
A brutal and broken food system 
 
The food system is broken, brutal and unsustainable. I have shown this in preceding 
chapters, in both the literature and in the chapters on the South African food system. 
The brutalities that the food system deals out to nature are harsh and debilitating, 
creating a habitat for further disaster in the world as we run out of years of farming in 
our soils, as we poison water systems and air, and as the industrial food system 
contributes to climate change. The brutalities that the food system deals out to humans 
are equally as harsh. Obesity, malnourishment and undernourishment are all 
associated with inadequate, modernised diets. These modernised diets and the 
systems that have created them have turned food, once a natural endowment, into an 
industry for profit.  
 
This research has described these brutalities as they play out in the South African food 
system, highlighting too that the current policies and programmes in place to address 
hunger have not provided the necessary solutions to eradicate it. This is evident not 
only in the shocking figures that reveal that almost half of the population is either 
hungry or at risk of hunger, but also in the assessment where I have revealed where 
South Africa remains food unsovereign in many respects, particularly as power in the 
food system rests in the hands of a few. This powerlessness of the majority has given 
rise to not only devastating hunger, but has also necessitated a systemic alternative, 
one birthed out of crisis, namely food sovereignty. Food sovereignty, an alternative 
that is taking root in South Africa, has not been given sufficient attention nor study, 
and it is for this reason, among other rationales described in the introduction, that I 
chose to focus on the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign as a case study.  
 
In this chapter I briefly discuss key findings from my study on food sovereignty in South 
Africa and further elaborate on the potential of the SAFSC to overcome systemic roots 
of hunger. As I have established in Chapter 6, the objectives of the SAFSC are broadly 
to tackle the systemic roots of huger, to advance food sovereignty alternatives and 
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provide a unified platform to champion food sovereignty and ultimately the 
preconditions of food sovereignty. Now that my first research question has been 
answered, and the food system in South Africa has been broadly contextualised and 
assessed (Chapter 4), and I have revealed that it does not realise principles of food 
sovereignty and thus that it is food unsovereign (Chapter 5), I seek to delve deeper 
into answering my second research question. I have shown what food sovereignty in 
South Africa looks like, in the form of the nascent South African Food Sovereignty 
Campaign (Chapter 6). However here I conclude this research by assessing how 
SAFSC is contributing to meeting its objectives and ultimately the preconditions to 
food sovereignty in South Africa. I do this to compare their approach and strategies in 
South Africa, with those in the literature, but also to draw out strengths and challenges 
of the South African interpretation and practice of food sovereignty. 
 
A brutal and broken South African food system 
 
In chapter four I described the causes of hunger in not only the corporate food regime, 
but also in the legacy of colonialism and apartheid. Together these legacies and the 
current neoliberal policies are inflicting a range of brutalities on the South African food 
system. As described above, these have dire impacts for the environment and for 
people. As a result of these brutalities facing South Africans, solutions to hunger are 
proliferating, in the form of relief packages, technical fixes, fortification of staple foods, 
food banks and social assistance, to name a few. What many of these solutions fail to 
address, however, is the marked power imbalance in the food system, and as a result 
hunger is exacerbated. Despite these attempts, still thirteen million people are hungry.  
 
The effects of this hunger in South Africa include proliferation of suffering, 
hopelessness, despair, and loss of dignity. Ultimately an effect of hunger is 
powerlessness and is caused by a lack of democracy in the food system not only to 
access food, but also to protect oneself and those one loves. What this further leads 
to is social unrest, violence and division as individuals and communities struggle to 
fulfil their most basic needs, and resort to alternative measures out of desperation.  
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Solutions in South Africa are failing because they merely promote this unjust and brutal 
system by enabling the powerful agribusiness and corporations to remain in power. 
Many of these solutions are also one dimensional, looking to the condition, namely 
hunger and trying to ameliorate it, without exploring the deeper structural causes of 
hunger, such as the scarcity of democracy in the food system. In South Africa this 
system is undemocratic, as is evidenced by the government’s support for corporate 
investors, industrial agriculture and ultimately for economic growth, at the expense of 
small-scale farmers, the hungry and the unemployed.  
 
As such, the South African government, with its obligation to ensure that every citizen 
has the right to food, is doing the very opposite as it gives in to the powers at play in 
the food system, and as it further embeds itself in the neoliberal food policies, which 
are deeply connected to the international food system as Friedman and McMichael 
have shown. While some policies and programmes are important and necessary in 
the current broken food system, for example hunger relief packages for people who 
would otherwise be starving, or vitamin A supplementation for infants who presently 
have no access to alternative sources of vitamin A, other interventions are not as 
beneficial, and despite the proposed progress they boast, they will actually contribute 
to further hunger and environmental degradation in the long run. These include the 
promotion of the green revolution for Africa and drought resistant GM maize. At the 
same time certain policies are fundamentally lacking, such as those that might include 
adequate measures to police the food system, prevent corporations from colluding to 
profiteer from hunger, and promote a more equal spread of power in the food system.  
 
Aside from the policy content, most policies and plans to address hunger are dogged 
by political controversy, maladministration, corruption, inadequacy, lack of 
coordination between departments and importantly lack of political will and public 
consultation. As a result of failing policy at the national level, scepticism about the 
government’s will and ability to address pressing social issues is growing; as are 
additional solutions to address hunger proliferating. These include solutions by 
business and civil society that include many of the same strategies that government 
is employing. 
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When evaluating the South African food system according to food sovereignty 
principles and preconditions it becomes evident that there remain many gaps in policy 
and practice by both government, civil society and business. Despite these numerous 
efforts, brutalities persist, diseases proliferate, the land picture remains skewed, small-
scale farmers lack support and disregard for biodiversity by the industrial agriculture 
model continues in pursuit of economic growth. Furthermore, the hungry still lack 
power and choice over their food, children continue to be undernourished, and social 
peace is increasingly being disrupted. After taking a stark look at where we are, it 
becomes evident that South Africa is still desperately food insecure, additionally it is 
food unsovereign, and there are many areas in which alternative solutions are required 
to address inequality in the system.  
 
Therefore, in the face of the failure of government, and cynicism linked to their inaction, 
and in the face of failure of business and social movements alike, coupled with greater 
suffering and brutalities in the food system, alternatives to mainstream solutions are 
taking root. These alternative solutions do not look to the problematic food regime for 
ameliorative fixes, but instead seek to create a new regime, by fundamentally 
transforming the current unjust one. The corporate regime, as literature shows, has 
given rise to its nemesis, and this nemesis is emerging in South Africa too, where one 
of its embodiments is in the SAFSC. 
  
The South African Food Sovereignty Campaign 
 
In this research report I explored food sovereignty alternatives in South Africa and 
revealed how and why the South African Food Sovereignty Campaign emerged. The 
key triggers for its emergence thus include the range of brutalities and crises in the 
food system, while the key reason for its emergence is highlighted in one of its 
objectives, namely ‘to provide a unified platform for all sectors, movements, 
communities and organisations championing food sovereignty’ (SAFSC, 2015d:3), in 
the face of such crises. Besides the fact that it uses the food sovereignty framework 
to address hunger, there are a few other key characteristics that make the SAFSC’s 
approach to addressing hunger different from government and civil society. I discuss 
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these below and comment too on how these characteristics and strategies help 
achieve food sovereignty principles as described in the literature. 
 
The food sovereignty approach is different 
 
First, the SAFSC makes use of a participatory and grassroots approach to addressing 
hunger. This approach was implemented even before the campaign was launched at 
the right to food dialogues as representatives from across the food system were given 
the opportunity to discussed the main issues that faced them in relation to food, land 
and agriculture. This process continued at the launch of the campaign where group 
discussions on most issues were held for people to voice their opinions, concerns and 
key needs of a campaign. The hunger tribunal also gave voice to the hungry, landless, 
farmers and experts alike. Not only are voices heard in the campaign at an ideas level, 
but learning processes, activist schools and exchange visits led by grassroots activists 
in their communities are also a key approach. While the capacity of grassroots activists 
at some levels is missing, there has been tremendous growth in this regard as people 
share experiences and knowledge through learning exchanges. This is certainly unlike 
the top-down government approach that keeps people dependent on government 
support. Instead these approaches empower partners in the campaign, who thereafter 
empower people in their communities, with the aim of putting the power back into their 
own hands.  
 
As the campaign promotes participation, they are able to address the problem of 
representivity and delegation of powers, for ‘it is in participating that everyone 
represents themselves’ (MST in Patel, 2007:207). And through the delegation of 
powers, the SAFSC begins to practice the food sovereignty principle of democratic 
control and local decision making. Democratic control in the food system, as alluded 
to in chapters 4, 5 and 6 means that people (particularly producers) have a say in the 
policies that govern the food system. A big barrier to achieving this principle is that 
government policies do not allow this participation and the prospects of them allowing 
it, or accepting alternative solutions outside of its neoliberal framework are dire. 
Nevertheless, what the SAFSC can do is provide alternative avenues through which 
the voices of the hungry, the farmers and other people in the food system can be 
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heard. It aims to do this in 2016 by developing the food sovereignty act through 
participatory processes. While it is expected that the act may not have any teeth to 
influence government, the act and the process by which it is developed is aimed at 
providing a symbolic and powerful example of what the people want, as opposed to 
what the state wants for the people. It further provides legitimacy to the food 
sovereignty act, as it will be developed by those who are suffering from the system.  
 
By opening up the process to discuss the act and other campaign strategies, the 
SAFSC is attempting to meet an additional precondition, namely that food providers 
are being heard, valued and supported. Food providers currently do not receive 
adequate support from government. This is because their needs are not taken into 
consideration when policy is drafted, and also because policy is not carried out 
effectively (particularly land reform, support to small-scale farmers and post settlement 
support, for reasons I have discussed in the report). A prime example of uncoordinated 
and lacking government support is of the farmers who sought advice from a SAFSC 
partner when they had received farming implements from the government even though 
they lacked land to farm on.  
 
The SAFSC approach thus differs from government’s approach because it places 
value on small-scale farmers over industrial agriculture. The government’s support 
goes the other way. The SAFSC further seeks to support small-scale farmers as a 
campaigning priority for 2016 as they engage with the state and highlight state failure. 
However, in this approach lies a major barrier to success, namely the state’s fixation 
on neoliberal policies and their belief in industrial agriculture. Overcoming this 
challenge might require more bargaining power than what the SAFSC currently has, 
as such a key aim is to grow the campaign, both the first and second generations, as 
they expose the brutalities of the current farming model and the importance of sourcing 
locally and supporting local small-scale producers. At the same time the SAFSC is 
promoting alternatives and supporting small-scale farmers by encouraging the sharing 
of agroecological farming practices, knowledge, seeds and seed-saving techniques 
between the more successful farmers and those who lack skill, resources or 
motivation. Motivation for these farmers is indeed important in a system where they 
may have become despondent due to the lack of state support, lack of access to 
markets and increasingly unpredictable rainfall patterns, for example. These farmers 
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often need to be shown that there is hope. Without this crucial step, food sovereignty 
will remain in isolated pockets across the country, not reaching its potential to change 
the food system at large. By promoting alternatives and supporting and motivating 
small-scale farmers, additional principles of food sovereignty are met, which I discuss 
below.  
 
The food sovereignty framework differs from state and business’ approach because it 
is not fixated on economic wealth and profit. While the state and even business 
approaches seek the most economical solutions to hunger, that either promote sales 
(for business) or require the least effort (like staple food fortification), or where 
approaches might contribute to economic growth, these are favoured over the actual 
needs of people, and over the biodiversity of the environment. The importance of 
economic development over protection of natural resources and human livelihoods is 
evident in the land grabs, mining agreements and the displacement of populations 
from these areas, as well as the environmental degradation of areas surrounding 
mining sites, all of which is endorsed by the state. The importance of economic 
development over protection of natural resources and human health is also evident in 
the state’s support for large scale agriculture which uses genetically modified seeds 
and glyphosate, a potential human carcinogen. In effect the state and business are 
promoting an unsafe and unsustainable food system. The SAFSC on the other hand 
supports and practises a completely different approach as it works with nature by 
promoting and sharing the practice of agroecology among its partners and their 
communities, and as it promotes values of human solidarity, democracy, equality and 
further promotes the commons of land, food, seed and resources. Neither of these 
values or principles can be viewed by a state or a business embedded in a neoliberal 
system that is trying to uphold a food system that caters to profit, capital and 
international trade agreements to promote economic growth. It is for this reason that 
food sovereignty actors seek a fundamental change to the system too.  
 
Finally, the SAFSC does not give handouts in the form of aid, or supposedly more 
‘expert’ knowledge (except for popular education for example to debunk myths and 
share hidden information about GMOs and glyphosate). Rather, the SAFSC seeks to 
use the capacity that exists in communities and in organisations to strengthen them 
so that together, partners in the campaign can build alternative power from below in 
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the food system. This power is different from that of the government or business’ 
because no elite minority or person has control over it. 
 
The challenge in this approach, however, is that currently power is very deeply 
entrenched in the capitalist system, and everyone’s (including the activist’s lives) are 
implicated in it. Dealing with the state and corporates and taking back the power 
requires that alternatives must exist and be present, first to convince others that it is 
possible, but second to fall back on something, should the corporate food regime be 
dismantled (and when the years of farming in the commercial farms’ soil run out). As 
such, the SAFSC recognises that building food sovereignty is a process. It is not a 
programme that can be simply implemented to achieve an ideal South Africa by 2030 
as the Growth and Development Strategy aims to do. Rather it is a process of gradually 
taking back power, building social cohesion, bridging racial divides, and struggling for 
a common cause, by sharing knowledge and resources, and importantly building a 
new common sense.  
 
The above characteristics of the food sovereignty alternative in South Africa, as 
embodied by the SAFSC and its partners are in many respects similar to the 
international movement as they promote the broad food sovereignty principles to some 
extent, while the barriers and context in which the principles are pursued do indeed 
differ. I turn now to discuss a few ways in which the SAFSC’s approaches, strategies 
and practices differ from the international sphere. These differences are due to the 
SAFSC’s context in time and place in South Africa.  
 
The South African Food Sovereignty Campaign is different 
 
The SAFSC’s expression in South Africa also differs from the international expressions 
in key ways. First because it promotes the solidarity economy – to build alternatives 
to the state and the corporate profit driven model. While the solidarity economy has 
been recognised as beneficial for food sovereignty in other countries, the links and 
potentials have not yet been explored in the literature. Nevertheless, the solidarity 
economy has the potential to offer the much needed alternatives in the South African 
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contexts where expressions of Ubuntu have not yet been lost, and where individuality 
is plaguing societies and leading to outbreaks of xenophobia for example.  
 
A second key way in which the SAFSC differs from international examples is that it 
was not inspired by a first generation of food sovereignty activists. Rather the first and 
second generation of food sovereignty activists are emerging somewhat 
simultaneously in South Africa, and supporting each other as they do so. The 
brutalities in the food system are partly the cause of this simultaneous emergence. 
This is because it is no longer only peasants who are feeling threatened by a more 
commercialised, globalised and industrialised food system, but entire populations too 
are increasingly being exposed to its brutalities. From the wealthy who are continually 
being marketed more modernised diets, to the middle class who feel the squeeze of 
increasing food prices, to the poor who are exploited in farms and supermarkets for a 
wage that hardly affords them GM staple foods, to the hungry, who are altogether left 
out of the system. Both generations are implicated too in a nutrition transition, the 
harmful effects of climate change and environmental degradation. The relation 
between these two generations is still in its early stages, nevertheless bonds are being 
forged and solidarity expressed as the second uses social media and other 
communication tools to share the struggles of the first generation, and as the first 
generation works in ethical ways to feed the second generation locally.  
 
A final way in which the SAFSC version of food sovereignty differs from international 
expressions is the way in which it emerged with COPAC as the catalyst. While 
international examples, for example MST, emerged among rural peasants 
experiencing ongoing land dispossession in Latin America, in South Africa, first the 
SPP expression and then the SAFSC have seen external NGOs take on the 
responsibility of undertaking popular education, facilitating discussions (such as the 
right to food dialogues), establishing the need, and thereafter supporting the initiation 
of the campaign and maintaining its development. This SAFSC is further empowering 
both generations to take on the struggle for food sovereignty. Therefore, because of 
the weakness of social movements in South Africa, NGO’s like COPAC have had to 
take on a coordinating role, and may need to continue doing so until another 
organisation steps up to the task, or ultimately until forces on the ground are able to 
maintain the campaign on their own.  
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Above I have shown how food sovereignty is playing out in South Africa, in ways that 
are both similar and different to the international experiences. I have also shown how 
the SAFSC is trying to overcome challenges as they aim to achieve various principles 
and preconditions of food sovereignty. Finally, in this section below, I discuss the 
potential that the SAFSC has to transform the food system in South Africa. These 
potentials exist in two important strengths of the campaign and its ideology, namely 
unity in diversity, and the framework it uses to address hunger, namely food 
sovereignty.    
 
Strength and potential of the SAFSC 
 
There are many strengths of the SAFSC, however here I mention two of its key 
strengths and potentials to alter the South African food system. The first strength is in 
the ability of the campaign to unite various actors in the civil society, environmental, 
and food related spaces in South Africa. These connections break racial and class 
divides, encourage solidarity between different actors and facilitate a process of 
learning and sharing of knowledge and experiences. When asking actors and activists 
about any challenges they may perceive in bringing unity and vision to a campaign 
with so many different actors and organisations, they did not hesitate to answer that 
this was not a challenge, but rather a strength of the campaign as it is in unity that they 
are able to build power and challenge the current system; a system that is in desperate 
need of changing before it gains more ground and inflicts further damage. This leads 
to the second strength.  
 
Second, and this should be clear from the literature, an important strength of the 
SAFSC is in the framework used to address hunger, namely the food sovereignty 
framework. As Bové and Dufour (2011:168) suggest, the strength of the food 
sovereignty movement is that it differs from place to place. Since conditions in the food 
system differ from place to place, as I have shown in my research, its solutions in 
South Africa also ought to be very specific to the context. The SAFSC is pursuing 
contextual relevance in its solutions as it ensures representativeness from people 
across the food system. Furthermore, and this is where the SAFSC is inherently similar 
with the broader international food sovereignty movement, in that it is not working 
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within the current unjust food regime, but is rather building a new one. Food 
sovereignty actors and activists in South Africa realise that the current food system is 
beyond repair, so in their activities, strategies and campaigning, they try forge a new 
way, imagining alternatives, demonstrating and teaching these alternatives, while at 
the same time exposing the myths maintained by the corporate food regime. In doing 
so they aim to bring an end to the food system.  
 
I conclude the research with the following song, which was sung at the hunger tribunal. 
This song clearly and simply sums up the last point, the research and the mission of 
the nascent South African Food Sovereignty Campaign,  
 
What a system 
what a system 
what a system, what a crime; 
We can’t mend it 
we must end it 
End it now, and for all time (Author unknown) 
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APPENDIX 1 – Interview schedules 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 Organisation and role:  
1. What do you farm, for how long have you been established here? 
2. How did you/your organisation become part of the SA Food sovereignty campaign?  
 
Understanding of food system 
3. What are the biggest challenges you face as a producer of food in the current food 
system? 
4. Why do you think you face these challenges?  
5. Is the situation getting better or worse and why? 
 
 Understanding of food sovereignty and the farmer/ organisation’s role in promoting it 
6. What is food sovereignty, and what does it mean to you as a farmer? 
7. How does food sovereignty challenge the way food is produced, distributed and 
consumed in your country and in your occupation/position in the food chain? 
8. What are the most significant challenges or difficulties in your area in efforts to 
implement food sovereignty? 
9. Who else is working towards food sovereignty in your area? Are there other farmers 
or organisations? Are some more successful than others? If so, why? 
10. What are the most significant activities and strategies to promote food sovereignty 
that you/your organisation is engaging in? And which are most successful? Have you 
had failures, and if so, what led to these? 
Name: ___________________________ Occupation/position: 
____________________________ 
Date: ____________________________ Place: 
__________________________________ 
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11. What kinds of conditions have to exist for the successful implementation of food 
sovereignty? How are governments, local and national responding to the call for food 
sovereignty? 
12. What does food sovereignty mean for rural farming communities? 
13. What does food sovereignty mean for the environment?  
14. What does food sovereignty mean for health and nutrition?  
15 What does food sovereignty mean for local economies? i.e. how does it promote 
feeding local communities? 
16. What does food sovereignty mean for land issues and land reform? 
17. A large number of organisations are represented in the food sovereignty campaign 
in South Africa, and each is working on the concept of food sovereignty in a number 
of ways. What are the challenges in working together, considering distinct cultures and 
agricultural practices? How do you work together considering this diversity? 
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 Organisation and role:  
1. What does your organisation do, and what is your role in this organisation? 
2. How did you/your organisation become part of the SA Food sovereignty campaign?  
 
 Understanding of food sovereignty and the organisation’s role in it 
3. What is food sovereignty, and what does it mean to you/ your occupation/ your 
organisation? 
4. How does food sovereignty challenge the way food is produced, distributed and 
consumed in your country and in your occupation/position in the food chain? 
5. What are the most significant challenges or difficulties in your area in efforts to 
implement food sovereignty? 
6. Who else is working towards food sovereignty in your area? And are some 
organisations more successful than others? If so, why? 
7. What are the most significant activities and strategies to promote food sovereignty 
that you/your organisation is engaging in? And which are most successful? Have you 
had failures, and if so, what led to these? 
8. What kinds of conditions have to exist for the successful implementation of food 
sovereignty? How are governments, local and national responding to the call for food 
sovereignty? 
9. What does food sovereignty mean for the objectives of your organisation? 
10. What does food sovereignty mean for the environment?  
11. What does food sovereignty mean for health and nutrition?  
INTERVIEW GUIDE for EXPERTS 
Name: ___________________________ Occupation/position: 
____________________________ 
Date: ____________________________ Place: 
__________________________________ 
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12 What does food sovereignty mean for local economies? i.e how does it promote 
feeding local communities? 
13. What does food sovereignty mean for land issues and land reform? 
14. A large number of organisations are represented in the food sovereignty campaign 
in South Africa, and each is working on the concept of food sovereignty in a number 
of ways. What are the challenges in working together, considering distinct cultures and 
agricultural practices? How do you work together considering this diversity? 
  
